...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-out-cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by network’s inability to control grid voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
The unprecedented blackout that brought the Iberian peninsula to a standstill at the end of April was caused by surging voltages triggering
“a chain reaction of disconnections” that shut down the power network,
an expert report commissioned by the Spanish government has found.
Speaking to reporters on Tuesday afternoon, the country’s environment minister, Sara Aagesen, ruled out a cyber-attack as the
cause of the outage on 28 April, saying it had been down to a “multifactorial” system failure caused by the network’s inability to control grid voltage.
(read the rest on the link if desired, it is in English)
<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c62d8k8edgxo>
*Spain's government blames huge blackout on grid regulator and private firms*
3 hours ago
Guy Hedgecoe
BBC News in Madrid
The Spanish government has said that the national grid operator and private power generation companies were to blame for an energy blackout
that caused widespread chaos in Spain and Portugal earlier this year.
...
Nearly two months after the unprecedented outage, the minister for ecological transition, Sara Aagesen, has presented a report on its causes.
She said the partly state-owned grid operator, Red Eléctrica, had miscalculated the power capacity needs for that day, explaining that the "system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
The regulator should have switched on another thermal plant, she said, but "they made their calculations and decided that it was not necessary".
Aagesen also blamed private generators for failing to regulate the grid's voltage shortly before the blackout happened.
"Generation firms which were supposed to control voltage and which, in addition, were paid to do just that did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said, without naming
any of the companies responsible.
(read the rest on the link if desired, it is in English)
<https://www.eldiario.es/economia/informe-apagon-detecta-centrales-no-estaban-regulando-tension-desconexion-indebida-instalaciones_1_12391582.html>
Translated article (by DeepL)
*The blackout report detects power plants that ‘were not regulating voltage’ and an ‘undue’ disconnection of installations.*
The historic energy blackout was due to ‘a combination of factors’: there were plants “available” to regulate voltage that were not doing so ‘according to the regulations’ and there were plants that were disconnected ‘improperly’, according to Aagesen
- The government gives an ultimatum to the electricity sector due to its delays in providing data on the blackout.
Antonio M. Vélez
17 June 2025 13:58 h Updated 17/06/2025 17:02 h
14-18 minutes
A phenomenon of ‘overvoltages’ and a ‘chain reaction’ caused by ‘a
combination of factors’ of several agents in the sector, with a plant
that is not available and Red Eléctrica (REE) does not decide to replace
it; generation plants that ‘were not regulating voltage’ as required by the regulations and an ‘improper’ disconnection of facilities. These are the causes of the historic blackout on 28 April, as explained this
Tuesday by the Third Vice-President and Minister for Ecological
Transition, Sara Aagesen.
At a press conference after presenting the report drawn up by the committee investigating the very serious energy blackout, approved this morning by the National Security Council, Aagesen explained that one of
the causes of the blackout is that the system ‘did not have sufficient voltage control capacity’.
The thermal generation groups that had to do so, ‘many of them’ paid financially, ‘did not contribute’ to doing so because the plants ‘were not programmed’ properly. It should be remembered that for at
least five years the National Commission for Markets and Competition
(CNMC) has been planning to approve a regulation to regulate this issue.
The current one is ‘obsolete’, as the regulator itself has acknowledged.
Aagesen insisted that ‘there are several causes’ of the blackout.
One of them is ‘poor voltage regulation capacity’, due to ‘poor planning’ or because ‘some operators’ were not complying with the regulations.
The result of this deficient voltage control is that this parameter ‘did not stop rising’ that morning and the disconnections of plants began. Also the ‘smaller’ ones, which the system operator, REE, ‘cannot see because they are in the distribution network’. After a first disconnection in Granada and those already known in Badajoz and Seville, there are more disconnections that had not been revealed until now in Segovia, Huelva and Cáceres.
According to Aagesen, ‘some of these disconnections occurred improperly’, i.e. before reaching the overvoltage levels allowed by the regulations, and other disconnections occurred ‘within the authorised limits to protect the installations’. And from there to a massive ‘blackout’ within five seconds, with a ‘chain reaction’ against which there was ‘nothing to be done’.
In the first phase of voltage instability, on the eve of the blackout, REE asked 10 power plants ‘spread throughout the territory’ that were not matched by the market to enter the so-called system of technical restrictions in order to control the voltage. But that Sunday afternoon, one of the planned plants was declared ‘unavailable’.
Faced with this change, the system operator has to ‘readjust’ and decides to ‘reschedule but not replace’ that plant: it only does so at dawn. The report does not identify this plant because it is ‘anonymised’ at the express request of the companies, according to sources from Transición Ecológica.
The Vice-President called for ‘reflection’ by ‘all the agents’ in
the electricity system but did not want to point out responsibilities,
which is something that will occur in ‘the next phase’: it will be ‘the administrative and judicial procedures’ that will have to establish
them, in reference to the decisions that the CNMC may take and the proceedings that are already underway in the National Court.
On the day of the blackout, from 10.30 a.m. onwards, voltage instability intensified, although ‘within the limits’ set by the regulations, with various calls from the control centres. At 12:03 a.m.
an ‘atypical’ oscillation arrived, with a higher than normal frequency.
The system operator links it to ‘a specific installation and its anomalous behaviour’; it takes “effective” measures to dampen it but the
‘meshing of the grids’ and the low demand contribute to ‘an increase in voltage’; it also reduces the export of energy to France, which means
that generation in Spain falls and voltage rises.
At 12.16 this oscillation reappears and ‘dampens again’. Another oscillation occurs at 12.19 which is absorbed and the result is a
negative effect ‘on system voltage’. It is decided to connect a power plant in the southern zone but it will take ‘an hour and a half’ to connect. And the disconnections of plants begin.
Aagesen announced that the next Council of Ministers will approve a Royal Decree-Law with a package of measures to ensure that the incident ‘does not happen again’. It will ‘accelerate the implementation’ of the
National Energy Commission (CNE) announced more than a year ago; the ‘supervision and verification’ of system agents will be strengthened, storage will be promoted and the CNMC will approve these regulations to
allow renewables to control voltage, as requested by REE in 2021.
Aagesen explained that in the analysis of the operation of the system, more than 100 requests for information were made, with more than
700 requests and millions of data in 170 GB of information.
The report includes a first phase of voltage instabilities, also in the ‘days prior’ to the blackout, a second phase of system oscillations (in the half hour prior to the outage), another of generation losses,
and the subsequent collapse of the electricity system. A ‘complex, delicate’ analysis with “contradictory” data and ‘information that in the end has not arrived’. These ‘omissions’ have been ‘made explicit in
the report’ that will be published this afternoon.
From the point of view of cybersecurity, it has been concluded that ‘there is no evidence of cyber-incident or cyber-attack as a cause of
the energy crisis, neither in the operator nor at the different levels’.
However, ‘vulnerabilities’ and ‘shortcomings’ have been identified
in the systems in the face of potential risks that will be “exploited”
to issue recommendations for the future, following ‘the largest investigation into cybersecurity that has ever taken place in our
country’, with more than 1600 hours of work, more than a thousand IP,
more than 133 GB and fourteen operators analysed: from the system
operator to the more than 30 control centres of the distributors
throughout the country; and a third level ‘of detail’ of the generation facilities.
Some conclusions will be brought to the attention of the CNMC:
those issues that should be brought to the CNMC's attention. The report,
due to a ‘confidentiality obligation’ has “anonymised” information, ‘on
most occasions’ at the request of the actors involved. Aagesen is due to appear before the Official Secrets Committee this week.
The report has been presented 49 days after the blackout, ‘practically half the time Europe gives to present its report to the EU’ and much earlier than expected.
Aagesen had promised that the document would be ready within three months of the incident, but in recent days (in parallel to the explosion
of the scandal of alleged corruption of Santos Cerdán, now ex-Secretary
of Organisation of the PSOE) the meetings of the inter-ministerial
committee investigating the outage have accelerated. The last meetings
were held last Friday, Sunday and Monday.
In total, this body chaired by Aagesen and made up of ‘state professionals of recognised prestige’ was created on 30 April. It is
made up of several ministries and has held 14 meetings since this
historic Iberian zero, which has provoked cross accusations between the electricity companies (particularly Iberdrola) and the system operator, against the backdrop of the multi-million dollar compensation at stake.
On 4 June, the committee went so far as to write to the electricity companies to express its ‘concern’ about the slowness in sending certain information, which led aelec, which includes Iberdrola and Endesa, to
state that it is ‘absolutely false’ that they were ‘hiding information’
about the blackout, although these two companies acknowledged that they
had some requests for data pending to be answered.
The committee is made up of several ministries, in addition to Ecological Transition (Economy, Defence, Interior...) and organisations
such as the National Cryptologic Centre and the Defence Staff. The
Nuclear Safety Council (CSN) and the CNMC, which will also draw up its
own report, will be ‘invited’. In addition to this document, as required by EU regulations, the European transmission operators' association
ENTSO-e, of which REE is a member, will draw up its own report.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
On 18/06/2025 08:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
That is partly due to machine translation out of the Spanish.
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:
On 18/06/2025 08:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
That is partly due to machine translation out of the Spanish.
The bits I quoted were from Guy Hedgecoe, a BBC correspondent.
On 2025-06-18 09:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
The report was written by a committee of experts. Fifty, I think.
The committee studying the blackout is made up of representatives of the Ministry for Ecological Transition and the
Demographic Challenge (MITECO), the Presidency of the Government, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the
Interior. Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Intelligence Centre, the General Staff and the
National Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure are involved.
https://www.miteco.gob.es/es/prensa/ultimas-noticias/2025/abril/el-gobierno-crea-el-comite-para-el-analisis-de-la-crisis-de-elec.html
#:~:text=Adem%C3%A1s%20del%20MITECO%2C%20el%20Comit%C3%A9%20est%C3%A1%20integrado,medio%20del%20Centro%20Nacional%20de%20Protecci%C3
%B3n%20de [www.miteco.gob.es]
The blackout, which occurred on 28 April 2025, affected the Iberian Peninsula, including Spain, Portugal and Andorra, and
extended as far south as France. The power outage caused disruptions to essential services such as hospitals, airports and
telecommunications networks. The causes of the blackout are being investigated by this committee.
On 2025-06-18 09:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
The report was written by a committee of experts. Fifty, I think.
On 2025-06-18 09:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
The report was written by a committee of experts. Fifty, I think.
The committee studying the blackout is made up of representatives of the Ministry for Ecological Transition and the
Demographic Challenge (MITECO), the Presidency of the Government, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the
Interior. Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Intelligence Centre, the General Staff and the
National Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure are involved.
https://www.miteco.gob.es/es/prensa/ultimas-noticias/2025/abril/el-gobierno-crea-el-comite-para-el-analisis-de-la-crisis-de-elec.html
#:~:text=Adem%C3%A1s%20del%20MITECO%2C%20el%20Comit%C3%A9%20est%C3%A1%20integrado,medio%20del%20Centro%20Nacional%20de%20Protecci%C3
%B3n%20de [www.miteco.gob.es]
The blackout, which occurred on 28 April 2025, affected the Iberian Peninsula, including Spain, Portugal and Andorra, and
extended as far south as France. The power outage caused disruptions to essential services such as hospitals, airports and
telecommunications networks. The causes of the blackout are being investigated by this committee.
On 18/06/2025 17:17, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:
On 18/06/2025 08:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
That is partly due to machine translation out of the Spanish.
The bits I quoted were from Guy Hedgecoe, a BBC correspondent.
Oh dear! Is English his first language?
On Wed, 18 Jun 2025 20:37:20 +0200, "Carlos E.R."
<robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
On 2025-06-18 09:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
The report was written by a committee of experts. Fifty, I think.
How many are experienced power engineers who have the practical
ability to cut to the core and live to tell the tale?
On 18/06/2025 19:37, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-06-18 09:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
The report was written by a committee of experts. Fifty, I think.
The committee studying the blackout is made up of
representatives of the Ministry for Ecological Transition and the
Demographic Challenge (MITECO), the Presidency of the
Government, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the
Interior. Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security,
the National Intelligence Centre, the General Staff and the
National Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure >> are involved.
https://www.miteco.gob.es/es/prensa/ultimas-noticias/2025/abril/el-
gobierno-crea-el-comite-para-el-analisis-de-la-crisis-de-elec.html
#:~:text=Adem%C3%A1s%20del%20MITECO%2C%20el%20Comit%C3%A9%20est%C3%A1%20integrado,medio%20del%20Centro%20Nacional%20de%20Protecci%C3
%B3n%20de [www.miteco.gob.es]
The blackout, which occurred on 28 April 2025, affected the
Iberian Peninsula, including Spain, Portugal and Andorra, and
extended as far south as France. The power outage caused
disruptions to essential services such as hospitals, airports and
telecommunications networks. The causes of the blackout are
being investigated by this committee.
Until they publish a detailed explanation of how it was that a
predictable surge of power from solar PV at high noon was able to bring
down the *entire* Spanish grid it looks like a white wash to me.
Also exactly what order the cascade failure occurred in (and name and prosecute the companies that they claim did not follow the rules).
If that claim is true then they were culpable for the failure.
Comparable UK reports name all the players involved and exactly what
happened at each site and when. See for example the report on our fairly spectacular summer failure in 2023 - this is a summary:
https://reports.electricinsights.co.uk/q3-2019/the-blackout/
NESO seem to have conveniently deleted the original National Grid
technical report from their site :( Aha found it:
https://www.neso.energy/document/152346/download
And that is what a proper investigation report ought to look like!
On 2025-06-18 22:19, Joe Gwinn wrote:
On Wed, 18 Jun 2025 20:37:20 +0200, "Carlos E.R."
<robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
On 2025-06-18 09:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
The report was written by a committee of experts. Fifty, I think.
How many are experienced power engineers who have the practical
ability to cut to the core and live to tell the tale?
As many as necessary. You probably can find their names if you are
interested and seek it out.
On 18/06/2025 08:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
That is partly due to machine translation out of the Spanish.
Long and short of it was they didn't have enough dynamic inertia in the system and when it reached high noon something had to give.
Icarus syndrome - quite literally!
In addition the network failed to protect itself from the abnormal state
and so went completely dark rather than dropping off the main offenders.
I suspect that the French interconnect dropping out was the coup de
grace but without the official timeline being published that is a guess.
A graph of power, frequency and line voltage minute by minute over the relevant few hours would be *very* interesting to examine.
It is odd that they don't explain why it failed so spectacularly
quickly. The final grid collapse took 5s and then it was all over.
On 19/06/2025 1:28 am, Martin Brown wrote:
On 18/06/2025 08:39, Liz Tuddenham wrote:
Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
[...]
...the minister for[...]
ecological transition, Sara Aagesen
the[...]
"system did not have enough dynamic voltage capacity".
did not absorb all the voltage
they were supposed to when tension was high," she said,
The usual nonsense we have come to expect from 'factual' reports.
Ignorant minister? Ignorant reporter? ...or both.
That is partly due to machine translation out of the Spanish.
Long and short of it was they didn't have enough dynamic inertia in
the system and when it reached high noon something had to give.
Icarus syndrome - quite literally!
The way I read it is that a relatively large number of relatively low
power generators - presumably solar cell farms - were programmed to turn themselves off if the net voltage got higher than some preprogrammed limit.
They all seemed to have turned off at once which is presumably what
pulled 3.3GW of generating capacity within thirty seconds.
Icarus died - but the Spanish network survived, as it was intended to do.
It just stopped delivering power for a couple of hours.
In addition the network failed to protect itself from the abnormal
state and so went completely dark rather than dropping off the main
offenders.
On the contrary, it did protect itself from the abnormal state, but at
the considerable cost of a couple of hours of blackout.
I suspect that the French interconnect dropping out was the coup de
grace but without the official timeline being published that is a guess.
A graph of power, frequency and line voltage minute by minute over the
relevant few hours would be *very* interesting to examine.
It is odd that they don't explain why it failed so spectacularly
quickly. The final grid collapse took 5s and then it was all over.
The speed is perfectly explicable. If you have lots of identical
controllers, all designed to turn themselves off when they see a
particular situation, they are all going to turn off at once.
A more intelligent design might have delayed the turn-off by a short, randomly selected delay, so that the excessive voltage might have gone
down slowly enough that the impeding turn-off could have been cancelled
in the slower reacting controllers before it got put into effect.
Adding grid-battery based fast-reacting controller to the system would presumably have worked rather better.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hornsdale_Power_Reserve
does seem to have been used in exactly that way from when it was first installed at the end of 2017. From 2022 it provided about 2000 MW of
inertial response to the grid.
On 2025-06-18 22:28, Martin Brown wrote:
Comparable UK reports name all the players involved and exactly what
happened at each site and when. See for example the report on our
fairly spectacular summer failure in 2023 - this is a summary:
https://reports.electricinsights.co.uk/q3-2019/the-blackout/
NESO seem to have conveniently deleted the original National Grid
technical report from their site :( Aha found it:
https://www.neso.energy/document/152346/download
And that is what a proper investigation report ought to look like!
You will have to wait. There is a procedure to follow.
On 2025-06-19 06:29, Bill Sloman wrote:
On 19/06/2025 1:28 am, Martin Brown wrote:
It is odd that they don't explain why it failed so spectacularly
quickly. The final grid collapse took 5s and then it was all over.
The speed is perfectly explicable. If you have lots of identical
controllers, all designed to turn themselves off when they see a
particular situation, they are all going to turn off at once.
A more intelligent design might have delayed the turn-off by a short,
randomly selected delay, so that the excessive voltage might have gone
down slowly enough that the impeding turn-off could have been
cancelled in the slower reacting controllers before it got put into
effect.
Adding grid-battery based fast-reacting controller to the system would
presumably have worked rather better.
Possibly.
A huge solar plant is being named. Well, its name has leaked.
<https://www.eldiario.es/economia/central-fotovoltaica-origen-apagon-megaplanta-nunez-balboa-iberdrola_1_12395979.html>
+++------------------
*The photovoltaic plant at the origin of the blackout is Iberdrola's
Núñez de Balboa mega-plant.*
As confirmed by elDiario.es, it was this plant which, half an hour before the outage, when it was generating 250 MW, began to produce
anomalous oscillations which Red Eléctrica has asked to investigate and attributes to ‘a malfunction of an internal control’ or ‘an internal anomaly (...) to be clarified by the owner’
- Red Eléctrica places the start of the blackout in the ‘malfunction’ of a photovoltaic plant in Badajoz
The photovoltaic plant in the province of Badajoz that triggered the historic blackout on 28 April, when it caused a series of anomalous oscillations in the grid, is Iberdrola's Núñez de Balboa mega-plant.
This was confirmed to elDiario.es by several sources familiar with the confidential reports of the Government's commission of experts and the
system operator, Red Eléctrica, which asked to investigate the ‘malfunctioning’ of this installation, one of the largest solar parks in the country.
The government has concluded, after 49 days of investigation, that the Iberian blackout was a ‘multifactorial’ event without a single cause
that would explain a combination of factors: insufficient capacity in
the system to regulate voltage as expected, failures in REE's
programming (which the company denies), malfunctioning of the voltage
control systems of generation facilities and plants that were
disconnected ‘improperly’.
It was, according to the governmental opinion, ‘a combination of conditions’ that led to ‘a chain reaction of overvoltage, with no single fault having been identified that could alone explain the outage’.
This ‘chain reaction’ started, according to REE, half an hour before the blackout. Until midday on Monday ‘nothing could have foreshadowed or
even remotely predicted the events that occurred’, according to the
system operator.
But at 12:03, an anomalous oscillation reduced the
voltage in the system and forced urgent measures to be taken.
As REE's Director of Operations, Concha Sánchez, explained at a press conference on Wednesday, this ‘very significant’ fluctuation lasted almost five minutes and required “immediate” action as it was a ‘dangerous’ situation: the way in which the interconnection with France operates had to be changed, as it stopped operating on alternating
current and switched to fixed set-point, and the grid meshing was
increased, which complicated voltage control.
The origin is in what the report released Wednesday by REE calls ‘Photovoltaic Plant A’, which according to sources consulted by elDiario.es corresponds to the Núñez de Balboa plant. At that time, the facility generated about 250 megawatts (MW), according to the REE
report. The Government's report (in its confidential version, instead of
the one published with numerous crossings out and the names of plants
and companies erased, as the electricity companies had demanded), points
to ‘anomalous oscillatory behaviour in the output of active and reactive power’ of this Iberdrola plant.
"In a few seconds, the plant's generation oscillates with a peak-to-peak amplitude of around 70% of the output it had immediately before the oscillation. This behaviour contrasts with that of other plants of the
same technology connected at the same node or nearby nodes," says the document published by the government on Tuesday night.
According to the report, this oscillation is ‘more typical of
synchronous technologies’, such as nuclear or gas, which ‘modify their power factor to maintain a constant voltage’, than of a photovoltaic
plant, ‘which is subject to a fixed power factor’ and in which ‘the output power value, especially the active power, should be constant’.
According to the committee's opinion, "during this disturbance there are strong voltage oscillations, not only in frequency and power, mainly in
the south and west of the Iberian Peninsula. Unlike previous voltage fluctuations detected on the same morning or on previous days, in this
case there are repetitive oscillations of voltage rise and fall in the
space of seconds, which follow a specific pattern coinciding with the oscillation in frequency, in the form of a seesaw".
‘During this period, some calls are reported by agents to the System Operator about the oscillations’ and ‘a sudden drop in the damping of
the system is detected’, which ‘becomes more vulnerable’. The same oscillation is reproduced at 12.16 pm. One minute earlier, the Núñez de Balboa plant had ‘changed its production’ from the aforementioned 250 MW to 350 MW.
According to the REE report, ‘no fluctuations were observed in the
plant's active power’, but ‘in reactive power’, which is needed to operate the electricity grids. This second oscillation of Núñez de
Balboa comes shortly before another less atypical one originating in the centre of Europe at 12.19 pm, a prelude to the succession of
overvoltages that will begin at 12.22 pm, which the system will not be
able to absorb and will end up leading to the blackout.
REE points to a malfunction at Núñez de Balboa as an explanation for
this anomalous behaviour: ‘The grid conditions at the connection point, short-circuit power and voltage level were analysed, and both were
correct, so it is likely that the oscillation was caused by a
malfunction of an internal control or by an internal anomaly of the
plant, which should be clarified by the owner of the plant’.
‘The other plant that evacuates to the transmission grid through the
same link installation as well as others that evacuate in nearby
substations has been reviewed, and the only one that oscillated was the
one indicated,’ says the system operator's report published on Wednesday.
The document, which REE is obliged to publish by regulation, given the seriousness of the blackout, calls for an ‘investigation into the cause
of the appearance of the forced oscillation originating in the
photovoltaic plant in the province of Badajoz and to implement
corrective actions to avoid its repetition’.
"Before, during and after
When asked by elDiario.es, Iberdrola does not comment on this matter. On Wednesday, sources from the electricity company told Europa Press that
its behaviour was ‘impeccable’, in contrast to the ‘reckless and negligent’ management of REE, and expressed their “astonishment” at the statements made by those responsible for Redeia, ‘who seem to confuse
the consequences of the blackout with its causes’.
While the groundwork is being prepared to determine who is responsible
for the blackout, with a view to the millions in compensation that will
have to be paid to those affected in the future, Iberdrola has been
pointing the finger at REE, as the electricity system operator, as being responsible for the incident for weeks.
Its executive chairman, Ignacio Sánchez Galán, said a few weeks ago that ‘Iberdrola's actions before, during and after the incident always
responded to the protocols and regulations established by the competent ministry and by the system operator, which is Red Eléctrica, which is ultimately responsible for keeping the lights on in the country’. The
day before, the CEO of Iberdrola España, Mario Ruiz-Tagle, stressed that ‘the responsibility for controlling overvoltages lies with Red Eléctrica’.
The malfunctioning of Núñez de Balboa is not the only cause of the blackout, but it is the beginning of the events that led to this unprecedented Iberian zero, according to REE, which fixes its origin in
the previous half hour.
But the vice-president and minister for Ecological Transition, Sara
Aagesen, pointed on Tuesday to ‘poor planning’ on the eve of the
blackout by REE in the reserve power (gas and nuclear) in the so-called technical restrictions market, which the company denies: the planned
power was at annual minimums, and also a plant was declared unavailable
and was not replaced.
The government has also pointed out (this analysis is shared by REE)
that this reserve market did not work as it should: the three nuclear reactors and the six combined cycle gas plants that were supposed to
operate under technical restrictions (a mechanism with which electricity companies pocket billions every year) ‘were not regulating voltage’ as they should when these surges began. One gas plant in southern Spain
stands out as doing the opposite of what it should have done: it
injected reactive power instead of absorbing it.
According to REE's Director of Operations, if these plants had done
their job by controlling the voltage, ‘we would not have had a
blackout’. ‘The incident would have been avoided,’ said the non-executive president of REE, Beatriz Corredor. The former socialist minister insists on denying any responsibility for the company and rules
out resigning.
The third cause of the blackout, according to the government's report,
is an ‘undue’ disconnection of installations: a ‘cascading tripping of renewable generation plants’, says REE, which does not identify which
ones because the companies in the sector have asked to anonymise all the information that affects them. REE has agreed to publish the information
that affects it.
It is likely that this information will emerge with the report being
prepared by the sector regulator, the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC).
In the background of the blackout is also the lack of mechanisms to
allow renewables to regulate voltage. This possibility is included in an operating procedure that is already 25 years old. Its update, as the REE report reminds us, ‘has been pending approval since 2021’ by the CNMC.
On 19/06/2025 09:04, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-06-19 06:29, Bill Sloman wrote:
On 19/06/2025 1:28 am, Martin Brown wrote:
While the groundwork is being prepared to determine who is responsible
for the blackout, with a view to the millions in compensation that
will have to be paid to those affected in the future, Iberdrola has
been pointing the finger at REE, as the electricity system operator,
as being responsible for the incident for weeks.
They have had enough warnings that something like this would happen if
they cut their spinning reserves right to the bone.
It must also surely be the responsibility of *all* the generating
systems not to continue to push full power into an already over voltage
and over frequency grid.
But the vice-president and minister for Ecological Transition, Sara
Aagesen, pointed on Tuesday to ‘poor planning’ on the eve of the
blackout by REE in the reserve power (gas and nuclear) in the
so-called technical restrictions market, which the company denies: the
planned power was at annual minimums, and also a plant was declared
unavailable and was not replaced.
That is the influence of bean counters. Spinning reserves cost money.
The government has also pointed out (this analysis is shared by REE)
that this reserve market did not work as it should: the three nuclear
reactors and the six combined cycle gas plants that were supposed to
operate under technical restrictions (a mechanism with which
electricity companies pocket billions every year) ‘were not regulating
voltage’ as they should when these surges began. One gas plant in
southern Spain stands out as doing the opposite of what it should have
done: it injected reactive power instead of absorbing it.
If that is true then they should be prosecuted for it. They helped to
bring down the grid. It doesn't bode well when the investigators have
their hands tied by government and the energy companies to anonymise who
was guilty of what! Better to pretend it was multifactorial and
completely unforeseeable than try to find and fix the actual root cause.
According to REE's Director of Operations, if these plants had done
their job by controlling the voltage, ‘we would not have had a
blackout’. ‘The incident would have been avoided,’ said the
non-executive president of REE, Beatriz Corredor. The former socialist
minister insists on denying any responsibility for the company and
rules out resigning.
Why am I not surprised?
The third cause of the blackout, according to the government's report,
is an ‘undue’ disconnection of installations: a ‘cascading tripping of >> renewable generation plants’, says REE, which does not identify which
ones because the companies in the sector have asked to anonymise all
the information that affects them. REE has agreed to publish the
information that affects it.
It wasn't undue if they were left holding the baby and the grid was in catastrophic collapse. Serious damage can result to their output stages.
It is likely that this information will emerge with the report being
prepared by the sector regulator, the National Markets and Competition
Commission (CNMC).
The sector regulator seems to have totally failed to regulate.
In the background of the blackout is also the lack of mechanisms to
allow renewables to regulate voltage. This possibility is included in
an operating procedure that is already 25 years old. Its update, as
the REE report reminds us, ‘has been pending approval since 2021’ by
the CNMC.
Perhaps now they might pull their finger out and do it.
Don't hold your breath.
On 19/06/2025 09:04, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-06-19 06:29, Bill Sloman wrote:
On 19/06/2025 1:28 am, Martin Brown wrote:
It is odd that they don't explain why it failed so spectacularly
quickly. The final grid collapse took 5s and then it was all over.
The speed is perfectly explicable. If you have lots of identical
controllers, all designed to turn themselves off when they see a
particular situation, they are all going to turn off at once.
That is the sort of detail that should be in the report and isn't.
A huge solar plant is being named. Well, its name has leaked.
<https://www.eldiario.es/economia/central-fotovoltaica-origen-apagon-
megaplanta-nunez-balboa-iberdrola_1_12395979.html>
+++------------------
*The photovoltaic plant at the origin of the blackout is Iberdrola's
Núñez de Balboa mega-plant.*
As confirmed by elDiario.es, it was this plant which, half an
hour before the outage, when it was generating 250 MW, began to
produce anomalous oscillations which Red Eléctrica has asked to
investigate and attributes to ‘a malfunction of an internal control’
or ‘an internal anomaly (...) to be clarified by the owner’
- Red Eléctrica places the start of the blackout in the
‘malfunction’ of a photovoltaic plant in Badajoz
The photovoltaic plant in the province of Badajoz that triggered the
historic blackout on 28 April, when it caused a series of anomalous
oscillations in the grid, is Iberdrola's Núñez de Balboa mega-plant.
This was confirmed to elDiario.es by several sources familiar with the
confidential reports of the Government's commission of experts and the
system operator, Red Eléctrica, which asked to investigate the
‘malfunctioning’ of this installation, one of the largest solar parks
in the country.
Now we are getting somewhere...
Thank heavens for unauthorised leaks in corrupt political administrations.
As REE's Director of Operations, Concha Sánchez, explained at a press
conference on Wednesday, this ‘very significant’ fluctuation lasted
almost five minutes and required “immediate” action as it was a
‘dangerous’ situation: the way in which the interconnection with
France operates had to be changed, as it stopped operating on
alternating current and switched to fixed set-point, and the grid
meshing was increased, which complicated voltage control.
"stopped operating on AC" does that mean it can switch to DC operation
to allow Spain to freewheel its grid frequency?
If it was operating in "DC mode" why did it disconnect?
‘During this period, some calls are reported by agents to the System
Operator about the oscillations’ and ‘a sudden drop in the damping of
the system is detected’, which ‘becomes more vulnerable’. The same
oscillation is reproduced at 12.16 pm. One minute earlier, the Núñez
de Balboa plant had ‘changed its production’ from the aforementioned
250 MW to 350 MW.
Did some of the classical turbine generator systems drop off grid
prematurely to save themselves from the frequency going out of bounds?
That could partially explain the loss of damping (or was there almost no spinning reserve making power at the peak of solar PV output).
According to the REE report, ‘no fluctuations were observed in the
plant's active power’, but ‘in reactive power’, which is needed to
operate the electricity grids. This second oscillation of Núñez de
Balboa comes shortly before another less atypical one originating in
the centre of Europe at 12.19 pm, a prelude to the succession of
overvoltages that will begin at 12.22 pm, which the system will not be
able to absorb and will end up leading to the blackout.
The fluctuation "originating" in the "centre of Europe" sounds more like
a reaction to Spain injecting fluctuations into the continental grid.
"Before, during and after
When asked by elDiario.es, Iberdrola does not comment on this matter.
On Wednesday, sources from the electricity company told Europa Press
that its behaviour was ‘impeccable’, in contrast to the ‘reckless and >> negligent’ management of REE, and expressed their “astonishment” at
the statements made by those responsible for Redeia, ‘who seem to
confuse the consequences of the blackout with its causes’.
It will become a finger pointing game and only the fat slimly lawyers defending their clients will win in the end. Decade long legal battle...
While the groundwork is being prepared to determine who is responsible
for the blackout, with a view to the millions in compensation that
will have to be paid to those affected in the future, Iberdrola has
been pointing the finger at REE, as the electricity system operator,
as being responsible for the incident for weeks.
They have had enough warnings that something like this would happen if
they cut their spinning reserves right to the bone.
The government has also pointed out (this analysis is shared by REE)
that this reserve market did not work as it should: the three nuclear
reactors and the six combined cycle gas plants that were supposed to
operate under technical restrictions (a mechanism with which
electricity companies pocket billions every year) ‘were not regulating
voltage’ as they should when these surges began. One gas plant in
southern Spain stands out as doing the opposite of what it should have
done: it injected reactive power instead of absorbing it.
If that is true then they should be prosecuted for it. They helped to
bring down the grid. It doesn't bode well when the investigators have
their hands tied by government and the energy companies to anonymise who
was guilty of what! Better to pretend it was multifactorial and
completely unforeseeable than try to find and fix the actual root cause.
The Australian example might get drawn to their attention, but I doubt it.
On 18/06/2025 23:16, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-06-18 22:28, Martin Brown wrote:
Comparable UK reports name all the players involved and exactly what
happened at each site and when. See for example the report on our
fairly spectacular summer failure in 2023 - this is a summary:
https://reports.electricinsights.co.uk/q3-2019/the-blackout/
NESO seem to have conveniently deleted the original National Grid
technical report from their site :( Aha found it:
https://www.neso.energy/document/152346/download
And that is what a proper investigation report ought to look like!
On 2025-06-17 21:38, Carlos E.R. wrote:
It looks like a promotional article, but it shows that there are battery systems installed, and some more are being created.
<https://www.eleconomista.es/energia/noticias/13425187/06/25/iberdrola-avanza-en-la-construccion-de-nuevos-sistemas-de-almacenamiento-de-energia-con-baterias.html>
Iberdrola is making progress in the construction of new energy storage systems with batteries.
The electricity company is already building five facilities with almost 150 MW
The company is also making progress in pumping in the Cáceres area.
Rubén Esteller
20/06/2025 - 10:10
Iberdrola is promoting new energy storage projects with batteries. The company, which already has a solid presence in the renewable energy
sector, is developing a series of key facilities that will enable it to optimise the use of energy generated by renewable sources such as solar
and wind.
Among the most important projects are the six battery energy storage
systems (BESS) that the utility has begun to build in several autonomous communities. These facilities, which have a combined capacity of 150 MW,
are backed by aid from the Strategic Programme for the Recovery and Transformation of the Economy, and will generate 100 direct and indirect jobs. The storage capacity of each of these plants is two hours, which
will provide flexibility to the electricity system, allowing for the
storage of surplus energy when renewable production is high to be
released later at times of higher demand.
Iberdrola pioneered the installation of batteries alongside renewable
energy sources. With a 3MW battery and 9MWh of storage capacity, Campo Arañuelo III, in Cáceres, was the first photovoltaic project in Spain to incorporate a storage battery.
...
Iberdrola also remains committed to large-scale pumped storage hydroelectricity. In this field, the company has a significant presence
in projects such as Cortes-La Muela, in Valencia, and Tamega, in
Portugal, with the La Muela plant being the largest pumped storage
facility in Europe, with an installed capacity of 1,293 MW.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-out- cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after expert report*
On 2025-06-17 21:38, Carlos E.R. wrote:
Sara Aagesen, Minister for Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge: "the objective of strengthening the resilience of our
electricity system takes on special relevance in the current context, a complex and geopolitically very, very complicated context. Promoting the energy transition, promoting the electrification of industrial demand, sustainable mobility, the entry of more innovative technologies and solutions, such as storage and flexibility, allows us to create a more robust, more solvent system, with more stable and predictable bills for citizens, the self-employed, SMEs and our industry. In short, more
strategic autonomy in a complex, uncertain and volatile world".
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-out- cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by network’s inability to control grid voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
On 2025-06-17 21:38, Carlos E.R. wrote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-out-
cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by networks inability to control grid
voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
<https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con-francia/>
Energy policy
*The Government approves the installation of synchronous compensators
and reinforces the interconnection with France*
The 65 actions are aimed at incorporating additional tools into the
networks to facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of >oscillations and, in general, to reinforce the electricity system
Redaccin
Editorial staff
07/08/2025
The Council of Ministers, at the request of the Ministry for Ecological >Transition and the Demographic Challenge (Miteco), has approved a list
of specific actions to increase the resilience of the electricity grid,
which will be incorporated as a new Specific Modification to the
Development Plan for the Electricity Transmission Grid 2021-2026, the
second, after the one implemented in 2024. The list includes 65 actions
aimed at incorporating additional tools into the grids to facilitate
voltage control, stability in the event of fluctuations and, in general,
the reinforcement of the electricity system, both on the Spanish
mainland and in the Canary Islands and Balearic Islands.
The actions include the installation of synchronous compensators for the >first time on the mainland, as well as the incorporation of new units on
the islands. These devices provide dynamic voltage control and, given
their local nature, are distributed geographically to reinforce it in
the different areas, complementing the equipment and solutions that the >system already has for this function.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 22:10:21 +0200, "Carlos E.R."
<robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
On 2025-06-17 21:38, Carlos E.R. wrote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-out-
cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by network’s inability to control grid
voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
<https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con-francia/>
Energy policy
*The Government approves the installation of synchronous compensators
and reinforces the interconnection with France*
The 65 actions are aimed at incorporating additional tools into the
networks to facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of
oscillations and, in general, to reinforce the electricity system
Redacción
Editorial staff
07/08/2025
The Council of Ministers, at the request of the Ministry for Ecological
Transition and the Demographic Challenge (Miteco), has approved a list
of specific actions to increase the resilience of the electricity grid,
which will be incorporated as a new Specific Modification to the
Development Plan for the Electricity Transmission Grid 2021-2026, the
second, after the one implemented in 2024. The list includes 65 actions
aimed at incorporating additional tools into the grids to facilitate
voltage control, stability in the event of fluctuations and, in general,
the reinforcement of the electricity system, both on the Spanish
mainland and in the Canary Islands and Balearic Islands.
The actions include the installation of synchronous compensators for the
first time on the mainland, as well as the incorporation of new units on
the islands. These devices provide dynamic voltage control and, given
their local nature, are distributed geographically to reinforce it in
the different areas, complementing the equipment and solutions that the
system already has for this function.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:out-
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 22:10:21 +0200, "Carlos E.R."
<robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
On 2025-06-17 21:38, Carlos E.R. wrote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-
cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout><https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la- instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con- francia/>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by network’s inability to control grid >>>> voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
Energy policy
*The Government approves the installation of synchronous compensators
and reinforces the interconnection with France*
The 65 actions are aimed at incorporating additional tools into the
networks to facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of
oscillations and, in general, to reinforce the electricity system
Redacción
Editorial staff
07/08/2025
The Council of Ministers, at the request of the Ministry for
Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (Miteco), has
approved a list of specific actions to increase the resilience of the
electricity grid,
which will be incorporated as a new Specific Modification to the
Development Plan for the Electricity Transmission Grid 2021-2026, the
second, after the one implemented in 2024. The list includes 65
actions aimed at incorporating additional tools into the grids to
facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of fluctuations
and, in general,
the reinforcement of the electricity system, both on the Spanish
mainland and in the Canary Islands and Balearic Islands.
The actions include the installation of synchronous compensators for
the first time on the mainland, as well as the incorporation of new
units on the islands. These devices provide dynamic voltage control
and, given their local nature, are distributed geographically to
reinforce it in the different areas, complementing the equipment and
solutions that the system already has for this function.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments
may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as
motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine
where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because like
all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced on an
hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage control service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:out-
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 22:10:21 +0200, "Carlos E.R."
<robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
On 2025-06-17 21:38, Carlos E.R. wrote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-
cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout><https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la- >instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con- >francia/>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by networks inability to control grid
voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
Energy policy
*The Government approves the installation of synchronous compensators
and reinforces the interconnection with France*
The 65 actions are aimed at incorporating additional tools into the
networks to facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of
oscillations and, in general, to reinforce the electricity system
Redaccin
Editorial staff
07/08/2025
The Council of Ministers, at the request of the Ministry for
Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (Miteco), has
approved a list of specific actions to increase the resilience of the
electricity grid,
which will be incorporated as a new Specific Modification to the
Development Plan for the Electricity Transmission Grid 2021-2026, the
second, after the one implemented in 2024. The list includes 65
actions aimed at incorporating additional tools into the grids to
facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of fluctuations
and, in general,
the reinforcement of the electricity system, both on the Spanish
mainland and in the Canary Islands and Balearic Islands.
The actions include the installation of synchronous compensators for
the first time on the mainland, as well as the incorporation of new
units on the islands. These devices provide dynamic voltage control
and, given their local nature, are distributed geographically to
reinforce it in the different areas, complementing the equipment and
solutions that the system already has for this function.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments
may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as
motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine
where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because like
all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced on an
hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage control
service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they are >unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators, will
deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited, and consume >reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor). They have been in >common use since the early days of power distribution to produce reactive >power near loads, to reduce the amount remote generation needs to send
over transmission lines, with the attendant losses. Regular capacitors
are also used for this purpose, but the rotary type is continuously >adjustable.
On Wed, 09 Jul 2025 21:49:09 GMT, Glen Walpert <nospam@null.void> wrote:<clip>
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
The actions include the installation of synchronous compensators for
the first time on the mainland, as well as the incorporation of new
units on the islands. These devices provide dynamic voltage control
and, given their local nature, are distributed geographically to
reinforce it in the different areas, complementing the equipment and >>>>> solutions that the system already has for this function.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments
may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as
motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine
where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because
like all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced
on an hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage
control service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they are >>unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators, will >>deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited, and
consume reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor). They have >>been in common use since the early days of power distribution to produce >>reactive power near loads, to reduce the amount remote generation needs
to send over transmission lines, with the attendant losses. Regular >>capacitors are also used for this purpose, but the rotary type is >>continuously adjustable.
Yeah. I read Frank's comment as well, and he may well be correct, but
one cannot assume that politicians are being quite that precise.
In the mechanical world, it's quite common to have a large but unloaded three-phase induction motor running at or near synchronous speed,
precisely to absorb surge loads, and it would also serve to absorb surge overvoltages ... if they are large enough. The energy is stored in the rotational energy of the rotor.
Do we have any idea how big these Synchronous Compensators are, in
kilograms?
The good news is that they are talking spinning reserve, like big
turbines, not fancy electronics and batteries.
Joe
On Wed, 09 Jul 2025 18:08:45 -0400, Joe Gwinn wrote:
On Wed, 09 Jul 2025 21:49:09 GMT, Glen Walpert <nospam@null.void> wrote:<clip>
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
The actions include the installation of synchronous compensators for >>>>>> the first time on the mainland, as well as the incorporation of new >>>>>> units on the islands. These devices provide dynamic voltage control >>>>>> and, given their local nature, are distributed geographically to
reinforce it in the different areas, complementing the equipment and >>>>>> solutions that the system already has for this function.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments
may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as
motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine >>>> where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because
like all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced
on an hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage >>>> control service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they are >>>unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators, will >>>deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited, and >>>consume reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor). They have >>>been in common use since the early days of power distribution to produce >>>reactive power near loads, to reduce the amount remote generation needs >>>to send over transmission lines, with the attendant losses. Regular >>>capacitors are also used for this purpose, but the rotary type is >>>continuously adjustable.
Yeah. I read Frank's comment as well, and he may well be correct, but
one cannot assume that politicians are being quite that precise.
In the mechanical world, it's quite common to have a large but unloaded
three-phase induction motor running at or near synchronous speed,
precisely to absorb surge loads, and it would also serve to absorb surge
overvoltages ... if they are large enough. The energy is stored in the
rotational energy of the rotor.
Do we have any idea how big these Synchronous Compensators are, in
kilograms?
The good news is that they are talking spinning reserve, like big
turbines, not fancy electronics and batteries.
Joe
Tons might be a more appropriate unit of weight, though I haven't seen any >figures.
From:
< https://www.hitachienergy.com/products-and-solutions/facts/synchronous-condenser-system >
"Hitachi Energy's synchronous condenser system cover 10 - 200 MVAr range
with single-machine solutions. Installation of larger machines or when
100% redundancy is required, a multi-machine installation with coor-
dinated control can be installed. This solution is based on a modular >concept."
A 200 MVAr synchronous condenser will be about the same size as a 200 MW >synchronous motor.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-out-cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April blackout, after
expert report*
System failure caused by network’s inability to control grid voltage said
to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:
instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con- francia/><https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments
may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as
motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine
where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because like
all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced on an
hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage control
service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they are unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators, will
deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited, and consume reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor). They have been in common use since the early days of power distribution to produce reactive power near loads, to reduce the amount remote generation needs to send
over transmission lines, with the attendant losses. Regular capacitors
are also used for this purpose, but the rotary type is continuously adjustable.
On Wed, 09 Jul 2025 22:37:57 GMT, Glen Walpert <nospam@null.void>
wrote:
On Wed, 09 Jul 2025 18:08:45 -0400, Joe Gwinn wrote:
On Wed, 09 Jul 2025 21:49:09 GMT, Glen Walpert <nospam@null.void> wrote: >>>
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
From:
< https://www.hitachienergy.com/products-and-solutions/facts/synchronous-condenser-system >
"Hitachi Energy's synchronous condenser system cover 10 - 200 MVAr range
with single-machine solutions. Installation of larger machines or when
100% redundancy is required, a multi-machine installation with coor-
dinated control can be installed. This solution is based on a modular
concept."
A 200 MVAr synchronous condenser will be about the same size as a 200 MW
synchronous motor.
That seems plausible.
If I'm guessing Spanish politics correctly, the Government has decided
to bite the bullet, and they'll go big. Here's hoping.
On 6/17/2025 12:38 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-
out-cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by network’s inability to control grid
voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
[snip]
But, why the omission of specific details? WHICH installation had
problems?
Which firms are being slow in producing the requested data?
Is there a reason not to hold people (and organizations) accountable, BY NAME?
On Thu, 10 Jul 2025 02:27:53 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 23:49, Glen Walpert wrote:
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:
...
instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con-<https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-
francia/>
...
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments
may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as
motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine >>>> where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because
like all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced
on an hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage >>>> control service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they are
unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators, will
deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited, and
consume reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor). They have
been in common use since the early days of power distribution to
produce reactive power near loads, to reduce the amount remote
generation needs to send over transmission lines, with the attendant
losses. Regular capacitors are also used for this purpose, but the
rotary type is continuously adjustable.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synchronous_condenser>
Synchronous condenser
In electrical engineering, a synchronous condenser (sometimes called a
syncon, synchronous capacitor or synchronous compensator) is a
DC-excited synchronous motor, whose shaft is not connected to anything
but spins freely.[1] Its purpose is not to convert electric power to
mechanical power or vice versa, but to adjust conditions on the three
phase electric power transmission grid. Its field is controlled by a
voltage regulator to either generate or absorb reactive power as needed
to adjust the grid's voltage, or to improve power factor. The
condenser’s installation and operation are identical to large electric
motors and generators. (Some generators are actually designed to be able
to operate as synchronous condensers with the prime mover
disconnected[2]).
Right. While I recall them being referred to as rotary capacitors
somewhere, even the classic "Principles of Alternating Current Machinery"
by Lawrence and Richards 4th ed 1953 calls them synchronous condensers.
(This book was written by the MIT professors who first developed a lot of
the rigorous analysis presented.)
On Wed, 09 Jul 2025 21:49:09 GMT, Glen Walpert <nospam@null.void>
wrote:
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:out-
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 22:10:21 +0200, "Carlos E.R."
<robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
On 2025-06-17 21:38, Carlos E.R. wrote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-
instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con-cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout><https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by networks inability to control grid >>>>>> voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
francia/>
Energy policy
*The Government approves the installation of synchronous compensators >>>>> and reinforces the interconnection with France*
The 65 actions are aimed at incorporating additional tools into the
networks to facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of
oscillations and, in general, to reinforce the electricity system
Redacción
Editorial staff
07/08/2025
The Council of Ministers, at the request of the Ministry for
Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (Miteco), has
approved a list of specific actions to increase the resilience of the >>>>> electricity grid,
which will be incorporated as a new Specific Modification to the
Development Plan for the Electricity Transmission Grid 2021-2026, the >>>>> second, after the one implemented in 2024. The list includes 65
actions aimed at incorporating additional tools into the grids to
facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of fluctuations
and, in general,
the reinforcement of the electricity system, both on the Spanish
mainland and in the Canary Islands and Balearic Islands.
The actions include the installation of synchronous compensators for >>>>> the first time on the mainland, as well as the incorporation of new
units on the islands. These devices provide dynamic voltage control
and, given their local nature, are distributed geographically to
reinforce it in the different areas, complementing the equipment and >>>>> solutions that the system already has for this function.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments
may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as
motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine
where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because like
all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced on an
hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage control >>> service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they are
unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators, will
deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited, and consume >> reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor). They have been in
common use since the early days of power distribution to produce reactive
power near loads, to reduce the amount remote generation needs to send
over transmission lines, with the attendant losses. Regular capacitors
are also used for this purpose, but the rotary type is continuously
adjustable.
Yeah. I read Frank's comment as well, and he may well be correct, but
one cannot assume that politicians are being quite that precise.
In the mechanical world, it's quite common to have a large but
unloaded three-phase induction motor running at or near synchronous
speed, precisely to absorb surge loads, and it would also serve to
absorb surge overvoltages ... if they are large enough. The energy is
stored in the rotational energy of the rotor.
Do we have any idea how big these Synchronous Compensators are, in
kilograms?
The good news is that they are talking spinning reserve, like big
turbines, not fancy electronics and batteries.
Joe
On 2025-07-09 23:49, Glen Walpert wrote:
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:
...
instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con-<https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-
francia/>
...
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments
may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as
motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine
where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because
like all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced
on an hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage
control service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they are
unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators, will
deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited, and
consume reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor). They have
been in common use since the early days of power distribution to
produce reactive power near loads, to reduce the amount remote
generation needs to send over transmission lines, with the attendant
losses. Regular capacitors are also used for this purpose, but the
rotary type is continuously adjustable.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synchronous_condenser>
Synchronous condenser
In electrical engineering, a synchronous condenser (sometimes called a syncon, synchronous capacitor or synchronous compensator) is a
DC-excited synchronous motor, whose shaft is not connected to anything
but spins freely.[1] Its purpose is not to convert electric power to mechanical power or vice versa, but to adjust conditions on the three
phase electric power transmission grid. Its field is controlled by a
voltage regulator to either generate or absorb reactive power as needed
to adjust the grid's voltage, or to improve power factor. The
condenser’s installation and operation are identical to large electric motors and generators. (Some generators are actually designed to be able
to operate as synchronous condensers with the prime mover
disconnected[2]).
On 6/17/2025 12:38 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-out- cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after
expert report*
System failure caused by network’s inability to control grid
voltage said
to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
[snip]
But, why the omission of specific details? WHICH installation had
problems? Which firms are being slow in producing the requested data?
Is there a reason not to hold people (and organizations) accountable, BY NAME?
On 2025-07-10 13:27, Glen Walpert wrote:con-
On Thu, 10 Jul 2025 02:27:53 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 23:49, Glen Walpert wrote:
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:
...
instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-<https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-
francia/>
...
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the
comments may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as >>>>> motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to
determine where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs >>>>> because like all motors they take active power from the grid which
is priced on an hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for >>>>> the voltage control service and how the installed equipment will be
accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they
are unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators,
will deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited,
and consume reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor).
They have been in common use since the early days of power
distribution to produce reactive power near loads, to reduce the
amount remote generation needs to send over transmission lines, with
the attendant losses. Regular capacitors are also used for this
purpose, but the rotary type is continuously adjustable.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synchronous_condenser>
Synchronous condenser
In electrical engineering, a synchronous condenser (sometimes called a
syncon, synchronous capacitor or synchronous compensator) is a
DC-excited synchronous motor, whose shaft is not connected to anything
but spins freely.[1] Its purpose is not to convert electric power to
mechanical power or vice versa, but to adjust conditions on the three
phase electric power transmission grid. Its field is controlled by a
voltage regulator to either generate or absorb reactive power as
needed to adjust the grid's voltage, or to improve power factor. The
condenser’s installation and operation are identical to large electric >>> motors and generators. (Some generators are actually designed to be
able to operate as synchronous condensers with the prime mover
disconnected[2]).
Right. While I recall them being referred to as rotary capacitors
somewhere, even the classic "Principles of Alternating Current
Machinery"
by Lawrence and Richards 4th ed 1953 calls them synchronous condensers.
(This book was written by the MIT professors who first developed a lot
of the rigorous analysis presented.)
But I don't get where the capacitor relationship comes in. Do they have capacitors somewhere?
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 17:42:58 -0700, Don Y wrote:
On 6/17/2025 12:38 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-out-
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after
expert report*
System failure caused by network’s inability to control grid
voltage said
to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
[snip]
But, why the omission of specific details? WHICH installation had
problems? Which firms are being slow in producing the requested data?
Is there a reason not to hold people (and organizations) accountable, BY
NAME?
You can find the details in the reports someone here posted earlier:
https://www.neso.energy/document/152346/download
(figures 7 an 8 on page 20 are classic, they belong in a book on control theory as an example of conditional stability)
and the addendum:
https://www.neso.energy/document/152351/download
The wind farm failure was probably due to gradually adding more turbines, thus increasing the open loop gain of reactive power control (which is proportional to the number of generators in parallel) without readjusting
the controller gain set by the factory, probably based on the number of turbines in the first batch ordered. Do we blame the factory, the
operators, or the university professors who trained them? Or just accept that humans are not all knowing, learn something and move on. The simultaneous fossil fuel plant failure was also due to causes not attributable to negligence im my interpretation of the report.
Glen
Joe Gwinn <joegwinn@comcast.net> wrote:
On Wed, 09 Jul 2025 21:49:09 GMT, Glen Walpert <nospam@null.void>
wrote:
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:out-
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 22:10:21 +0200, "Carlos E.R."
<robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
On 2025-06-17 21:38, Carlos E.R. wrote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules-
instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con-cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout><https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April
blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by network?s inability to control grid >>>>>>> voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
francia/>
Energy policy
*The Government approves the installation of synchronous compensators >>>>>> and reinforces the interconnection with France*
The 65 actions are aimed at incorporating additional tools into the >>>>>> networks to facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of
oscillations and, in general, to reinforce the electricity system
Redaccin
Editorial staff
07/08/2025
The Council of Ministers, at the request of the Ministry for
Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (Miteco), has
approved a list of specific actions to increase the resilience of the >>>>>> electricity grid,
which will be incorporated as a new Specific Modification to the
Development Plan for the Electricity Transmission Grid 2021-2026, the >>>>>> second, after the one implemented in 2024. The list includes 65
actions aimed at incorporating additional tools into the grids to
facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of fluctuations >>>>>> and, in general,
the reinforcement of the electricity system, both on the Spanish
mainland and in the Canary Islands and Balearic Islands.
The actions include the installation of synchronous compensators for >>>>>> the first time on the mainland, as well as the incorporation of new >>>>>> units on the islands. These devices provide dynamic voltage control >>>>>> and, given their local nature, are distributed geographically to
reinforce it in the different areas, complementing the equipment and >>>>>> solutions that the system already has for this function.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments
may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as
motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine >>>> where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because like >>>> all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced on an
hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage control >>>> service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they are
unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators, will
deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited, and consume >>> reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor). They have been in
common use since the early days of power distribution to produce reactive >>> power near loads, to reduce the amount remote generation needs to send
over transmission lines, with the attendant losses. Regular capacitors
are also used for this purpose, but the rotary type is continuously
adjustable.
Yeah. I read Frank's comment as well, and he may well be correct, but
one cannot assume that politicians are being quite that precise.
In the mechanical world, it's quite common to have a large but
unloaded three-phase induction motor running at or near synchronous
speed, precisely to absorb surge loads, and it would also serve to
absorb surge overvoltages ... if they are large enough. The energy is
stored in the rotational energy of the rotor.
Do we have any idea how big these Synchronous Compensators are, in
kilograms?
The good news is that they are talking spinning reserve, like big
turbines, not fancy electronics and batteries.
Joe
100 to 400 tons seem to be the figures quoted.
On Thu, 10 Jul 2025 11:54:09 -0000 (UTC), piglet
<erichpwagner@hotmail.com> wrote:
Joe Gwinn <joegwinn@comcast.net> wrote:
On Wed, 09 Jul 2025 21:49:09 GMT, Glen Walpert <nospam@null.void>
wrote:
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con- >>>> francia/>
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 22:10:21 +0200, "Carlos E.R."
<robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
On 2025-06-17 21:38, Carlos E.R. wrote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules- >>>> out-<https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-
cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April >>>>>>>> blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by network?s inability to control grid >>>>>>>> voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
Energy policy
*The Government approves the installation of synchronous compensators >>>>>>> and reinforces the interconnection with France*
The 65 actions are aimed at incorporating additional tools into the >>>>>>> networks to facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of >>>>>>> oscillations and, in general, to reinforce the electricity system >>>>>>> Redacción
Editorial staff
07/08/2025
The Council of Ministers, at the request of the Ministry for
Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (Miteco), has >>>>>>> approved a list of specific actions to increase the resilience of the >>>>>>> electricity grid,
which will be incorporated as a new Specific Modification to the >>>>>>> Development Plan for the Electricity Transmission Grid 2021-2026, the >>>>>>> second, after the one implemented in 2024. The list includes 65
actions aimed at incorporating additional tools into the grids to >>>>>>> facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of fluctuations >>>>>>> and, in general,
the reinforcement of the electricity system, both on the Spanish >>>>>>> mainland and in the Canary Islands and Balearic Islands.
The actions include the installation of synchronous compensators for >>>>>>> the first time on the mainland, as well as the incorporation of new >>>>>>> units on the islands. These devices provide dynamic voltage control >>>>>>> and, given their local nature, are distributed geographically to >>>>>>> reinforce it in the different areas, complementing the equipment and >>>>>>> solutions that the system already has for this function.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments >>>>> may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as >>>>> motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine >>>>> where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because like >>>>> all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced on an >>>>> hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage control >>>>> service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they are >>>> unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators, will
deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited, and consume >>>> reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor). They have been in >>>> common use since the early days of power distribution to produce reactive >>>> power near loads, to reduce the amount remote generation needs to send >>>> over transmission lines, with the attendant losses. Regular capacitors >>>> are also used for this purpose, but the rotary type is continuously
adjustable.
Yeah. I read Frank's comment as well, and he may well be correct, but
one cannot assume that politicians are being quite that precise.
In the mechanical world, it's quite common to have a large but
unloaded three-phase induction motor running at or near synchronous
speed, precisely to absorb surge loads, and it would also serve to
absorb surge overvoltages ... if they are large enough. The energy is
stored in the rotational energy of the rotor.
Do we have any idea how big these Synchronous Compensators are, in
kilograms?
The good news is that they are talking spinning reserve, like big
turbines, not fancy electronics and batteries.
Joe
100 to 400 tons seem to be the figures quoted.
I didn't see that anywhere. Where did you find it?
Joe
On Thu, 10 Jul 2025 13:51:57 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 13:27, Glen Walpert wrote:con-
On Thu, 10 Jul 2025 02:27:53 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 23:49, Glen Walpert wrote:
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:
...
instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-<https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-
francia/>
...
But I don't get where the capacitor relationship comes in. Do they have
capacitors somewhere?
They only have a few small capacitors in the control circuits, not
directly line connected, but the rotating machine can behave like a
capacitor (condenser is an old term for capacitor) in that when
overexcited current leads voltage, providing reactive power to inductive loads where current lags voltage.
Reactive power is out of phase with
voltage and adds current to the distribution system without carrying any
real power (while incurring real losses), what it does is provide the
field in all of the many induction motors on the grid. Capacitors are
often used near loads to reduce reactive power losses, the synchronous condenser does the same thing as well as providing stabilization by responding to grid voltage variation with automatic changes in reactive
power (which has a stronger influence on grid voltage than real power).
You can find good descriptions of reactive power many places, but it is a somewhat complex subject.
Again, which plants? Was there policy in place that caused this (if so,
why hadn't ALL plants?)
"...because ‘some operators’ were not complying with the regulations"
Which?
"The report, due to a ‘confidentiality obligation’ has “anonymised” information, ‘on most occasions’ at the request of the actors involved..."
Do you see the pattern, here?
I.e., "Someone was killed. We've spoken to the killer -- who shall remain anonymous and promise not to do it again..."
Joe Gwinn <joegwinn@comcast.net> wrote:
On Thu, 10 Jul 2025 11:54:09 -0000 (UTC), piglet
<erichpwagner@hotmail.com> wrote:
Joe Gwinn <joegwinn@comcast.net> wrote:
On Wed, 09 Jul 2025 21:49:09 GMT, Glen Walpert <nospam@null.void>
wrote:
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0200, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-09 22:57, Joe Gwinn wrote:instalacion-de-compensadores-sincronos-y-refuerza-la-interconexion-con- >>>>> francia/>
On Wed, 9 Jul 2025 22:10:21 +0200, "Carlos E.R."
<robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote:
On 2025-06-17 21:38, Carlos E.R. wrote:
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/expert-report-rules- >>>>> out-<https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-gobierno-aprueba-la-
cyber-attack-for-spain-and-portugal-april-blackout>
*Spanish minister rules out cyber-attack as cause of April >>>>>>>>> blackout, after expert report*
System failure caused by network?s inability to control grid >>>>>>>>> voltage said to be behind outage in Spain and Portugal
Energy policy
*The Government approves the installation of synchronous compensators >>>>>>>> and reinforces the interconnection with France*
The 65 actions are aimed at incorporating additional tools into the >>>>>>>> networks to facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of >>>>>>>> oscillations and, in general, to reinforce the electricity system >>>>>>>> Redaccin
Editorial staff
07/08/2025
The Council of Ministers, at the request of the Ministry for
Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge (Miteco), has >>>>>>>> approved a list of specific actions to increase the resilience of the >>>>>>>> electricity grid,
which will be incorporated as a new Specific Modification to the >>>>>>>> Development Plan for the Electricity Transmission Grid 2021-2026, the >>>>>>>> second, after the one implemented in 2024. The list includes 65 >>>>>>>> actions aimed at incorporating additional tools into the grids to >>>>>>>> facilitate voltage control, stability in the event of fluctuations >>>>>>>> and, in general,
the reinforcement of the electricity system, both on the Spanish >>>>>>>> mainland and in the Canary Islands and Balearic Islands.
The actions include the installation of synchronous compensators for >>>>>>>> the first time on the mainland, as well as the incorporation of new >>>>>>>> units on the islands. These devices provide dynamic voltage control >>>>>>>> and, given their local nature, are distributed geographically to >>>>>>>> reinforce it in the different areas, complementing the equipment and >>>>>>>> solutions that the system already has for this function.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
... You can read the rest on the link if desired.
I did. Thanks.
What exactly do they mean by "Synchronous Compensators"?
I don't know, I'm not an electrical engineer. But one of the comments >>>>>> may explain a bit:
Frank
07/08/2025 Synchronous compensators are reverse generators acting as >>>>>> motors connected to the grid. What follows is simulations to determine >>>>>> where on the grid they are most effective, power and costs because like >>>>>> all motors they take active power from the grid which is priced on an >>>>>> hourly basis. And the last thing is who will pay for the voltage control >>>>>> service and how the installed equipment will be accounted for.
Synchronous Compensators are also known as Rotary Capacitors, they are >>>>> unloaded synchronous motors which, like synchronous generators, will >>>>> deliver reactive power (same as a capacitor) when overexcited, and consume
reactive power when underexcited (like an inductor). They have been in >>>>> common use since the early days of power distribution to produce reactive >>>>> power near loads, to reduce the amount remote generation needs to send >>>>> over transmission lines, with the attendant losses. Regular capacitors >>>>> are also used for this purpose, but the rotary type is continuously
adjustable.
Yeah. I read Frank's comment as well, and he may well be correct, but >>>> one cannot assume that politicians are being quite that precise.
In the mechanical world, it's quite common to have a large but
unloaded three-phase induction motor running at or near synchronous
speed, precisely to absorb surge loads, and it would also serve to
absorb surge overvoltages ... if they are large enough. The energy is >>>> stored in the rotational energy of the rotor.
Do we have any idea how big these Synchronous Compensators are, in
kilograms?
The good news is that they are talking spinning reserve, like big
turbines, not fancy electronics and batteries.
Joe
100 to 400 tons seem to be the figures quoted.
I didn't see that anywhere. Where did you find it?
Joe
Google, and this
<https://www.weg.net/institutional/NL/fr/news/produits-et-solutions/weg-manufactures-mega-synchronous-condensers >
On 2025-07-10 15:55, Don Y wrote:
Again, which plants? Was there policy in place that caused this (if so,
why hadn't ALL plants?)
"...because ‘some operators’ were not complying with the regulations"
Which?
"The report, due to a ‘confidentiality obligation’ has “anonymised” >> information, ‘on most occasions’ at the request of the actors involved..."
Do you see the pattern, here?
I.e., "Someone was killed. We've spoken to the killer -- who shall remain >> anonymous and promise not to do it again..."
Because if not, they would not have talked and the cause would not be known and
corrective action not taken fast.
On 7/10/2025 12:00 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 15:55, Don Y wrote:
Again, which plants? Was there policy in place that caused this (if so, >>> why hadn't ALL plants?)
"...because ‘some operators’ were not complying with the regulations" >>>
Which?
"The report, due to a ‘confidentiality obligation’ has “anonymised” >>> information, ‘on most occasions’ at the request of the actors
involved..."
Do you see the pattern, here?
I.e., "Someone was killed. We've spoken to the killer -- who shall
remain
anonymous and promise not to do it again..."
Because if not, they would not have talked and the cause would not be
known and corrective action not taken fast.
"Something horrific happened. We've spoken to the parties responsible.
We *think* they won't do it again but don't want anyone to know who
was actually responsible (as THEY aren't part of the problem??)"
On 2025-07-10 23:39, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 12:00 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 15:55, Don Y wrote:
Again, which plants? Was there policy in place that caused this (if so, >>>> why hadn't ALL plants?)
"...because ‘some operators’ were not complying with the regulations" >>>>
Which?
"The report, due to a ‘confidentiality obligation’ has “anonymised”
information, ‘on most occasions’ at the request of the actors involved..."
Do you see the pattern, here?
I.e., "Someone was killed. We've spoken to the killer -- who shall remain
anonymous and promise not to do it again..."
Because if not, they would not have talked and the cause would not be known >>> and corrective action not taken fast.
"Something horrific happened. We've spoken to the parties responsible.
We *think* they won't do it again but don't want anyone to know who
was actually responsible (as THEY aren't part of the problem??)"
Finding a culprit to sue will take decades (it is another investigation), and we want solutions now.
On 2025-07-11 01:20, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 3:14 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 23:39, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 12:00 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 15:55, Don Y wrote:
Again, which plants? Was there policy in place that caused this (if so,
why hadn't ALL plants?)
"...because ‘some operators’ were not complying with the regulations"
Which?
"The report, due to a ‘confidentiality obligation’ has “anonymised”
information, ‘on most occasions’ at the request of the actors involved..."
Do you see the pattern, here?
I.e., "Someone was killed. We've spoken to the killer -- who shall remain
anonymous and promise not to do it again..."
Because if not, they would not have talked and the cause would not be >>>>> known and corrective action not taken fast.
"Something horrific happened. We've spoken to the parties responsible. >>>> We *think* they won't do it again but don't want anyone to know who
was actually responsible (as THEY aren't part of the problem??)"
Finding a culprit to sue will take decades (it is another investigation), >>> and we want solutions now.
So, let's just keep the "bad actor" in the same position of responsibility >> WHILE we are deciding who to sue?
I prefer to have electricity than a culprit.
On 7/10/2025 3:14 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 23:39, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 12:00 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 15:55, Don Y wrote:
Again, which plants? Was there policy in place that caused this
(if so,
why hadn't ALL plants?)
"...because ‘some operators’ were not complying with the regulations" >>>>>
Which?
"The report, due to a ‘confidentiality obligation’ has “anonymised”
information, ‘on most occasions’ at the request of the actors
involved..."
Do you see the pattern, here?
I.e., "Someone was killed. We've spoken to the killer -- who shall >>>>> remain
anonymous and promise not to do it again..."
Because if not, they would not have talked and the cause would not
be known and corrective action not taken fast.
"Something horrific happened. We've spoken to the parties responsible. >>> We *think* they won't do it again but don't want anyone to know who
was actually responsible (as THEY aren't part of the problem??)"
Finding a culprit to sue will take decades (it is another
investigation), and we want solutions now.
So, let's just keep the "bad actor" in the same position of responsibility WHILE we are deciding who to sue?
On 7/10/2025 5:27 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-11 01:20, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 3:14 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 23:39, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 12:00 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 15:55, Don Y wrote:
Again, which plants? Was there policy in place that caused this >>>>>>> (if so,
why hadn't ALL plants?)
"...because ‘some operators’ were not complying with the
regulations"
Which?
"The report, due to a ‘confidentiality obligation’ has “anonymised”
information, ‘on most occasions’ at the request of the actors >>>>>>> involved..."
Do you see the pattern, here?
I.e., "Someone was killed. We've spoken to the killer -- who
shall remain
anonymous and promise not to do it again..."
Because if not, they would not have talked and the cause would not >>>>>> be known and corrective action not taken fast.
"Something horrific happened. We've spoken to the parties
responsible.
We *think* they won't do it again but don't want anyone to know who
was actually responsible (as THEY aren't part of the problem??)"
Finding a culprit to sue will take decades (it is another
investigation), and we want solutions now.
So, let's just keep the "bad actor" in the same position of
responsibility
WHILE we are deciding who to sue?
I prefer to have electricity than a culprit.
But you have no assurance that you will *still* have electricity!
If the same "actors" are in place, what guarantee that they won't
similarly screw up next week/month/year? What incentive do THEY
have to "perform correctly" -- if the NEXT lawsuit will be years
after the *first* lawsuit?
If you hide their identities *now*, that doesn't prevent all the
same "anonymized data" from being subpoenaed and introduced as
evidence in their later *trial*. They're still on-the-hook
for their responsibility.
(Ah, but stockholders can continue to profit UNTIL the trial...)
On 2025-07-11 02:35, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 5:27 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-11 01:20, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 3:14 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 23:39, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 12:00 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 15:55, Don Y wrote:
Again, which plants? Was there policy in place that caused this (if so,
why hadn't ALL plants?)
"...because ‘some operators’ were not complying with the regulations"
Which?
"The report, due to a ‘confidentiality obligation’ has “anonymised”
information, ‘on most occasions’ at the request of the actors involved..."
Do you see the pattern, here?
I.e., "Someone was killed. We've spoken to the killer -- who shall remain
anonymous and promise not to do it again..."
Because if not, they would not have talked and the cause would not be >>>>>>> known and corrective action not taken fast.
"Something horrific happened. We've spoken to the parties responsible. >>>>>> We *think* they won't do it again but don't want anyone to know who >>>>>> was actually responsible (as THEY aren't part of the problem??)"
Finding a culprit to sue will take decades (it is another investigation), >>>>> and we want solutions now.
So, let's just keep the "bad actor" in the same position of responsibility >>>> WHILE we are deciding who to sue?
I prefer to have electricity than a culprit.
But you have no assurance that you will *still* have electricity!
If the same "actors" are in place, what guarantee that they won't
similarly screw up next week/month/year? What incentive do THEY
have to "perform correctly" -- if the NEXT lawsuit will be years
after the *first* lawsuit?
If you hide their identities *now*, that doesn't prevent all the
same "anonymized data" from being subpoenaed and introduced as
evidence in their later *trial*. They're still on-the-hook
for their responsibility.
(Ah, but stockholders can continue to profit UNTIL the trial...)
If their identities were not anonymized, they would not have talked at all. It
would have taken years to have a working report.
I prefer to have this report now, so that it can be acted upon, and let the courts find the culprits to sue at their leisurely pace in a decade time.
On 7/11/25 22:14, Phil Hobbs wrote:
On 2025-07-11 13:41, Jeroen Belleman wrote:
On 7/11/25 02:35, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 5:27 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-11 01:20, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 3:14 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:
On 2025-07-10 23:39, Don Y wrote:
On 7/10/2025 12:00 PM, Carlos E.R. wrote:Finding a culprit to sue will take decades (it is another
On 2025-07-10 15:55, Don Y wrote:
Again, which plants? Was there policy in place that caused >>>>>>>>>> this (if so,
why hadn't ALL plants?)
"...because ‘some operators’ were not complying with the >>>>>>>>>> regulations"
Which?
"The report, due to a ‘confidentiality obligation’ has >>>>>>>>>> “anonymised”
information, ‘on most occasions’ at the request of the actors >>>>>>>>>> involved..."
Do you see the pattern, here?
I.e., "Someone was killed. We've spoken to the killer -- who >>>>>>>>>> shall remain
anonymous and promise not to do it again..."
Because if not, they would not have talked and the cause would >>>>>>>>> not be known and corrective action not taken fast.
"Something horrific happened. We've spoken to the parties
responsible.
We *think* they won't do it again but don't want anyone to know who >>>>>>>> was actually responsible (as THEY aren't part of the problem??)" >>>>>>>
investigation), and we want solutions now.
So, let's just keep the "bad actor" in the same position of
responsibility
WHILE we are deciding who to sue?
I prefer to have electricity than a culprit.
But you have no assurance that you will *still* have electricity!
If the same "actors" are in place, what guarantee that they won't
similarly screw up next week/month/year? What incentive do THEY
have to "perform correctly" -- if the NEXT lawsuit will be years
after the *first* lawsuit?
If you hide their identities *now*, that doesn't prevent all the
same "anonymized data" from being subpoenaed and introduced as
evidence in their later *trial*. They're still on-the-hook
for their responsibility.
(Ah, but stockholders can continue to profit UNTIL the trial...)
Typical American: Sue! Sue! Sue!
Jeroen Belleman
Y'all come visit, and see.
Cheers
Phil Hobbs
Not right now, sorry. Too afraid to end up in a Salvadorian prison.
Maybe when civilization returns.
Jeroen Belleman
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