[continued from previous message]

B. What restrictions are appropriate?

[48] The AGC asks that Mr. Turmel be required to obtain
leave before instituting new proceedings in this Court. In
addition, the AGC proposes that this Court:
(a) make leave conditional on payment of Mr. Turmel's
outstanding costs;
(b) prohibit Mr. Turmel from preparing court materials or
assisting others with their proceedings; and
(c) order that no proceedings be instituted using materials
prepared by Mr. Turmel, except with leave.

[49] This Court has plenary jurisdiction to impose
additional requirements as may be necessary to prevent
abuses of process (Ubah at para 44; Canada (Attorney
General) v Fabrikant, 2019 FCA 198 [Fabrikant] at para 2).
Vexatiousness comes in many shapes and sizes, and each
vexatious litigant may require the Court to impose different
measures (Fabrikant at para 45): In cases such as this, a
vexatious litigant order should try to do the following:
- Bar vexatious litigants from litigating themselves,
litigating through proxies, and assisting others with their
litigation.
- Rule on the issue whether the vexatious litigant's
pending cases should be discontinued; if so, describe the
manner in which they may be resurrected and continued.
- Prevent the Registry from spending time on
unnecessary communications and worthless filings.
- Permit access to the Court by leave, and only in the
narrow circumstances permitted by law where access is
necessary and the respondent has respected the procedural
rules and previous court orders; in such cases, ensure that
interested persons have the opportunity to make submissions.
- Empower the Registry to take quick and
administratively simple steps to protect itself, the Court
and other litigants from vexatious behaviour.
- Preserve the Court's powers to act further, when
necessary, to adjust the vexatious litigant order, but only
in accordance with procedural fairness.
- Ensure that other judgments, orders and directions,
to the extent not inconsistent with the vexatious litigant
order, remain in effect and can be enforced.

[50] Some litigants may require "certain safeguards and
restrictions" to discourage them from finding other ways to
continue their vexatious conduct (Badawy v 1038482 Alberta
Ltd (IntelliView Technologies Inc), 2019 FC 504 at para
121). In Ubah, Justice Christine Pallotta prohibited a
vexatious litigant from preparing documents intended to be
filed in this Court for any person other than himself, and
from filing or otherwise communicating with the Court except
on his own behalf (at paras 50-51):
Also, I agree with the AGC that it is essential to
implement restrictions to prevent Mr. Ubah from
litigating by proxy-a key reason why Mr. Ubah's conduct
is harmful and ungovernable. Mr. Ubah is not a lawyer.
He is not bound by rules of professional conduct or
accountability. Yet his conduct in these matters
resembles the conduct of a lawyer. Preventing litigation
by proxy is one of the aims of a vexatious litigant
order, as set out in Fabrikant at paragraph 45. The
consequence of restrictions on Mr. Ubah's ability to
litigate by proxy is that the proceedings where this
appears to be the case should not continue except with
leave of the Court. [.]

[51] I am satisfied that similar restrictions are
appropriate here. In addition, Mr. Turmel should be
prohibited from seeking leave to commence new proceedings
until all of his outstanding costs awards are paid in full.
I note that a similar requirement was imposed by Chief
Justice Marc Noel of the FCA in Potvin v Rooke, 2019 FCA 285
at paragraph 8.

JCT: I can always ask to dispense with the payment of past
costs as I ask for leave due to national import of the
relief sought. I mainly deal with important life-and-death
issues so far. Eliminate poverty, legalize casino jobs,
oppose prohibition of cannabis medication, oppose judges
overruling doctors medical opinions, oppose judges imposing
caps on possession, oppose vaccine mandates on false alarms.

[52] The AGC asks that these restrictions apply equally to
the commencement of new proceedings in the FCA. This remedy
was granted by Justice Roger Hughes in Lawyers' Professional
Indemnity Company v Coote, 2013 FC 643 [Coote FC]. In a
subsequent proceeding, Coote v Canada (Human Rights
Commission), 2021 FCA 150 [Coote FCA], Justice Stratas Page:
19 observed that the Order of Justice Hughes "prohibited
the appellant from directly or indirectly instituting or
continuing any proceedings in the Federal Court of
Canada and in this Court except with leave of a judge of
the Federal Court" [emphasis original] (at para 3). The
AGC therefore maintains that this Court has jurisdiction
to impose restrictions on the institution of new
proceedings in the FCA.

[53] In Stukanov v Canada (Attorney General), 2022 FC 1421,
Justice Glennys McVeigh declined to impose restrictions on a
vexatious litigant's ability to institute new proceedings in
the FCA:
"Regarding the Federal Court of Appeal request, this
Court cannot make such an order and the Respondent must
seek that separately from the Federal Court of Appeal"
(at para 2). The AGC notes that the decision does not
contain any detailed discussion of the jurisdictional
implications of this remedy, but the same may be said of
Coote FC and Coote FCA.

[54] While Coote FCA may be taken as an implicit endorsement
of this Court's capacity to impose restrictions on the
commencement of proceedings in the FCA, I am left in some
doubt whether this Court's jurisdiction extends to the
regulation of matters before the FCA. I therefore decline to
impose restrictions on Mr. Turmel's conduct before the FCA.
In the event that the Judgment in this application is
appealed, the FCA may wish to provide further guidance on
this jurisdictional question.

JCT: You know I'm going to appeal being labelled a vexatious
litigant for 6 different actions.

[55] In all other respects, the relief requested by the AGC
should be granted.

JUDGMENT

THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that:

1. John C. Turmel is declared to be a vexatious litigant
pursuant to s 40 of the Federal Courts Act.

2. Mr. Turmel is prohibited from instituting new proceedings
in this Court, or continuing any proceedings previously
instituted by Mr. Turmel, except with leave of the Court.

3. Any application by Mr. Turmel for leave to institute or
continue a proceeding must, in addition to satisfying the
criteria in s 40(4) of the Federal Courts Act, demonstrate
that all outstanding costs awards against Mr. Turmel in this
Court have been paid in full.

4. Mr. Turmel is prohibited from preparing, distributing, or
in any way disseminating court documents, including template
documents, for use by others in proceedings before this
Court.

5. Mr. Turmel is prohibited from assisting others with any
proceedings before this Court, including by filing
materials, or purporting to represent them, or communicating
with the Court on their behalf.

6. No further proceedings may be instituted in this Court
using originating documents, including template documents,
which are in any way prepared, distributed or disseminated
by Mr. Turmel, except with leave of the Court.

7. Costs of this application are awarded against Mr. Turmel
in the all-inclusive sum of $500.00.
"Simon Fothergill" Judge

JCT: The Crown had asked for over $4,000 in costs so $500 was nice.
All he did was repeat what the crown had written so maybe he wasn't so happy with what he was compelled to do.

FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-962-22
STYLE OF CAUSE: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA v JOHN C.
TURMEL
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: OCTOBER 19, 2022
JUDGMENT AND REASONS: FOTHERGILL J.
DATED: NOVEMBER 9, 2022
APPEARANCES:
Jon Bricker FOR THE APPLICANT
John C. Turmel
(on his own behalf)
FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Attorney General of Canada
Toronto, Ontario
FOR THE APPLICANT

JCT: So now I have to appeal being my 6 actions making me a
vexatious litigant.

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