On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.
Millions of these stipulated relations in a knowledge hierarchy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
comprise human knowledge expressed in language.
Stipulated relations are like the Prolog Facts. Truth preserving
operations are like the Prolog Rules. Anything unprovable by
Facts and Rules in the system is untrue in the system.
Self-contradictory expressions are rejected as not truth bearers
instead of categorized as undecidable propositions.
Empirically verified to be true in the current moment:
I have a left hand right now, is sufficient.
I can't verify that.
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
On 9/5/2024 9:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/5/24 8:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.
Millions of these stipulated relations in a knowledge hierarchy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
comprise human knowledge expressed in language.
Stipulated relations are like the Prolog Facts. Truth preserving
operations are like the Prolog Rules. Anything unprovable by
Facts and Rules in the system is untrue in the system.
Self-contradictory expressions are rejected as not truth bearers
instead of categorized as undecidable propositions.
Which just shows you don't even understand the problem that Gettier
was pointing out. It isn't "bad logic", it is knowing you have a
correct interpretation of your observations.
Your problem is it is impossible to determine "sufficient verification".
It was a justified true belief (all three were stipulated)
except the justification had a loophole allowing it to be
insufficient justification under Gettier.
Just like it is stipulated to be true, it is now stipulated
to be "sufficient justification". The strongest justification
is a necessary consequence from stipulated truths.
*The simplest example of this is the syllogism*
Major premise: All humans are mortal.
Minor premise: All Greeks are humans.
Conclusion/Consequent: All Greeks are mortal. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism#Basic_structure
Other justifications would be less certain https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
On 9/6/2024 6:28 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/6/24 7:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification? >>>>>>>>
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
In other words, you are just admitting that you don't know what you
are doing, as you don't really get redefine fundamental terms and stay
in the logic system.
I came up with a brand new idea and gave it an appropriate name.
Truth in the system that I defined only pertains to relations
between finite strings. It is the actual philosophical foundation
of every expression X of language L that is true on the basis of
its meaning expressed in language L.
You can't get away with saying that all new ideas are inherently wrong.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
So, I guess you don't think the pythagorous formula, that "the square
of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two
sides" is "proved true" as it can not be proved entirely based on its
MEANING expressed in the language. Since its "proof" isn't based on
just the actual meaning of any of the words used, it can't be true by
your definition.
Sorry, you are just proving that you are a total idiot.
I never limited meaning to words. Meaning is relations between
finite strings. The body of {linguistic truth} is the body of
{analytic truth} that the logical positivists promoted except
it has been made unequivocal.
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
On 9/6/2024 6:10 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/6/24 8:10 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:34 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/5/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 9/5/2024 9:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/5/24 8:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification? >>>>>>>>>>
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works. >>>>>>> Millions of these stipulated relations in a knowledge hierarchy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
comprise human knowledge expressed in language.
Stipulated relations are like the Prolog Facts. Truth preserving >>>>>>> operations are like the Prolog Rules. Anything unprovable by
Facts and Rules in the system is untrue in the system.
Self-contradictory expressions are rejected as not truth bearers >>>>>>> instead of categorized as undecidable propositions.
Which just shows you don't even understand the problem that
Gettier was pointing out. It isn't "bad logic", it is knowing you
have a correct interpretation of your observations.
Your problem is it is impossible to determine "sufficient
verification".
It was a justified true belief (all three were stipulated)
except the justification had a loophole allowing it to be
insufficient justification under Gettier.
And the problem is you can't just "define away" that insufficiency.
Your problem is you just don't know enough to see the problem, and
thus assume there isn't one, which is EXACTLY the sort of thing
Gettier was pointing out. One of the examples was deducing there was
a fire because they saw smoke, but the "smoke" was just a cloud of
insects, and not smoke, attracted to the fire that wasn't creating
smoke.
The justification was incorrect, so should we call that knowledge of
fire, and if someone can be convinced they "know" something, when
they don't, were they correct in calling it "knowledge", and if we
can't actually know that we know something, do we even know it, even
if it might be true?
Just like it is stipulated to be true, it is now stipulated
to be "sufficient justification". The strongest justification
is a necessary consequence from stipulated truths.
No, you are just showing your ignorance for the words or what the
problem is.
It is not "stipulated" that knowledge is true, it is a definitional
requirement. And the problem that Gettier was talking about is that
we can't be certain our interpretation of our observation is
correct, so we can't be sure our reaso
*The simplest example of this is the syllogism*
Major premise: All humans are mortal.
Minor premise: All Greeks are humans.
Conclusion/Consequent: All Greeks are mortal.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism#Basic_structure
Which, since it has no "observations" in it, doesn't talk about the
issue here.
It provides a concrete example of sufficient justification thus
conclusively proving the sufficient justification exists.
Nope, just that you don't understand the logic you are talking about.
Gettier isn't talking about "Analytic Truth" which is a truth based on
the defined definitions, but on Knowledge based on observation, i.e
emperical knowledge.
Other justifications would be less certain
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
Which seems to mean that you are just trying to define away the
problem by ignoring it.
A justified true belief is impossibly false because it is stipulated
to only apply to true beliefs.
And that is the problem, you can't TELL if it is a justified true
belief, so you can't tell if it is actually knowledge.
Gettier is talking about knowledge that comes from observations, and
the fact that it seems impossible to determine if we are "correctly
interpreting" or observations of the world.
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem#Case_I
Sufficient evidence that Smith got the job would be the boss
tells Smith he got the job.
Nope, The boss might have lied.
It is 100% impossible that the boss lied because in all
of these cases the belief is stipulated to be true.
When someone is going by the number of coins in the pocket
of the one that is hired as the determiner of who is hired
they must have a few screws loose in their brain.
On 9/7/2024 7:22 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/6/24 11:31 PM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:10 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/6/24 8:10 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/6/2024 6:34 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/5/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 9/5/2024 9:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/5/24 8:58 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient
verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that >>>>>>>>>> nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually >>>>>>>>> works.
Millions of these stipulated relations in a knowledge hierarchy >>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science) >>>>>>>>> comprise human knowledge expressed in language.
Stipulated relations are like the Prolog Facts. Truth preserving >>>>>>>>> operations are like the Prolog Rules. Anything unprovable by >>>>>>>>> Facts and Rules in the system is untrue in the system.
Self-contradictory expressions are rejected as not truth bearers >>>>>>>>> instead of categorized as undecidable propositions.
Which just shows you don't even understand the problem that
Gettier was pointing out. It isn't "bad logic", it is knowing
you have a correct interpretation of your observations.
Your problem is it is impossible to determine "sufficient
verification".
It was a justified true belief (all three were stipulated)
except the justification had a loophole allowing it to be
insufficient justification under Gettier.
And the problem is you can't just "define away" that insufficiency. >>>>>>
Your problem is you just don't know enough to see the problem, and >>>>>> thus assume there isn't one, which is EXACTLY the sort of thing
Gettier was pointing out. One of the examples was deducing there
was a fire because they saw smoke, but the "smoke" was just a
cloud of insects, and not smoke, attracted to the fire that wasn't >>>>>> creating smoke.
The justification was incorrect, so should we call that knowledge
of fire, and if someone can be convinced they "know" something,
when they don't, were they correct in calling it "knowledge", and
if we can't actually know that we know something, do we even know
it, even if it might be true?
Just like it is stipulated to be true, it is now stipulated
to be "sufficient justification". The strongest justification
is a necessary consequence from stipulated truths.
No, you are just showing your ignorance for the words or what the
problem is.
It is not "stipulated" that knowledge is true, it is a
definitional requirement. And the problem that Gettier was talking >>>>>> about is that we can't be certain our interpretation of our
observation is correct, so we can't be sure our reaso
*The simplest example of this is the syllogism*
Major premise: All humans are mortal.
Minor premise: All Greeks are humans.
Conclusion/Consequent: All Greeks are mortal.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism#Basic_structure
Which, since it has no "observations" in it, doesn't talk about
the issue here.
It provides a concrete example of sufficient justification thus
conclusively proving the sufficient justification exists.
Nope, just that you don't understand the logic you are talking about.
Gettier isn't talking about "Analytic Truth" which is a truth based
on the defined definitions, but on Knowledge based on observation,
i.e emperical knowledge.
Other justifications would be less certain
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
Which seems to mean that you are just trying to define away the
problem by ignoring it.
A justified true belief is impossibly false because it is stipulated >>>>> to only apply to true beliefs.
And that is the problem, you can't TELL if it is a justified true
belief, so you can't tell if it is actually knowledge.
Gettier is talking about knowledge that comes from observations,
and the fact that it seems impossible to determine if we are
"correctly interpreting" or observations of the world.
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem#Case_I
Sufficient evidence that Smith got the job would be the boss
tells Smith he got the job.
Nope, The boss might have lied.
It is 100% impossible that the boss lied because in all
of these cases the belief is stipulated to be true.
Nope, you don't understand that problem.
The question is how can you determine that your believe has sufficent
reason to be true.
Within the stipulated definitions that I am
providing that is the same as asking how do
you know that a true statement is true?
We could define knowledge differently
as any believe such that we have sufficient
reason to know it is true.
Example your boss tells you you got the job and you
take the job and work on the job for ten years.
This is 100% perfectly sufficient reason to know
you got the job.
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification? >>>>>>>>
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used >>>>>> by DG Schwartz in 1985.
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification? >>>>>>>>>>
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works. >>>>>>
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept?
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used >>>>>> by DG Schwartz in 1985.
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification? >>>>>>>>>>
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works. >>>>>>
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept?
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient
verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that >>>>>>>>>> nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually >>>>>>>>> works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been >>>>>>>> used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the term. >>>>>>
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used it
before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept?
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear
what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino
is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the
opus or discussion where it is presented.
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not
identifiable.
No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).
Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
Formalized as:
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
adapted to become this
x ∉ Pr if and only if p // line 1 of the proof
Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
(1) x ∉ Provable if and only if p // assumption (see above)
(2) x ∈ True if and only if p // Tarski's convention T
(3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True. // (1) and (2) combined
(4) either x ∉ True or x̄ ∉ True; // axiom: ~True(x) ∨ ~True(~x)
(5) if x ∈ Provable, then x ∈ True; // axiom: Provable(x) → True(x) (6) if x̄ ∈ Provable, then x̄ ∈ True; // axiom: Provable(~x) → True(~x)
(7) x ∈ True
(8) x ∉ Provable
(9) x̄ ∉ Provable
On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used >>>>>>>> by DG Schwartz in 1985.
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification? >>>>>>>>>>>>
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that >>>>>>>>>> nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works. >>>>>>>>
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the term. >>>>>>
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used it before? >>>> Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept?
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear
what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino
is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the
opus or discussion where it is presented.
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not
identifiable.
No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).
On 9/10/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 13:03:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient >>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that >>>>>>>>>>>> nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually >>>>>>>>>>> works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has >>>>>>>>>> been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the >>>>>>>> term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used it
before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept?
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear
what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino
is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the
opus or discussion where it is presented.
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not
identifiable.
No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).
In the system Tarski was using (i.e. ordinary logic) a proof cannot
be rejected.
If the system is too stupid to reject invalid input
then it is too stupid. Ordinary logic is too stupid
to even say the Liar Paradox that I what I invented
minimal type theory.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
LP := ~True(LP)
(0) not (1)
(1) true (0) // cycle in digraph
On 9/10/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 13:03:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used >>>>>>>>>> by DG Schwartz in 1985.
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that >>>>>>>>>>>> nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works. >>>>>>>>>>
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the term. >>>>>>>>
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept?
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear
what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino
is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the
opus or discussion where it is presented.
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not
identifiable.
No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).
In the system Tarski was using (i.e. ordinary logic) a proof cannot
be rejected.
If the system is too stupid to reject invalid input
then it is too stupid. Ordinary logic is too stupid
to even say the Liar Paradox that I what I invented
minimal type theory.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
LP := ~True(LP)
(0) not (1)
(1) true (0) // cycle in digraph
On 9/10/2024 5:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/10/24 9:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/9/2024 9:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/9/24 3:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 9/8/2024 12:55 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/8/24 9:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:If that is your claim, then a statement is Linguistically FALSE if >>>>>> there is NOT such a connection (verses there is a connection to
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth
actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has >>>>>>>>>>>> been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the >>>>>>>>>> term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used >>>>>>>> it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept? >>>>>>>>
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
its negation), since THAT is the definiton of the Truth Predicate
of Tarski, it results in TRUE if the statement is True, or FALSE
if the statement is either FALSE or not actually a truth bearer,
and it is that later part that causes the problem.
LP = "this sentence is not true"
according to MY truth predicate
~True(LP) & ~True(~LP) MEANING NOT ALLOWED IN ANY FORMAL
SYSTEM BECAUSE IT IS NOT A FREAKING BEATER OF TRUTH.
So, you admit that you system can't have a truth predicate per the
required definition either.
No jackass. I admit that my truth predicate is smart
enough to reject invalid input you freaking moron.
I admit the every system that does not do this is AFU !
On other words, you admit that it doesn't meet the requirements to
give a TRUE/FALSE answer for EVERY input.
You already said that "a fish" is neither true nor false.
x = "a fish"
Boolean True(English, x) == false
Boolean True(English, ~x) == false
if (~True(English,x) & ~True(English, ~x))
printf("x is not a truth bearer");
In other words, you admit you are too stupid to know what you are
talking about, because you don't actually know the definition of a
truth predicate.
You are just trying to declair that everything is just AFU, but you
con't actually "fix" it, becasuse you don't know what you need to do
to build another system, because that is to hard for you to understand
from the "Clift Notes" you have studied about logic.
Sorry, that IS the facts,
On 9/10/2024 5:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/10/24 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/10/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 13:03:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth
actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has >>>>>>>>>>>> been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the >>>>>>>>>> term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used >>>>>>>> it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept? >>>>>>>>
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear
what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino >>>>>> is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the >>>>>> opus or discussion where it is presented.
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not
identifiable.
No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).
In the system Tarski was using (i.e. ordinary logic) a proof cannot
be rejected.
If the system is too stupid to reject invalid input
then it is too stupid. Ordinary logic is too stupid
to even say the Liar Paradox that I what I invented
minimal type theory.
No, you are too stupid to understand that "rejection" isn't an option,
In other words you are trying to pretend that type mismatch
error doesn't exist. What is the square root of an actual dead frog?
The answer must be numeric and it must be correct.
"rejection" isn't an option
On 9/11/2024 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:46:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/10/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 13:03:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth
actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has >>>>>>>>>>>> been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the >>>>>>>>>> term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used >>>>>>>> it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept? >>>>>>>>
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear
what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino >>>>>> is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the >>>>>> opus or discussion where it is presented.
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not
identifiable.
No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).
In the system Tarski was using (i.e. ordinary logic) a proof cannot
be rejected.
If the system is too stupid to reject invalid input
then it is too stupid. Ordinary logic is too stupid
to even say the Liar Paradox that I what I invented
minimal type theory.
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
LP := ~True(LP)
(0) not (1)
(1) true (0) // cycle in digraph
For ordinary first order logic it is possible to make a program that
reads a text file and checks whether it is a vlaid proof. Is the same
possible for your Minimal Type Theory?
I don't need any of that. All that I need to do
is reject the Liar Paradox as invalid input because
it specifies a cycle in its evaluation sequence.
Tarski was simply far too stupid to this this.
On 9/11/2024 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:46:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/10/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 13:03:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction
yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}.
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely
based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical
truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be
verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used the term. >>>>>>>>>>
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept? >>>>>>>>
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning
for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear
what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino >>>>>> is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the >>>>>> opus or discussion where it is presented.
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic
meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not
identifiable.
No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).
In the system Tarski was using (i.e. ordinary logic) a proof cannot
be rejected.
If the system is too stupid to reject invalid input
then it is too stupid. Ordinary logic is too stupid
to even say the Liar Paradox that I what I invented
minimal type theory.
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
LP := ~True(LP)
(0) not (1)
(1) true (0) // cycle in digraph
For ordinary first order logic it is possible to make a program that
reads a text file and checks whether it is a vlaid proof. Is the same
possible for your Minimal Type Theory?
I don't need any of that.
All that I need to do
is reject the Liar Paradox as invalid input because
it specifies a cycle in its evaluation sequence.
Tarski was simply far too stupid to this this.
On 9/11/2024 6:23 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/11/24 8:05 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/10/2024 5:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/10/24 9:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/9/2024 9:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/9/24 3:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 9/8/2024 12:55 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/8/24 9:24 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:If that is your claim, then a statement is Linguistically FALSE >>>>>>>> if there is NOT such a connection (verses there is a connection >>>>>>>> to its negation), since THAT is the definiton of the Truth
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has >>>>>>>>>>>>>> been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction >>>>>>>>>>>>> yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely >>>>>>>>>>>>> based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be >>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used >>>>>>>>>>>> the term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used >>>>>>>>>> it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept? >>>>>>>>>>
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning >>>>>>>>> for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context. >>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic >>>>>>>>> meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
Predicate of Tarski, it results in TRUE if the statement is
True, or FALSE if the statement is either FALSE or not actually >>>>>>>> a truth bearer, and it is that later part that causes the problem. >>>>>>>>
LP = "this sentence is not true"
according to MY truth predicate
~True(LP) & ~True(~LP) MEANING NOT ALLOWED IN ANY FORMAL
SYSTEM BECAUSE IT IS NOT A FREAKING BEATER OF TRUTH.
So, you admit that you system can't have a truth predicate per the >>>>>> required definition either.
No jackass. I admit that my truth predicate is smart
enough to reject invalid input you freaking moron.
I admit the every system that does not do this is AFU !
On other words, you admit that it doesn't meet the requirements to
give a TRUE/FALSE answer for EVERY input.
You already said that "a fish" is neither true nor false.
x = "a fish"
Boolean True(English, x) == false
Boolean True(English, ~x) == false
if (~True(English,x) & ~True(English, ~x))
printf("x is not a truth bearer");
So? That means that the predicate can't "Reject" funny non-sense, they
just say it is false.
You are just too clueless about how these things work.
Expressions of language that are not a truth bearers
are a type mismatch error for formal logic systems.
Propositions must be declarative sentence types or there
is a type mismatch error.
But, if x is defined as ~True(L, x) and that makes True(L, x) false,
then that makes x true, so the predicate just goofed and said a true
statement was false.
Sorry, you are just proving you don't understand the words you are using,
In other words, you admit you are too stupid to know what you are
talking about, because you don't actually know the definition of a
truth predicate.
You are just trying to declair that everything is just AFU, but you
con't actually "fix" it, becasuse you don't know what you need to do
to build another system, because that is to hard for you to
understand from the "Clift Notes" you have studied about logic.
Sorry, that IS the facts,
On 9/11/2024 6:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/11/24 8:00 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/10/2024 5:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/10/24 9:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/10/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 13:03:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has >>>>>>>>>>>>>> been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction >>>>>>>>>>>>> yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely >>>>>>>>>>>>> based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be >>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used >>>>>>>>>>>> the term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used >>>>>>>>>> it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept? >>>>>>>>>>
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning >>>>>>>>> for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context. >>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear >>>>>>>> what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino >>>>>>>> is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the >>>>>>>> opus or discussion where it is presented.
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic >>>>>>>>> meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not >>>>>>>> identifiable.
No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).
In the system Tarski was using (i.e. ordinary logic) a proof cannot >>>>>> be rejected.
If the system is too stupid to reject invalid input
then it is too stupid. Ordinary logic is too stupid
to even say the Liar Paradox that I what I invented
minimal type theory.
No, you are too stupid to understand that "rejection" isn't an option,
In other words you are trying to pretend that type mismatch
error doesn't exist. What is the square root of an actual dead frog?
The answer must be numeric and it must be correct.
"rejection" isn't an option
No, just that it can't be a "type mismatch",
That is is ridiculously stupid thing to say
you are claiming that an actual dead frog has a numeric square root
*This has been my original basis since 2012*
Kurt Gödel in his 1944 Russell's mathematical logic gave the following definition of the "theory of simple types" in a footnote:
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the
objects of thought ... are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of
such relations, etc. (with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and that sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears the relation
R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ are not of types
fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
as just prior to that Tarski proved that the statement *WAS* a valid
statement.
You are just proving you don't undertstand what you are reading and
just guessing (incorrectly) what things means, which is one of the
methods of stupidity. Smart people when they come across something
they don't understand, spend so time to learn the meaning, but you are
afraid that the truth will brainwash you, because you have already
brainwashed yourself.
On 9/12/2024 3:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-11 11:44:39 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/11/2024 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:46:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/10/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 13:03:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has >>>>>>>>>>>>>> been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction >>>>>>>>>>>>> yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely >>>>>>>>>>>>> based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be >>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used >>>>>>>>>>>> the term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used >>>>>>>>>> it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept? >>>>>>>>>>
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning >>>>>>>>> for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context. >>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear >>>>>>>> what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino >>>>>>>> is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the >>>>>>>> opus or discussion where it is presented.
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic >>>>>>>>> meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not >>>>>>>> identifiable.
No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).
In the system Tarski was using (i.e. ordinary logic) a proof cannot >>>>>> be rejected.
If the system is too stupid to reject invalid input
then it is too stupid. Ordinary logic is too stupid
to even say the Liar Paradox that I what I invented
minimal type theory.
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
LP := ~True(LP)
(0) not (1)
(1) true (0) // cycle in digraph
For ordinary first order logic it is possible to make a program that
reads a text file and checks whether it is a vlaid proof. Is the same
possible for your Minimal Type Theory?
I don't need any of that.
If your Minimal Type Theory does not do more than that then it is not
publishable in a respectable journal.
In other words if MTT has unlimited orders of logic
this makes MTT inferior to FOL?
The prior version of MTT simply translated its expressions
into directed graph of the evaluation sequence. A cycle
in this evaluation sequence proved that the expression
was ill-formed.
https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
LP := ~True(LP)
00 ~ (01)
01 True (00)
All that I need to do
is reject the Liar Paradox as invalid input because
it specifies a cycle in its evaluation sequence.
Tarski was simply far too stupid to this this.
Then you needn't tell anybody about your rejection.
On 9/11/2024 6:30 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 9/11/24 7:44 AM, olcott wrote:
On 9/11/2024 2:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-10 13:46:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/10/2024 3:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-09 13:03:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/9/2024 4:11 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-08 13:24:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/8/2024 4:17 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-07 13:54:47 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/7/2024 3:09 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-06 11:17:53 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/6/2024 5:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-05 12:58:13 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
of "sufficient reason".
Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> verification?
Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
Cats are a know if animal.
Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actually works.
I've never seen or heard any linguist say so. The term has >>>>>>>>>>>>>> been used
by DG Schwartz in 1985.
This is similar to the analytic/synthetic distinction >>>>>>>>>>>>> yet unequivocal.
I am redefining the term analytic truth to have a
similar definition and calling this {linguistic truth}. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Expression of X of language L is proved true entirely >>>>>>>>>>>>> based on its meaning expressed in language L. Empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>> truth requires sense data from the sense organs to be >>>>>>>>>>>>> verified as true.
Seems that you don't know about any linguist that has used >>>>>>>>>>>> the term.
I INVENTED A BRAND NEW FREAKING TERM
Is it really a new term if someone else (DG Schwartz) has used >>>>>>>>>> it before?
Is it a term for a new concept or a new term for an old concept? >>>>>>>>>>
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a
new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning >>>>>>>>> for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context. >>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stipulative_definition
A stipulative definition is a temporary hack when it is not clear >>>>>>>> what the definition should be or when a need for a good definitino >>>>>>>> is not expected. A stipluative definition is not valid outside the >>>>>>>> opus or discussion where it is presented.
*LINGUISTIC TRUTH IS STIPULATED TO MEAN*
When expression X of language L is connected to its semantic >>>>>>>>> meaning M by a sequence of truth preserving operations P in
language L then and only then is X true in L. That was the
True(L,X) that Tarski "proved" cannot possibly exist.
Copyright 2024 Olcott
With that definition Tarski proved that linguistic truth is not >>>>>>>> identifiable.
No he did not. Tarski's proof that begins with the Liar Paradox
gets rejected at step (3).
In the system Tarski was using (i.e. ordinary logic) a proof cannot >>>>>> be rejected.
If the system is too stupid to reject invalid input
then it is too stupid. Ordinary logic is too stupid
to even say the Liar Paradox that I what I invented
minimal type theory.
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF
LP := ~True(LP)
(0) not (1)
(1) true (0) // cycle in digraph
For ordinary first order logic it is possible to make a program that
reads a text file and checks whether it is a vlaid proof. Is the same
possible for your Minimal Type Theory?
I don't need any of that. All that I need to do
is reject the Liar Paradox as invalid input because
it specifies a cycle in its evaluation sequence.
Tarski was simply far too stupid to this this.
And thus prove you don't understand what you are talking about,
Tarski understand that it creates a cycle,
What about my dumbed down version?
Is "a fish" true or false?
Tarski was simply too stupid to understand
that non-truth-bearers are a type mismatch error
for any Boolean True(English, "a fish") predicate.
Mankind with very rare exceptions is too stupid
to know that the Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer.
That other people are stupid provides zero evidence
that I am incorrect.
and that is why the truth predicate can't exist, because adding it to
the system allows the cycle into the system as something that must be
resolved, but can't.
Until you can show the error in the prior section that he was refering
to to show why that statement CAN'T be formed, you are just stuck
being the stupid liar.
Of course, the fact that you don't understand it gives your problems,
but that just shows that your think it is ok to lie if you don't know
the answer.
Sorry, that is just the actual facts, even if you are too stupid to
understand it.
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