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Glenn Hoge
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Read many books about World War II in the Pacific.Apr 2

In the Battle of Midway, why did RAdm Tamon Yamaguchi choose to go down
with his ship, but VAdm Chūichi Nagumo did not?

When the flagship Akagi was hit, Admiral Nagumo was in no hurry to leave
her. Indeed, it certainly seemed as though he was inclined to go down
with her. But Admiral Kusaka, his chief of staff, appealed to Nagumo’s
sense of duty. Kusaka reminded Nagumo that he was still the commander of
the First Air Fleet, and as long as any part of that fleet remained operational, it was his duty to command it. Thus persuaded, Nagumo
allowed himself to evacuate the Akagi and transfer his flag to the
cruiser Nagara.

No such impediment interfered with Admiral Yamaguchi. He was in command
of the Second Carrier Division, but both carriers of that force were
knocked out of action. He saw his duty as requiring him to go down with
his flagship, the carrier Hiryu, to atone for her loss. His force of personality was such that no one was inclined to try and talk him out of
it, and thus he fulfilled his duty, as he saw it, and went down with the
ship.

This was a major example of how the martial culture of Japan worked
against her interests in the war. Yamaguchi was considered one of the
best admirals in the entire navy. Indeed, there were some who felt that
he would be the logical successor to Admiral Yamamoto himself. By
remaining aboard the Hiryu, Yamaguchi deprived his nation of his skills,
his talent, his leadership ability, his aggressive drive, his tactical knowledge, and a whole bunch of other traits. Skilled admirals didn’t
grow on trees; they took decades to be trained and rise up to achieve
their level. Yet with all that, Yamaguchi threw it all away to assuage
his own brand of honor. And in so doing, he materially harmed his
country’s chances in the war.

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Mike
· Apr 2
from everything I've ever read Admiral Yamaguchi seem to be an extremely capable Commander

I think the Midway operation would have been much different if he had
been the overall commander instead of Nagumo…I don't think he would have
made Nagumo's mistakes

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David Ferrell
· Apr 3
Possibly, but most contemporary analysis these days suggest that Nagumo
was sinned against much more than he sinned, given the rigidity of
Admiral Yamamoto’s plans and Japanese carrier air doctrines at the time. Yamaguchi would've been operating under the same handicaps. He might've
ordered a more comprehensive and aggressive morning air search, the one
thing he could do that could've made a difference.

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Glenn Hoge
· Apr 3
Yamaguchi would have done one crucial thing differently. He would have
launched an air attack against the American carrier as soon as it had
been discovered, regardless of which planes were available or how they
were armed. We know this because he recommended to Nagumo that he do
just that. “Consider it advisable to launch attack force immediately.”
But Nagumo, playing it doctrinally safe, wanted to wait until the planes
had been rearmed so that a coordinated strike could be launched.

By this point in the battle, the American attack that would ultimately
doom three of the four Japanese carriers had already been launched, or
was about to be. But if the U.S. planes had attacked empty ships, even
though they still would have been damaged, they might not have been so
badly damaged that they couldn’t be salvaged. And the Japanese planes, mis-armed though they might have been, still would have probably
inflicted some damage against the American fleet.

If Yamaguchi had been in charge, Midway would have been a much closer
thing, even if the Americans still managed to win.



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Richard Watson
· Sun
“Doctrinally safe” is a misnomer. Yamaguchi may have launched an
immediate strike against doctrine but there was no safe. The doctrine is
about forming a coordinated and weighted blow. This is what Nagumo was attempting. To launch an immediate strike is to make a off balance and
less coordinated strike.

Launching that strike, while also performing recovery operations would
have rendered the fleet no more safe. Launching first, delaying the
recovery, and re-arming the recovered aircraft would still have Kido
Butai with exposed ordinance & fuel for the US aviators to ignite.

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Richard Loppnow
· Sat
No, it would not have. The Japanese planes may never have even found the
US carriers.

With their lack of damage control, the Japanese carriers would’ve still
been toast.

Given that some Japanese pilots were rescued from the damaged carriers,
those same pilots all would’ve all been toast had they been sent after.

The US kept its fighter planes for combat air patrol. They would’ve
wreaked absolute havoc with whatever uncoordinated Japanese attack
planes did manage to actually find them.

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Simon Pitt
· Sun
“The US kept its fighter planes for combat air patrol. They would’ve wreaked absolute havoc with whatever uncoordinated Japanese attack
planes did manage to actually find them. “

Somehow I don’t think so. Not if any Zeros were accompanying the strike
force anyway. They would have made mincemeat of the F4F wildcats as they
had right throughout the battle historically. They ripped the US torpedo bombers a new arse as well, and the only reason the US were able to hit
three carriers simultaneously was solely down to the fact that owing to
this Japanese preoccupation with said torpedo bombers, the dive bombers
were able to sneak in unmolested, taking advantage of fortunate cloud
cover as well.

Besides, if the US combat air patrol was as great as you seem to think,
then why were the Yorktown, Hornet, Lexington and Princeton all lost to Japanese aircraft attack?


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Paul Tackowiak
· Wed
The one critical difference he might have made would have been to order
the Hiro to vacate the area rather than pursue what had to be assumed to
be a superior number of US carriers. That would have saved Japan 1
incredibly valuable carrier - but it would not have changed the wars
outcome.

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Nick Dalessandro
· Tue
How so?

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David Ferrell
· Apr 3
Yamaguchi would've made a formidable opponent during the Guadalcanal
campaign, especially at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons against a
tired and timid Frank Fletcher.


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Bill Oreto
· Apr 12
What tire and timid Fletcher? He had dumped in his lap by Ghromley the
campaign for Guadalcanal when he was just the carrier task force
commander. He was under strict orders from King and Nimitz not to risk
the last of the USN carriers. He was plagued by fleet oiler shortage
which were sent to the Atlantic for the Neutrality Patrol and shortages
of F4F-4s to defend his carriers.

That the knucklehead Morrison painted Fletcher as timid was because he
played to King. King had a resentment towards Fletcher for loss of
Lexington at Coral Sea and that Fletcher wore the MOH an award King did
not think Fletcher deserved.

It was Fletcher’s orders that sank 3 Japanese carriers at Midway. It is Fletcher’s order that sank a light carrier at Coral Sea, heavily damaged another and wiped out an entire air group of another. Fletcher sank more Japanese carrier tonnage than Halsey and Spruance combined. He won 3
strategic victories to Halsey’s and Spruance’s one each.

Morrison was later exposed by his own historical staff that he was bias
and that research was ignored, omitted or slanted for Morrison’s
personal gain. Basically a sycophant to King. Morrison did the same
hatchet job to Halsey another admiral that King did not like because of
his popularity.

You may wish to read John Lundstrom’s 4 books. The First South Pacific Campaign, The First Team, The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign
and finally Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. His unbiased research paints
entirely different but historically accurate picture of Admiral Fletcher
while trashing Morrison’s biased history. Fletcher was not perfect but
was damn good at his job. To admiral Fletcher’s credit he went to his
grave never attempting to set the record straight or criticize King. He
was all Navy.

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Paul Jacobs
· Tue
Yes, Fletcher had far greater challenges and impediments to deal with
than did other admirals in 1943–45. He did make some mistakes, like withdrawing the carriers at the outset of the Guadalcanal landings, but
overall he acted with the necessary caution required under the
circumstances, and the limitations imposed on him by logistics.

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Bill Oreto
· Tue
That is a debate back and forth on the withdrawal of the carriers. Some witnesses say he stuck to his schedule and others say he relented to
stay longer. After losing a third of his fighters he pulled out on
schedule. There were no replacement fighter aircraft but more so, no
pilots. Turner made him scrape goat for Savo Island when really no
amount carrier coverage would have prevented it due to range. All this
all is covered Black Shoe Carrier Admiral by Lundstrom. Excellent read
and highly recommended

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Elliott May
· Tue
Fletcher was back to face Nagumo`s carriers and stop the reinforcements
When he was needed

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Paul Jacobs
· Tue
Yes an excellent book. The question of course was how much risk was
warranted given the stakes. And the stakes in this case were high given
the potential threat to the invasion force. Imagine the extent of the
disaster had Mikawa persisted with his attack.


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Bill Oreto
· Wed
At best if the carriers stayed in position Fletcher would have struck
Mikawa on his way home after Savo Island and possibly have the carriers attacked either by sub or air attack. Turner was the one who moored the covering force for the evening in contested waters. In his defense he
like Fletcher was short of oil. All three admirals took gambles and
lost. Battle of Savo Island carriers or no carriers should been laid at Turner’s feet as the carriers would not have made a difference and that
too was brought out In the book as well,

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Paul Jacobs
· 22h
Although Mikawa was spotted in daylight hours, yes, it's very unlikely
that Fletcher could have intervened. But the withdrawal of his carriers
left Turner entirely without air cover and was a factor in Turner’s
decision to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal.

Bill Oreto
Again if you read the series of Lundstrom books Turner was way behind
off loading the transports some of it due to air attacks on the
transports, some it due the transports were improperly loaded and some
of it the Marines had no dedicated equipment or units (Pioneers) to off
load. Lessons learned. Even if Fletcher stayed Turner’s escorts were at
the bottom of Iron Bottom Bay. That was the primary reason for
withdrawing. Fletcher’s fighter cover for the first three days was not
very effective anyway for lack of fighter control and radar direction
that covered the entire battle space. All while he was losing fighters
that protect his carriers. Another lesson learned. Now flash forward to
the invasions of Betio and Okinawa. Adm. Spruance in command. He won’t
make the same mistakes as Fletcher. At Betio he loses a CVE nearly with
all hands and a brand new Essex class CV is seriously damaged by
torpedo. The transports remain untouched. At Okinawa there is an
abundance of CVEs, CVLs and CVs yet the largest Kamikaze raids are
directed towards 5th Fleet. Japanese doctrine saw the warships as the
real threat not the transports . They can be destroyed at leisure.
Turner’s radar pickets and 5th fleet took severe damage and some losses. Losses among transports was negligible. Being pressured to keep his
carriers near Guadalcanal leads to Saratoga being torpedoed (again) and
his relief due to a tantrum by King. All because he lacked oil and
destroyers to protect his carriers. Was Fletcher right yes of course he
was. Why? Because the loss of the carrier Wasp, the destroyer Porter and
a battleship torpedoed after his relief. Morrison’s historical work now
has to be looked upon as marred by bias and personal prejudice in order
to please Adm. King. Adm. Fletcher who did so much with so little will
always be remembered as a timid bungler thanks to Morrison. At least the
world now knows Morrison was not a historian and was not fit to write
the history of the USN in WW 2. Who really lost reputation?
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Ztev Konrad
· Tue
You seem to have gone into the background a lot.

But to my unknowledgeable eye , you cant have orders from King and
Nimitz that dont go through the theatre commander Ghormley. Also
Fletchers Task force was much larger than just ‘the carriers’ and escorts

‘The Expeditionary Force of eighty-two ships (designated as Task Force
61), was to be commanded by Vice-Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, and
included the amphibious force of Task Group 61.2 under Rear Admiral
Richmond K. Turner, escorted by the vessels of Task Group 61.1 Rear
Admiral Leigh Noyes.” Wikipedia

When you have overall command of an operation, its your No 1 job and
ridiculous to say it was dumped in his lap. Of course many higher
commanders dont perform adequately in the face of the enemy and chose
the ‘timid’ approach

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