• Re: Replacement of Cardinality (real-valued)

    From Jim Burns@21:1/5 to Ross Finlayson on Wed Aug 7 16:06:50 2024
    XPost: sci.math

    On 8/4/2024 11:46 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 08/04/2024 07:59 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 08/04/2024 07:52 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 08/04/2024 03:41 AM, FromTheRafters wrote:

    [...]
    [...]
    [...]

    It's kind of like when people say
    "hey you know the initial ordinal assignment is
    what we can say 'are' cardinals",

    For each equivalence relation '#' on a class A
    there is a family A/# of partitions of A

    [x] and [y] are the partitions holding x and y

    [x] = {u e A: u # x}
    [y] = {u e A: u # y}

    Any element of [x] serves equally well as
    a representative of the partition holding x
    [x] = [y] ⇔ x # y

    We somewhat.arbitrarily assign initial ordinal ξ
    to be the One True Representative of
    the partition [ξ] of sets A = |ξ|

    The initial ordinal has a certain elegance.
    Being ordinals, any ordinal means an initial ordinal.
    But for any set A = |ξ|, [A] = [ξ]
    and A serves as a representative just as well.

    ⎛ The axiom of choice is equivalent to
    ⎝ each partition [A] holds an ordinal.

    then it's like,
    "with the Continuum Hypothesis being undecide-able and all,
    then there are and aren't ordinals between
    what would be those cardinals by their cardinals the ordinals",

    We have a description of sets, the ZFC axioms.
    In some domains satisfying that description,
    the continuum hypothesis is true.
    In some domains satisfying that description,
    the continuum hypothesis is false.

    Therefore,
    the ZFC axioms aren't enough to decide
    the continuum hypothesis.

    sort of establishing that
    such a definition does and doesn't
    keep itself non-contradictory,

    No, that is not established.

    A theory describes more than one model.

    Some claims have proofs.
    Those claims are true in each model.

    Some claims are true in each model.
    Those claims have proofs.
    (That is a very nice result, maybe not super.obvious.)

    True.and.false in different models
    does not make a theory contradictory.
    The theory is silent, not wrong.

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    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Jim Burns@21:1/5 to Ross Finlayson on Thu Aug 8 15:00:38 2024
    XPost: sci.math

    On 8/7/2024 9:03 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
    On 08/07/2024 01:06 PM, Jim Burns wrote:

    A theory can describe more than one model.

    Some claims have proofs.
    Those claims are true in each model.

    Some claims are true in each model.
    Those claims have proofs.
    (That is a very nice result, maybe not super.obvious.)

    True.and.false in different models
    does not make a theory contradictory.
    The theory is silent, not wrong.

    What theory?

    | The completeness theorem applies to any first-order theory:
    | If T is such a theory, and
    | φ is a sentence (in the same language) and
    | every model of T is a model of φ,
    | then there is a (first-order) proof of φ
    | using the statements of T as axioms.
    | One sometimes says this as
    | "anything true in all models is provable".
    | (This does not contradict Gödel's incompleteness theorem,
    | which is about a formula φᵤ that is unprovable
    | in a certain theory T
    | but true in the "standard" model of the natural numbers:
    | φᵤ is false in some other, "non-standard" models of T.)

    Model theory?
    That's exactly what model theory not.is.

    | The completeness theorem makes a close link between
    | model theory,
    | which deals with what is true in different models, and
    | proof theory,
    | which studies what can be formally proven
    | in particular formal systems.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_completeness_theorem
    Gödel's completeness theorem

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