On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:
That does not disprove Tarski.
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except >>>>> for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.
This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:
That does not disprove Tarski.
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except >>>>> for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.
This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
On 3/16/2025 9:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:
That does not disprove Tarski.
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds
except
for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.
Sure he did, because he can create an expression x that it can not
handle.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.
Right, so for the x that is true if and only if True(x) is false that
he constructs in the language using properties created in a
metalangugage that knows the langugage, What does True(x) return?
True(X) always returns false whenever a sequence of truth preserving operations cannot derive X from the basic facts of general knowledge.
True(X) only fails on unknown truths.
If it says FALSE, because there it thinks there is no path to x from a
truth maker, then x turns out to be TRUE, and thus we have that True
of a shown true statement is false, and thus True is broken.
If it says TRUE because of that, then from the relationship shown in
the metalanguage, x must be false, and thus True just said a known
false statement was true.
There is no need for any separate metalanguage in my system.
This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.
Because the entire set of human general knowledge isn't a formal logic
system, and can't really be made into one.
Richard Montague showed otherwise for the entire set of human general knowledge that can be expressed in language.
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
Sure it was, otherwise, what value should it have returned for that
True(x)?
The problem is that pathology is out of the sight of the predicate,
hidden in the unknown metalanguage.
The problem is give a sufficently powerful enough logic system (able
to express the properties of the Natural Numbers) Tarski shows (with a
proof borrowing from Godel in ideas) that we CAN create such a
statement in the language, that expresses in the metalanguage (and
only knowable in the metalanguage) that pathological relationship.
THis just involves logic that is beyound your kindergarten level of
knowledge of logic, that you are too stupid to see exists.
A system that derives the X from True(X) by applying a sequence
a truth preserving operations to basic facts cannot be fooled.
On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:
That does not disprove Tarski.
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds
except
for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.
Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can construct
a statement x, which is only true it is the case that True(x) is
false, but this interperetation can only be seen in the metalanguage
created from the language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that
generates the proof testing relationship that shows that G can only be
true if it can not be proven as the existance of a number to make it
false, becomes a proof that the statement is true and thus creates a
contradiction in the system.
That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the
language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the
metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements
that you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong, just
shows how stupid you are.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.
Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in length.
This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.
But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your stupidity.
Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain the
contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an infinite
number of them possible, and thus to even try to express them all
requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to
meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta-systems, Tarski
proof can create a metasystem, that you system doesn't know about,
which creates the problem statement.
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such references.
And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce when
we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in the
language will be true if and only if !True(x), which he showed can be
done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your universal system
must have.
Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are
talking about.
We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural
language can express its own semantics as connections
between expressions of this same language.
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says that the
objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, the symbolic
expressions) are divided into types, namely: individuals, properties of individuals, relations between individuals, properties of such
relations, etc. (with a similar hierarchy for extensions), and that
sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears the relation
R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ are not of types
fitting together. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
When True(X) only returns TRUE for contiguous sequences
of truth preserving operations on the basis of basic
facts expressed in formalized natural language then
True(X) consistently works correctly for the entire
set of general human knowledge that can be expressed
using language.
On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote:
Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott:
That does not disprove Tarski.
We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except >>>>>>> for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!!
He said that this is impossible and no
counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong.
True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown
True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer
But if x is what you are saying is
A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never
showed that it cannot.
Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can construct a
statement x, which is only true it is the case that True(x) is false,
but this interperetation can only be seen in the metalanguage created
from the language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that generates
the proof testing relationship that shows that G can only be true if it
can not be proven as the existance of a number to make it false,
becomes a proof that the statement is true and thus creates a
contradiction in the system.
That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the
language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the
metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements that
you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong, just shows
how stupid you are.
True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth
preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic
facts and returns false otherwise.
Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in length.
This never fails on the entire set of human general
knowledge that can be expressed using language.
But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your stupidity.
Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain the
contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an infinite
number of them possible, and thus to even try to express them all
requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to
meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta-systems, Tarski
proof can create a metasystem, that you system doesn't know about,
which creates the problem statement.
It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or
self-contradiction.
Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such references.
And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce when
we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in the
language will be true if and only if !True(x), which he showed can be
done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your universal system
must have.
Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are
talking about.
We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural
language can express its own semantics as connections
between expressions of this same language.
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