• [digest] 2024 Week 5 (1/3)

    From IACR ePrint Archive@21:1/5 to All on Mon Feb 5 03:28:57 2024
    ## In this issue

    1. [2024/114] Mask Conversions for d+1 shares in Hardware, with ...
    2. [2024/115] Accelerating BGV Bootstrapping for Large $p$ Using ...
    3. [2024/116] On the practical CPAD security of “exact” and ...
    4. [2024/117] Breaking HWQCS: a code-based signature scheme from ...
    5. [2024/118] Data Privacy Made Easy: Enhancing Applications with ...
    6. [2024/119] R3PO: Reach-Restricted Reactive Program Obfuscation ...
    7. [2024/120] K-Waay: Fast and Deniable Post-Quantum X3DH without ...
    8. [2024/121] An acceleration of the AKS prime identification ...
    9. [2024/122] SPRITE: Secure and Private Routing in Payment ...
    10. [2024/123] Memory Checking Requires Logarithmic Overhead
    11. [2024/124] Perceived Information Revisited II: Information- ...
    12. [2024/125] New self-orthogonal codes from weakly regular ...
    13. [2024/126] Monte Carlo Tree Search for automatic differential ...
    14. [2024/127] Attacks Against the INDCPA-D Security of Exact FHE ...
    15. [2024/128] Non-Binding (Designated Verifier) Signature
    16. [2024/129] Finite Key OTP Functionality: Ciphers That Hold Off ...
    17. [2024/130] HADES: Automated Hardware Design Exploration for ...
    18. [2024/131] Practical Post-Quantum Signatures for Privacy
    19. [2024/132] SimpleFT: A Simple Byzantine Fault Tolerant Consensus
    20. [2024/133] Optimizing Implementations of Boolean Functions
    21. [2024/134] Byzantine Fault Tolerance with Non-Determinism, ...
    22. [2024/135] A Closer Look at the Belief Propagation Algorithm ...
    23. [2024/136] Secure Transformer Inference Made Non-interactive
    24. [2024/137] Sleepy Consensus in the Known Participation Model
    25. [2024/138] Correction Fault Attacks on Randomized CRYSTALS- ...
    26. [2024/139] Efficient Arithmetic in Garbled Circuits
    27. [2024/140] Efficient ECDSA-based Adaptor Signature for Batched ...
    28. [2024/141] Secure Statistical Analysis on Multiple Datasets: ...
    29. [2024/142] GradedDAG: An Asynchronous DAG-based BFT Consensus ...
    30. [2024/143] Scalable Collaborative zk-SNARK: Fully Distributed ...
    31. [2024/144] Efficient (3,3)-isogenies on fast Kummer surfaces
    32. [2024/145] Practical Batch Proofs of Exponentiation
    33. [2024/146] Computing Orientations from the Endomorphism Ring ...
    34. [2024/147] Prime Masking vs. Faults - Exponential Security ...
    35. [2024/148] Preliminary Cryptanalysis of the Biscuit Signature ...
    36. [2024/149] Evict+Spec+Time: Exploiting Out-of-Order Execution ...
    37. [2024/150] SALSA FRESCA: Angular Embeddings and Pre-Training ...
    38. [2024/151] Improving Linear Key Recovery Attacks using Walsh ...
    39. [2024/152] Equivalence of Generalised Feistel Networks
    40. [2024/153] Revisiting the Slot-to-Coefficient Transformation ...
    41. [2024/154] Broadcast Encryption using Sum-Product ...
    42. [2024/155] Fully Homomorphic Encryption on large integers
    43. [2024/156] Homomorphic sign evaluation using functional ...
    44. [2024/157] Delphi: sharing assessments of cryptographic ...
    45. [2024/158] HiSE: Hierarchical (Threshold) Symmetric-key Encryption
    46. [2024/159] Logstar: Efficient Linear* Time Secure Merge
    47. [2024/160] LightDAG: A Low-latency DAG-based BFT Consensus ...
    48. [2024/161] zkMatrix: Batched Short Proof for Committed Matrix ...
    49. [2024/162] Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Training for Deep Neural ...

    ## 2024/114

    * Title: Mask Conversions for d+1 shares in Hardware, with Application to Lattice-based PQC
    * Authors: Quinten Norga, Jan-Pieter D'Anvers, Suparna Kundu, Ingrid Verbauwhede
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/114)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/114.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    The conversion between arithmetic and Boolean mask representations (A2B & B2A) is a crucial component for side-channel resistant implementations of lattice-based cryptography.
    In this paper, we present a first- and high-order masked, unified hardware implementation which can perform both A2B & B2A conversions. We optimize the operation on several layers of abstraction, applicable to any protection order.
    First, we propose novel higher-order algorithms for the secure addition and B2A operation. This is achieved through, among others, an improved method for repeated masked modular reduction and through the X2B operation, which can be viewed as a conversion
    from any type of additive masking to its Boolean representation. This allows for the removal of a full secure addition during B2A post-processing.
    Compared to prior work, our $B2A_q$ requires 51/46/45 % less fresh randomness at first through third protection order when implemented in software or hardware.

    Secondly, on the circuit level, we successfully introduce half-cycle data paths and demonstrate how careful, manual masking is a superior approach for masking highly non-linear operations and providing first- and high-order security.
    Our techniques significantly reduce the high latency and fresh randomness overhead, typically introduced by glitch-resistant masking schemes and universally composable gadgets, including HPC3 by Knichel et al. presented at CCS 2022. Compared to state-of-
    the-art algorithms and masking techniques, our unified and high-throughput hardware implementation requires up to 89/84/86 % fewer clock cycles and 78/71/55 % fewer fresh random bits.

    We show detailed performance results for first-, second- and third-order protected implementations on FPGA. Our proposed algorithms are proven secure in the glitch extended probing model and their implementations are validated via practical lab analysis
    using the TVLA methodology. We experimentally show that both our first- and second-order masked implementation is hardened against univariate and multivariate attacks using 100 million traces, for each mode of operation.



    ## 2024/115

    * Title: Accelerating BGV Bootstrapping for Large $p$ Using Null Polynomials Over $\mathbb{Z}_{p^e}$
    * Authors: Shihe Ma, Tairong Huang, Anyu Wang, Xiaoyun Wang
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/115)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/115.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    The BGV scheme is one of the most popular FHE schemes for computing homomorphic integer arithmetic.
    The bootstrapping technique of BGV is necessary to evaluate arbitrarily deep circuits homomorphically.
    However, the BGV bootstrapping performs poorly for large plaintext prime $p$ due to its digit removal procedure exhibiting a computational complexity of at least $O(\sqrt{p})$.
    In this paper, we propose optimizations for the digit removal procedure with large $p$ by leveraging the properties of null polynomials over the ring $\mathbb{Z}_{p^e}$.
    Specifically, we demonstrate that it is possible to construct low-degree null polynomials based on two observations of the input to the digit removal procedure:
    1) the support size of the input can be upper-bounded by $(2B+1)^2$; 2) the size of the lower digits to be removed can be upper-bounded by $B$.
    Here $B$ can be controlled within a narrow interval $[22,23]$ in our parameter selection, making the degree of these null polynomials much smaller than $p$ for large values of $p$.
    These low-degree null polynomials can significantly reduce the polynomial degrees during homomorphic digit removal, thereby decreasing both running time and capacity consumption.
    Theoretically, our optimizations reduce the computational cost of extracting a single digit from $O(\sqrt{pe})$ (by Chen and Han) or $O(\sqrt{p}\sqrt[4]{e})$ (by Geelen et al.) to $\min(2B+1,\sqrt{\lceil e/t\rceil(2B+1)})$ for some $t\ge 1$.
    We implement and benchmark our method on HElib with $p=17,127,257,8191$ and $65537$.
    With our optimized digit removal, we achieve a bootstrapping throughput $1.38\sim151$ times that in HElib, with the speedup increasing with the value of $p$.
    For $p=65537$, we accelerate the digit removal step by 80 times and reduce the bootstrapping time from more than 12 hours to less than 14 minutes.



    ## 2024/116

    * Title: On the practical CPAD security of “exact” and threshold FHE schemes and libraries
    * Authors: Marina Checri, Renaud Sirdey, Aymen Boudguiga, Jean-Paul Bultel, Antoine Choffrut
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/116)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/116.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    In their 2021 seminal paper, Li and Micciancio presented a passive attack against the CKKS approximate FHE scheme and introduced the notion of CPAD security. The current status quo is that this line of attacks does not apply to ``exact'' FHE. In this
    paper, we challenge this statu quo by exhibiting a CPAD key recovery attack on the linearly homomorphic Regev cryptosystem which easily generalizes to other xHE schemes such as BFV, BGV and TFHE showing that these cryptosystems are not CPAD secure in
    their basic form. We also show that existing threshold variants of BFV, BGV and CKKS are particularily exposed to CPAD attackers and would be CPAD-insecure without smudging noise addition after partial decryption. Finally we successfully implement our
    attack against several mainstream FHE libraries and discuss a number of natural countermeasures and discuss their consequences in terms of FHE practice, security and efficiency. The attack itself is quite practical as it typically takes less than an hour
    on an average laptop PC, requiring a few thousand ciphertexts as well as up to around a million evaluations/decryptions, to perform a full key recovery.



    ## 2024/117

    * Title: Breaking HWQCS: a code-based signature scheme from high weight QC-LDPC codes
    * Authors: Alex Pellegrini, Giovanni Tognolini
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/117)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/117.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    We analyse HWQCS, a code based signature scheme presented at ICISC 2023, which uses quasi-cyclic low density parity check codes (QC-LDPC). The scheme introduces high Hamming weight errors and signs each message using a fresh ephemeral secret key rather
    than using only one secret key, so to avoid known attacks on QC-LDPC signature schemes.
    In this paper, we show that the signatures of HWQCS leak substantial information concerning the ephemeral keys and formally describe this behaviour. Furthermore, we show that for each security level, we can exploit the leakage to efficiently
    reconstruct partial secret data from very few signatures, and finally mount a universal forgery attack.



    ## 2024/118

    * Title: Data Privacy Made Easy: Enhancing Applications with Homomorphic Encryption
    * Authors: Charles Gouert, Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/118)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/118.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    Homomorphic encryption is a powerful privacy-preserving technology that is notoriously difficult to configure and use, even for experts. The key difficulties include restrictive programming models of homomorphic schemes and choosing suitable parameters
    for an application. In this tutorial, we outline methodologies to solve these issues and allow for conversion of any application to the encrypted domain using both leveled and fully homomorphic encryption.

    The first approach, called Walrus, is suitable for arithmetic-intensive applications with limited depth and applications with high throughput requirements. Walrus provides an intuitive programming interface and handles parameterization automatically by
    analyzing the application and gathering statistics such as homomorphic noise growth to derive a parameter set tuned specifically for the application. We provide an in-depth example of this approach in the form of a neural network inference as well as
    guidelines for using Walrus effectively.

    Conversely, the second approach (HELM) takes existing HDL designs and converts them to the encrypted domain for secure outsourcing on powerful cloud servers. Unlike Walrus, HELM supports FHE backends and is well-suited for complex applications. At a high
    level, HELM consumes netlists and is capable of performing logic gate operations homomorphically on encryptions of individual bits. HELM incorporates both CPU and GPU acceleration by taking advantage of the inherent parallelism provided by Boolean
    circuits. As a case study, we walk through the process of taking an off-the-shelf HDL design in the form of AES-128 decryption and running it in the encrypted domain with HELM.



    ## 2024/119

    * Title: R3PO: Reach-Restricted Reactive Program Obfuscation and its Application to MA-ABE
    * Authors: Kaartik Bhushan, Sai Lakshmi Bhavana Obbattu, Manoj Prabhakaran, Rajeev Raghunath
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/119)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/119.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    In recent breakthrough results, novel use of garbled circuits yielded constructions for several primitives like Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) and 2-round secure multi-party computation, based on standard assumptions in public-key cryptography. While
    the techniques in these different results have many common elements, these works did not offer a modular abstraction that could be used across them.

    Our main contribution is to introduce a novel notion of obfuscation, called Reach-Restricted Reactive Program Obfuscation (R3PO) that captures the essence of these constructions, and exposes additional capabilities. We provide a powerful composition
    theorem whose proof fully encapsulates the use of garbled circuits in these works.
    As an illustration of the potential of R3PO, and as an important contribution of independent interest, we present a variant of Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption (MA-ABE) that can be based on (single-authority) CP-ABE in a blackbox manner, using
    only standard cryptographic assumptions (e.g., DDH). This is in stark contrast to the existing constructions for MA-ABE, which rely on the random oracle model and/or support only limited policy classes.



    ## 2024/120

    * Title: K-Waay: Fast and Deniable Post-Quantum X3DH without Ring Signatures
    * Authors: Daniel Collins, Loïs Huguenin-Dumittan, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen, Nicolas Rolin, Serge Vaudenay
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/120)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/120.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    The Signal protocol and its X3DH key exchange core are regularly used by billions of people in applications like WhatsApp but are unfortunately not quantum-secure. Thus, designing an efficient and post-quantum secure X3DH alternative is paramount.
    Notably, X3DH supports asynchronicity, as parties can immediately derive keys after uploading them to a central server, and deniability, allowing parties to plausibly deny having completed key exchange. To satisfy these constraints, existing post-quantum
    X3DH proposals use ring signatures (or equivalently a form of designated-verifier signatures) to provide authentication without compromising deniability as regular signatures would. Existing ring signature schemes, however, have some drawbacks. Notably,
    they are not generally proven secure in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) and so the quantum security of parameters that are proposed is unclear and likely weaker than claimed. In addition, they are generally slower than standard primitives like
    KEMs.

    In this work, we propose an efficient, deniable and post-quantum X3DH-like protocol that we call K-Waay, that does not rely on ring signatures. At its core, K-Waay uses a split-KEM, a primitive introduced by Brendel et al. [SAC 2020], to provide Diffie-
    Hellman-like implicit authentication and secrecy guarantees. Along the way, we revisit the formalism of Brendel et al. and identify that additional security properties are required to prove a split-KEM-based protocol secure. We instantiate split-KEM by
    building a protocol based on the Frodo key exchange protocol relying on the plain LWE assumption: our proofs might be of independent interest as we show it satisfies our novel unforgeability and deniability security notions. Finally, we complement our
    theoretical results by thoroughly benchmarking both K-Waay and existing X3DH protocols. Our results show even when using plain LWE and a conservative choice of parameters that K-Waay is significantly faster than previous work.



    ## 2024/121

    * Title: An acceleration of the AKS prime identification algorithm
    * Authors: Stephen Meredith Williams
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/121)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/121.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    In its standard form, the AKS prime identification algorithm is deterministic and polynomial time but too slow to be of practical use. By dropping its deterministic attribute, it can be accelerated to an extent that it is practically useful, though still
    much slower than the widely used Miller-Rabin-Selfridge-Monier (MRSM) algorithm based on the Fermat Little Theorem or the Solovay-Strassen algorithm based on the Euler Criterion. The change made, in the last stage of AKS, is to check a modular equation
    not for a long sequence of values but for a single one. Another change is to reduce, arbitrarily, the size of the parameter $r$ giving the degree of the polynomial used for the last stage.



    ## 2024/122

    * Title: SPRITE: Secure and Private Routing in Payment Channel Networks
    * Authors: Gaurav Panwar, Roopa Vishwanathan, George Torres, Satyajayant Misra * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/122)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/122.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    Payment channel networks are a promising solution to the scalability challenge of blockchains and are designed for significantly increased transaction throughput compared to the layer one blockchain. Since payment channel networks are essentially
    decentralized peer-to-peer networks, routing transactions is a fundamental challenge. Payment channel networks have some unique security and privacy requirements that make pathfinding challenging, for instance, network topology is not publicly known, and
    sender/receiver privacy should be preserved, in addition to providing atomicity guarantees for payments. In this paper, we present an efficient privacy-preserving routing protocol, SPRITE, for payment channel networks that supports concurrent
    transactions. By finding paths offline and processing transactions online, SPRITE can process transactions in just two rounds, which is more efficient compared to prior work. We evaluate SPRITE’s performance using Lightning Net- work data and prove its
    security using the Universal Composability framework. In contrast to the current cutting-edge methods that achieve rapid transactions, our approach significantly reduces the message complexity of the system by 3 orders of magnitude while maintaining
    similar latencies.



    ## 2024/123

    * Title: Memory Checking Requires Logarithmic Overhead
    * Authors: Elette Boyle, Ilan Komargodski, Neekon Vafa
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/123)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/123.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    We study the complexity of memory checkers with computational security and prove the first general tight lower bound.

    Memory checkers, first introduced over 30 years ago by Blum, Evans, Gemmel, Kannan, and Naor (FOCS '91, Algorithmica '94), allow a user to store and maintain a large memory on a remote and unreliable server by using small trusted local storage. The user
    can issue instructions to the server and after every instruction, obtain either the correct value or a failure (but not an incorrect answer) with high probability. The main complexity measure of interest is the size of the local storage and the number of
    queries the memory checker makes upon every logical instruction. The most efficient known construction has query complexity $O(\log n/\log\log n)$ and local space proportional to a computational security parameter, assuming one-way functions, where $n$
    is the logical memory size. Dwork, Naor, Rothblum, and Vaikuntanathan (TCC '09) showed that for a restricted class of ``deterministic and non-adaptive'' memory checkers, this construction is optimal, up to constant factors. However, going beyond the
    small class of deterministic and non-adaptive constructions has remained a major open problem.

    In this work, we fully resolve the complexity of memory checkers by showing that any construction with local space $p$ and query complexity $q$ must satisfy
    $$ p \ge \frac{n}{(\log n)^{O(q)}} \;. $$
    This implies, as a special case, that $q\ge \Omega(\log n/\log\log n)$ in any scheme, assuming that $p\le n^{1-\varepsilon}$ for $\varepsilon>0$. The bound applies to any scheme with computational security, completeness $2/3$, and inverse polynomial in $
    n$ soundness (all of which make our lower bound only stronger). We further extend the lower bound to schemes where the read complexity $q_r$ and write complexity $q_w$ differ. For instance, we show the tight bound that if $q_r=O(1)$ and $p\le n^{1-\
    varepsilon}$ for $\varepsilon>0$, then $q_w\ge n^{\Omega(1)}$. This is the first lower bound, for any non-trivial class of constructions, showing a read-write query complexity trade-off.

    Our proof is via a delicate compression argument showing that a ``too good to be true'' memory checker can be used to compress random bits of information. We draw inspiration from tools recently developed for lower bounds for relaxed locally decodable
    codes. However, our proof itself significantly departs from these works, necessitated by the differences between settings.



    ## 2024/124

    * Title: Perceived Information Revisited II: Information-Theoretical Analysis of Deep-Learning Based Side-Channel Attacks
    * Authors: Akira Ito, Rei Ueno, Naofumi Homma
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/124)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/124.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    In conventional deep-learning-based side-channel attacks (DL-SCAs), an attacker trains a model by updating parameters to minimize the negative log-likelihood (NLL) loss function. Although a decrease in NLL improves DL-SCA performance, the reasons for
    this improvement remain unclear because of the lack of a formal analysis. To address this open problem, this paper explores the relationship between NLL and the attack success rate (SR) and conducts an information-theoretical analysis of DL-SCAs with an
    NLL loss function to solve open problems in DL-SCA. To this end, we introduce a communication channel for DL-SCAs and derive an inequality that links model outputs to the SR. Our inequality states that mutual information between the model output and
    intermediate value, which is named the latent perceived information (LPI), provides an upper bound of the SR of a DL-SCA with a trained neural network. Subsequently, we examine the conjecture by Ito et al. on the relationship between the effective
    perceived information (EPI) and SR and clarify its valid conditions from the perspective of LPI. Our analysis results reveal that a decrease in NLL correlated with an increase in LPI, which indicates that the model capability to extract intermediate
    value information from traces is enhanced. In addition, the results indicate that the LPI bounds the SR from above, and a higher upper bound of the SR could directly improve the SR if the selection function satisfies certain conditions, such as
    bijectivity. Finally, these theoretical insights are validated through attack experiments on neural network models applied to AES software and hardware implementations with masking countermeasures.



    ## 2024/125

    * Title: New self-orthogonal codes from weakly regular plateaued functions and their application in LCD codes
    * Authors: Melike Çakmak, Ahmet Sınak, Oğuz Yayla
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/125)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/125.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    A linear code is considered self-orthogonal if it is contained within its dual code. Self-orthogonal codes have applications in linear complementary dual codes, quantum codes and so on. The construction of self-orthogonal codes from functions over finite
    fields has been studied in the literature. In this paper, we generalize the construction method given by Heng et al. (2023) to weakly regular plateaued functions. We first construct several families of ternary self-orthogonal codes from weakly regular
    plateaued unbalanced functions. Then we use the self-orthogonal codes to construct new families of ternary LCD codes. As a consequence, we obtain (almost) optimal ternary self-orthogonal codes and LCD codes. Moreover, we propose two new classes of $p$-
    ary linear codes from weakly regular plateaued unbalanced functions over the finite fields of odd characteristics.



    ## 2024/126

    * Title: Monte Carlo Tree Search for automatic differential characteristics search: application to SPECK
    * Authors: Emanuele Bellini, David Gerault, Matteo Protopapa, Matteo Rossi
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/126)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/126.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    The search for differential characteristics on block ciphers is a difficult combinatorial problem. In this paper, we investigate the performances of an AI-originated technique, Single Player Monte-Carlo Tree Search (SP-MCTS), in finding good differential
    characteristics on ARX ciphers, with an application to the block cipher SPECK. In order to make this approach competitive, we include several heuristics, such as the combination of forward and backward searches, and achieve significantly faster results
    than state-of-the-art works that are not based on automatic solvers.
    We reach 9, 11, 13, 13 and 15 rounds for SPECK32, SPECK48, SPECK64, SPECK96 and SPECK128 respectively. In order to build our algorithm, we revisit Lipmaa and Moriai's algorithm for listing all optimal differential transitions through modular addition,
    and propose a variant to enumerate all transitions with probability close (up to a fixed threshold) to the optimal, while fixing a minor bug in the original algorithm.



    ## 2024/127

    * Title: Attacks Against the INDCPA-D Security of Exact FHE Schemes
    * Authors: Jung Hee Cheon, Hyeongmin Choe, Alain Passelègue, Damien Stehlé, Elias Suvanto
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/127)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/127.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    A new security model for fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), called INDCPA-D security and introduced by Li and Micciancio [Eurocrypt'21], strengthens INDCPA security by giving the attacker access to a decryption oracle for ciphertexts for which it should
    know the underlying plaintexts. This includes ciphertexts that it (honestly) encrypted and those obtained from the latter by evaluating circuits that it chose. Li and Micciancio singled out the CKKS FHE scheme for approximate data [Asiacrypt'17] by
    giving an INDCPA-D attack on it and (erroneously) claiming that INDCPA-D security and INDCPA security coincide for FHEs on exact data.

    We correct the widespread belief according to which INDCPA-D attacks are specific to approximate homomorphic computations. Indeed, the  equivalency formally proved by Li and Micciancio assumes that the schemes are not only exact but have a negligible
    probability of incorrect decryption. However, almost all competitive implementations of exact FHE schemes give away strong correctness by analyzing correctness heuristically and allowing noticeable probabilities of incorrect decryption. 

    We exploit this imperfect correctness  to mount efficient indistinguishability and key-recovery attacks against all major exact FHE schemes.  We illustrate their strength by concretely breaking the default BFV implementation of OpenFHE and simulating
    an attack for the default parameter set of the CGGI implementation of TFHE-rs (the attack is too expensive to be run on commodity desktops, because of the cost of CGGI bootstrapping). Our attacks extend to threshold versions of the exact FHE schemes,
    when the correctness is similarly loose.



    ## 2024/128

    * Title: Non-Binding (Designated Verifier) Signature
    * Authors: Ehsan Ebrahimi
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/128)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/128.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    We argue that there are some scenarios in which
    plausible deniability might be desired for a digital signature
    scheme. For instance, the non-repudiation property of conventional
    signature schemes is problematic in designing an Instant
    Messaging system (WPES 2004). In this paper, we formally
    define a non-binding signature scheme in which the Signer
    is able to disavow her own signature if she wants, but, the
    Verifier is not able to dispute a signature generated by the
    Signer. That is, the Signer is able to convince a third party
    Judge that she is the owner of a signature without disclosing
    her secret information. We propose a signature scheme that
    is non-binding and unforgeable. Our signature scheme is post-quantum secure if the underlying cryptographic primitives are post-quantum secure. In addition, a modification to our nonbinding
    signature scheme leads to an Instant Messaging system
    that is of independent interest.



    ## 2024/129

    * Title: Finite Key OTP Functionality: Ciphers That Hold Off Attackers Smarter Than Their Designers
    * Authors: Gideon Samid
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/129)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/129.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    The prevailing ciphers rely on the weak assumption that their attacker is not smarter than expected by their designers. The resultant crypto ecology favors the cryptographic powerhouses, and hinders cyber freedom, cyber privacy and cyber democracy.
    This weakness can be remedied by using the gold standard of cryptography -- One Time Pad, OTP. Alas, it comes with a prohibitive cost of a key as long as the message it encrypts. When the stakes are high enough users pay this high price because OTP is
    immunized against smarter and better equipped attackers. Claude Shannon has shown that this size imposition on the key is non-negotiable in the context he analyzed. Alas, changing the context, one could achieve OTP equivalence. Three simple changes are
    introduced: (i) make the size of the key an integral part of the secret, (ii) every finite message is encrypted with an arbitrary part of the key, (iii) allow for open-ended dilution of the contents-bearing bits of the ciphertext, with content-devoid
    bits, which don't confuse the intended recipient, but impose an open-ended cryptanalytic barrier before the attacker. A-priori a cryptanalyst is facing a set of messages each of them deemed plausible to be the one hidden in the ciphertext. If the
    ciphertext is Finite Key OTP compliant then membership in this set will not change after an exhaustive cryptanalytic processing of the ciphertext. This constitutes functional equivalence with OTP. OTP functionality with a shared finite key creates a
    path to digital freedom, digital privacy and digital democracy.



    ## 2024/130

    * Title: HADES: Automated Hardware Design Exploration for Cryptographic Primitives
    * Authors: Fabian Buschkowski, Georg Land, Jan Richter-Brockmann, Pascal Sasdrich, Tim Güneysu
    * [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/130)
    * [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/130.pdf)

    ### Abstract

    While formal constructions for cryptographic schemes have steadily evolved and emerged over the past decades, the design and implementation of efficient and secure hardware instances is still a mostly manual, tedious, and intuition-driven process. With
    the increasing complexity of modern cryptography, e.g., Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) schemes, and consideration of physical implementation attacks, e.g., Side-Channel Analysis (SCA), the design space often grows exorbitantly without developers being
    able to weigh all design options.


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