On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:We require that terms of art are used with their term-of-art >>>>>>>>>> meaning and
On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said:a fact or piece of information that shows that something >>>>>>>>>>> exists or is true:
On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said:
Within the entire body of analytical truth any expression >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of language that has no sequence of formalized semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deductive inference steps from the formalized semantic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundational truths of this system are simply untrue in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this system. (Isomorphic to provable from axioms). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>If there is a misconception then you have misconceived >>>>>>>>>>>>>> something. It is well
known that it is possible to construct a formal theory >>>>>>>>>>>>>> where some formulas
are neither provble nor disprovable.
This is well known.
And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line is false. >>>>>>>>>>>
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/proof >>>>>>>>>>
The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains the same >>>>>>>>> no matter what idiomatic meanings say.
Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth.
Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment.
The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line:
misconception means ~True.
The title line means that something is misunderstood but that
something
is not the meaning of "true".
It is untrue because it is misunderstood.
Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be untrue.
That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim.
Yes, but you didn't claim that.
The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would
be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified
as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less
than complete.
Math is not intentionally incomplete.
You paraphrased what I said incorrectly.
Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0].
Many theories are incomplete,
intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest of math.
But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied.
When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X lacks
a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue.
An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in another.
I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full context.
When we do this and require an expression of formal or natural language
to have a semantic connection to its truthmaker then true[0] cannot
exist apart from provable[0].'
True[math] can only exist apart from Provable[math] within
the narrow minded, idiomatic use of these terms. This is
NOT the way that True[0] and Provable[0] actually work.
My point is much more clear when we see that Tarski attempts
to show that True[0] is undefinable. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:We require that terms of art are used with their term-of-art meaning and
On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said:a fact or piece of information that shows that something >>>>>>>>>>> exists or is true:
On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said:
Within the entire body of analytical truth any expression of language
that has no sequence of formalized semantic deductive inference steps
from the formalized semantic foundational truths of this system are
simply untrue in this system. (Isomorphic to provable from axioms).
If there is a misconception then you have misconceived something. It is well
known that it is possible to construct a formal theory where some formulas
are neither provble nor disprovable.
This is well known.
And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line is false. >>>>>>>>>>>
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/proof >>>>>>>>>>
The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains the same >>>>>>>>> no matter what idiomatic meanings say.
Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth.
Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment.
The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line:
misconception means ~True.
The title line means that something is misunderstood but that something >>>>>> is not the meaning of "true".
It is untrue because it is misunderstood.
Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be untrue.
That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim.
Yes, but you didn't claim that.
The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would
be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified
as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less
than complete.
Math is not intentionally incomplete.
You paraphrased what I said incorrectly.
Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0].
Many theories are incomplete,
intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest of math.
But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied.
When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X lacks
a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue.
An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in another.
I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full context.
When we do this and require an expression of formal or natural language
to have a semantic connection to its truthmaker then true[0] cannot
exist apart from provable[0].
True[math] can only exist apart from Provable[math] within
the narrow minded, idiomatic use of these terms. This is
NOT the way that True[0] and Provable[0] actually work.
My point is much more clear when we see that Tarski attempts
to show that True[0] is undefinable. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
On 2/7/2025 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-06 14:46:55 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:We require that terms of art are used with their term-of-art meaning and
On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said:a fact or piece of information that shows that something >>>>>>>>>>>>> exists or is true:
On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said:
Within the entire body of analytical truth any expression of language
that has no sequence of formalized semantic deductive inference steps
from the formalized semantic foundational truths of this system are
simply untrue in this system. (Isomorphic to provable from axioms).
If there is a misconception then you have misconceived something. It is well
known that it is possible to construct a formal theory where some formulas
are neither provble nor disprovable.
This is well known.
And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/proof >>>>>>>>>>>>
The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains the same >>>>>>>>>>> no matter what idiomatic meanings say.
Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth.
Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment.
The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line:
misconception means ~True.
The title line means that something is misunderstood but that something
is not the meaning of "true".
It is untrue because it is misunderstood.
Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be untrue.
That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim.
Yes, but you didn't claim that.
The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would
be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified
as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less
than complete.
Math is not intentionally incomplete.
You paraphrased what I said incorrectly.
No, I did not paraphrase anything.
Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0].
That is not a part of the definition but it is a consequence of the
definition. Much of the lost capability is about things that are
outside of the scope of mathemiatics and formal theories.
When one thinks of math as only pertaining to numbers then math
is inherently very limited.
When one applies something like
Montague Grammar to formalize every detail of natural language
semantics then math takes on much more scope.
When we see this then we see "incompleteness" is a mere artificial contrivance.
True(x) always means that a connection to a semantic
truthmaker exists. When math does this differently it is simply
breaking the rules.
Many theories are incomplete,
intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest of math.
But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied.
When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X lacks
a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue.
An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in another.
I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full context.
Then you cannot have all the advantages of formal logic. In particular,
you need to be able to apply and verify formally invalid inferences.
All of the rules of correct reasoning (correcting the errors of
formal logic) are merely semantic connections between finite strings:
When one finite string expression of language is known to be true
other expressions are know to be semantically entailed.
When we do this and require an expression of formal or natural language
to have a semantic connection to its truthmaker then true[0] cannot
exist apart from provable[0].
Maybe, maybe not. Without the full support of formal logic it is hard to
prove. An unjustified faith does not help.
It all has always boiled down to semantic entailment.
True[math] can only exist apart from Provable[math] within
the narrow minded, idiomatic use of these terms. This is
NOT the way that True[0] and Provable[0] actually work.
If you want that to be true you need to define True[math] differently
from the way "truth" is used by mathimaticians.
We could equally define a "dead cat" to be a kind of {cow}.
Math does not get to change the way that truth really works,
when math tries to do this math is incorrect.
My point is much more clear when we see that Tarski attempts
to show that True[0] is undefinable.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Tarski did not attempt to show that True[0] is undefinable. He showed
quite successfully that arthmetic truth is undefinable. Whether that
proof applies to your True[0] is not yet determined.
Tarski is the foremost author of the whole notion of every
kind of truth. "snow is white" because within the actual state
of affairs the color of snow is perceived by humans to be white.
On 2/8/2025 4:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-07 16:21:01 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/7/2025 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-06 14:46:55 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said:That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim.
On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:We require that terms of art are used with their term-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> art meaning and
On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said:
On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Within the entire body of analytical truth any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language that has no sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formalized semantic deductive inference steps from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the formalized semantic foundational truths of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system are simply untrue in this system. (Isomorphic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to provable from axioms).
If there is a misconception then you have misconceived >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something. It is well
known that it is possible to construct a formal theory >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where some formulas
are neither provble nor disprovable.
This is well known.
And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
a fact or piece of information that shows that something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists or is true:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/proof >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains the >>>>>>>>>>>>> same
no matter what idiomatic meanings say.
Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth. >>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment.
The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line:
misconception means ~True.
The title line means that something is misunderstood but that >>>>>>>>>> something
is not the meaning of "true".
It is untrue because it is misunderstood.
Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be untrue. >>>>>>>
Yes, but you didn't claim that.
The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would
be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified
as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less
than complete.
Math is not intentionally incomplete.
You paraphrased what I said incorrectly.
No, I did not paraphrase anything.
Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0].
That is not a part of the definition but it is a consequence of the
definition. Much of the lost capability is about things that are
outside of the scope of mathemiatics and formal theories.
When one thinks of math as only pertaining to numbers then math
is inherently very limited.
That's right. That limited area should be called "number theory",
not "mathematics".
When one applies something like
Montague Grammar to formalize every detail of natural language
semantics then math takes on much more scope.
It is not possible to specify every detail of a natural language.
In order to do so one should know every detail of a natural language.
While one is finding out the language changes so that the already
aquired knowledge is invalid.
When we see this then we see "incompleteness" is a mere artificial
contrivance.
Hallucinations are possible but only proofs count in mathematics.
True(x) always means that a connection to a semantic
truthmaker exists. When math does this differently it is simply
breaking the rules.
Mathematics does not make anything about "True(x)". Some branches care
about semantic connections, some don't. Much of logic is about comparing
semantic connections to syntactic ones.
Many theories are incomplete,I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full
intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest of math. >>>>>> But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied.
When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X lacks >>>>>>> a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue.
An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in another. >>>>>
context.
Then you cannot have all the advantages of formal logic. In particular, >>>> you need to be able to apply and verify formally invalid inferences.
All of the rules of correct reasoning (correcting the errors of
formal logic) are merely semantic connections between finite strings:
There are no semantic connections between uninterpreted strings.
With different interpretations different connections can be found.
When we do not break the evaluation of an expression of language
into its syntax and semantics such that these are evaluated
separately and use something like Montague Semantics to formalize
the semantics as relations between finite strings then
it is clear that any expression of language that lacks a connection
through a truthmaker to the semantics that makes it true simply remains untrue.
In the big picture way that truth really works there cannot
possibly be true[0](x) that is not provable[0](x) where x
is made true by finite strings expressing its semantic meanings.
When one finite string expression of language is known to be true
other expressions are know to be semantically entailed.
Only if they are connected with (semantic or other) connections that
are known to preserve truth.
Yes, there must be truth preserving operations.
Formal logic fails at this some of the time. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
The only thing that is actually semantically entailed by a
contradiction is FALSE. (A & ~A) ⊨ FALSE
I fail to understand how anyone could be gullible enough into
being conned into believing that anything besides FALSE is
entailed by a contradiction.
When we do this and require an expression of formal or natural
language
to have a semantic connection to its truthmaker then true[0] cannot
exist apart from provable[0].
Maybe, maybe not. Without the full support of formal logic it is
hard to
prove. An unjustified faith does not help.
It all has always boiled down to semantic entailment.
Which is hard to show without the full support of formal logic.
We simply leave most of formal logic as it is with some changes:
(1) Non-truth preserving operations are eliminated.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if
it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises
to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
*We correct the above fundamental mistake*
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if
it takes a form that the conclusion is a necessary
consequence of its premises.
(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of
language with each unique natural language sense meaning
of a word having its own GUID.
True[math] can only exist apart from Provable[math] within
the narrow minded, idiomatic use of these terms. This is
NOT the way that True[0] and Provable[0] actually work.
If you want that to be true you need to define True[math] differently
from the way "truth" is used by mathimaticians.
We could equally define a "dead cat" to be a kind of {cow}.
Math does not get to change the way that truth really works,
when math tries to do this math is incorrect.
Math does not care how truth works outside mathematics. But the truth
about mathematics works the way truth usually does.
Math is not allowed to break these rules without making math incorrect.
My point is much more clear when we see that Tarski attempts
to show that True[0] is undefinable.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Tarski did not attempt to show that True[0] is undefinable. He showed
quite successfully that arthmetic truth is undefinable. Whether that
proof applies to your True[0] is not yet determined.
Tarski is the foremost author of the whole notion of every
kind of truth. "snow is white" because within the actual state
of affairs the color of snow is perceived by humans to be white.
Many philosophers before and after Tarski have tried to find out what
truth really is and how it works.
And I am finishing the job. I may have only one month left.
The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% chance
of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has
about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of life.
On 2/8/2025 4:28 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/8/25 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/8/2025 4:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-07 16:21:01 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/7/2025 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-06 14:46:55 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:Yes, but you didn't claim that.
On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Within the entire body of analytical truth any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language that has no sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formalized semantic deductive inference steps from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the formalized semantic foundational truths of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system are simply untrue in this system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Isomorphic to provable from axioms). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>If there is a misconception then you have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misconceived something. It is well
known that it is possible to construct a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory where some formulas
are neither provble nor disprovable.
This is well known.
And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
a fact or piece of information that shows that something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists or is true:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof
We require that terms of art are used with their term- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of- art meaning and
The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same
no matter what idiomatic meanings say.
Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment.
The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line: >>>>>>>>>>>>> misconception means ~True.
The title line means that something is misunderstood but >>>>>>>>>>>> that something
is not the meaning of "true".
It is untrue because it is misunderstood.
Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be >>>>>>>>>> untrue.
That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim. >>>>>>>>
The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would >>>>>>>>> be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified >>>>>>>>> as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less >>>>>>>>> than complete.
Math is not intentionally incomplete.
You paraphrased what I said incorrectly.
No, I did not paraphrase anything.
Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0].
That is not a part of the definition but it is a consequence of the >>>>>> definition. Much of the lost capability is about things that are
outside of the scope of mathemiatics and formal theories.
When one thinks of math as only pertaining to numbers then math
is inherently very limited.
That's right. That limited area should be called "number theory",
not "mathematics".
When one applies something like
Montague Grammar to formalize every detail of natural language
semantics then math takes on much more scope.
It is not possible to specify every detail of a natural language.
In order to do so one should know every detail of a natural language.
While one is finding out the language changes so that the already
aquired knowledge is invalid.
When we see this then we see "incompleteness" is a mere artificial
contrivance.
Hallucinations are possible but only proofs count in mathematics.
True(x) always means that a connection to a semantic
truthmaker exists. When math does this differently it is simply
breaking the rules.
Mathematics does not make anything about "True(x)". Some branches care >>>> about semantic connections, some don't. Much of logic is about
comparing
semantic connections to syntactic ones.
There are no semantic connections between uninterpreted strings.All of the rules of correct reasoning (correcting the errors ofMany theories are incomplete,
intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest of >>>>>>>> math.
But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied.
When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X lacks >>>>>>>>> a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue.
An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in
another.
I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full
context.
Then you cannot have all the advantages of formal logic. In
particular,
you need to be able to apply and verify formally invalid inferences. >>>>>
formal logic) are merely semantic connections between finite strings: >>>>
With different interpretations different connections can be found.
When we do not break the evaluation of an expression of language
into its syntax and semantics such that these are evaluated
separately and use something like Montague Semantics to formalize
the semantics as relations between finite strings then
it is clear that any expression of language that lacks a connection
through a truthmaker to the semantics that makes it true simply remains
untrue.
But no one has been claiming that, so you are just fighting strawmen.
The problem is these links can be infinite, and proofs must be finite.
Math is only incomplete when it is intentionally defined
in such a way to make it incomplete.
*See if you can understand this*
On 2/8/2025 9:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
Instead of just usual model theory and axiomatics
and "what's true in the logical theory", "what's
not falsified in the scientific theory", you can
have a theory where the quantity is truth, and
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas, then the Liar
"paradox" is only a prototype of a fallacy...
On 02/08/2025 07:32 AM, olcott wrote:
(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of
language with each unique natural language sense meaning
of a word having its own GUID.
And I am finishing the job. I may have only one month left.
The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% chance
of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has
about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of life.
Instead of just usual model theory and axiomatics
and "what's true in the logical theory", "what's
not falsified in the scientific theory", you can
have a theory where the quantity is truth, and
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas, then the Liar
"paradox" is only a prototype of a fallacy,
On 2/8/2025 4:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-07 16:21:01 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/7/2025 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-06 14:46:55 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said:That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim.
On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:We require that terms of art are used with their term-of- art meaning and
On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said:a fact or piece of information that shows that something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists or is true:
On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Within the entire body of analytical truth any expression of language
that has no sequence of formalized semantic deductive inference steps
from the formalized semantic foundational truths of this system are
simply untrue in this system. (Isomorphic to provable from axioms).
If there is a misconception then you have misconceived something. It is well
known that it is possible to construct a formal theory where some formulas
are neither provble nor disprovable.
This is well known.
And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/proof >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains the same >>>>>>>>>>>>> no matter what idiomatic meanings say.
Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth. >>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment.
The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line:
misconception means ~True.
The title line means that something is misunderstood but that something
is not the meaning of "true".
It is untrue because it is misunderstood.
Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be untrue. >>>>>>>
Yes, but you didn't claim that.
The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would
be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified
as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less
than complete.
Math is not intentionally incomplete.
You paraphrased what I said incorrectly.
No, I did not paraphrase anything.
Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0].
That is not a part of the definition but it is a consequence of the
definition. Much of the lost capability is about things that are
outside of the scope of mathemiatics and formal theories.
When one thinks of math as only pertaining to numbers then math
is inherently very limited.
That's right. That limited area should be called "number theory",
not "mathematics".
When one applies something like
Montague Grammar to formalize every detail of natural language
semantics then math takes on much more scope.
It is not possible to specify every detail of a natural language.
In order to do so one should know every detail of a natural language.
While one is finding out the language changes so that the already
aquired knowledge is invalid.
When we see this then we see "incompleteness" is a mere artificial
contrivance.
Hallucinations are possible but only proofs count in mathematics.
True(x) always means that a connection to a semantic
truthmaker exists. When math does this differently it is simply
breaking the rules.
Mathematics does not make anything about "True(x)". Some branches care
about semantic connections, some don't. Much of logic is about comparing
semantic connections to syntactic ones.
Then you cannot have all the advantages of formal logic. In particular, >>>> you need to be able to apply and verify formally invalid inferences.Many theories are incomplete,I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full context. >>>>
intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest of math. >>>>>> But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied.
When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X lacks >>>>>>> a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue.
An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in another. >>>>>
All of the rules of correct reasoning (correcting the errors of
formal logic) are merely semantic connections between finite strings:
There are no semantic connections between uninterpreted strings.
With different interpretations different connections can be found.
When we do not break the evaluation of an expression of language
into its syntax and semantics such that these are evaluated
separately and use something like Montague Semantics to formalize
the semantics as relations between finite strings then
it is clear that any expression of language that lacks a connection
through a truthmaker to the semantics that makes it true simply remains untrue.
In the big picture way that truth really works there cannot
possibly be true[0](x) that is not provable[0](x) where x
is made true by finite strings expressing its semantic meanings.
When one finite string expression of language is known to be true
other expressions are know to be semantically entailed.
Only if they are connected with (semantic or other) connections that
are known to preserve truth.
Yes, there must be truth preserving operations.
Formal logic fails at this some of the time. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
The only thing that is actually semantically entailed by a
contradiction is FALSE. (A & ~A) ⊨ FALSE
I fail to understand how anyone could be gullible enough into
being conned into believing that anything besides FALSE is
entailed by a contradiction.
We simply leave most of formal logic as it is with some changes:
(1) Non-truth preserving operations are eliminated.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if
it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises
to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
*We correct the above fundamental mistake*
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if
it takes a form that the conclusion is a necessary
consequence of its premises.
(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of
language with each unique natural language sense meaning
of a word having its own GUID.
True[math] can only exist apart from Provable[math] within
the narrow minded, idiomatic use of these terms. This is
NOT the way that True[0] and Provable[0] actually work.
If you want that to be true you need to define True[math] differently
from the way "truth" is used by mathimaticians.
We could equally define a "dead cat" to be a kind of {cow}.
Math does not get to change the way that truth really works,
when math tries to do this math is incorrect.
Math does not care how truth works outside mathematics. But the truth
about mathematics works the way truth usually does.
Math is not allowed to break these rules without making math incorrect.
My point is much more clear when we see that Tarski attempts
to show that True[0] is undefinable.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Tarski did not attempt to show that True[0] is undefinable. He showed
quite successfully that arthmetic truth is undefinable. Whether that
proof applies to your True[0] is not yet determined.
Tarski is the foremost author of the whole notion of every
kind of truth. "snow is white" because within the actual state
of affairs the color of snow is perceived by humans to be white.
Many philosophers before and after Tarski have tried to find out what
truth really is and how it works.
And I am finishing the job.
I may have only one month left.
The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% chance
of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has
about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of life.
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become
inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
On 2/8/2025 9:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/8/25 9:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/8/2025 4:28 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/8/25 10:32 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/8/2025 4:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-07 16:21:01 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/7/2025 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-06 14:46:55 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:Yes, but you didn't claim that.
On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said:The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misconception means ~True.
On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>This is well known.
Within the entire body of analytical truth any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language that has no sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formalized semantic deductive inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from the formalized semantic foundational truths >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of this system are simply untrue in this system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Isomorphic to provable from axioms). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>If there is a misconception then you have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misconceived something. It is well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known that it is possible to construct a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory where some formulas
are neither provble nor disprovable. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is false.
a fact or piece of information that shows that something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists or is true:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> english/ proof
We require that terms of art are used with their term- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of- art meaning and
The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same
no matter what idiomatic meanings say.
Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The title line means that something is misunderstood but >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something
is not the meaning of "true".
It is untrue because it is misunderstood.
Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be >>>>>>>>>>>> untrue.
That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim. >>>>>>>>>>
The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would >>>>>>>>>>> be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified >>>>>>>>>>> as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less >>>>>>>>>>> than complete.
Math is not intentionally incomplete.
You paraphrased what I said incorrectly.
No, I did not paraphrase anything.
Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0]. >>>>>>>>That is not a part of the definition but it is a consequence of the >>>>>>>> definition. Much of the lost capability is about things that are >>>>>>>> outside of the scope of mathemiatics and formal theories.
When one thinks of math as only pertaining to numbers then math
is inherently very limited.
That's right. That limited area should be called "number theory",
not "mathematics".
When one applies something like
Montague Grammar to formalize every detail of natural language
semantics then math takes on much more scope.
It is not possible to specify every detail of a natural language.
In order to do so one should know every detail of a natural language. >>>>>> While one is finding out the language changes so that the already
aquired knowledge is invalid.
When we see this then we see "incompleteness" is a mere artificial >>>>>>> contrivance.
Hallucinations are possible but only proofs count in mathematics.
True(x) always means that a connection to a semantic
truthmaker exists. When math does this differently it is simply
breaking the rules.
Mathematics does not make anything about "True(x)". Some branches
care
about semantic connections, some don't. Much of logic is about
comparing
semantic connections to syntactic ones.
Many theories are incomplete,
intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest >>>>>>>>>> of math.
But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied. >>>>>>>>>>
When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X >>>>>>>>>>> lacks
a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue.
An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in >>>>>>>>>> another.
I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full >>>>>>>>> context.
Then you cannot have all the advantages of formal logic. In
particular,
you need to be able to apply and verify formally invalid
inferences.
All of the rules of correct reasoning (correcting the errors of
formal logic) are merely semantic connections between finite
strings:
There are no semantic connections between uninterpreted strings.
With different interpretations different connections can be found. >>>>>>
When we do not break the evaluation of an expression of language
into its syntax and semantics such that these are evaluated
separately and use something like Montague Semantics to formalize
the semantics as relations between finite strings then
it is clear that any expression of language that lacks a connection
through a truthmaker to the semantics that makes it true simply
remains
untrue.
But no one has been claiming that, so you are just fighting strawmen.
The problem is these links can be infinite, and proofs must be finite. >>>>
Math is only incomplete when it is intentionally defined
in such a way to make it incomplete.
*See if you can understand this*
On 2/8/2025 9:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
Instead of just usual model theory and axiomatics
and "what's true in the logical theory", "what's
not falsified in the scientific theory", you can
have a theory where the quantity is truth, and
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas, then the Liar
"paradox" is only a prototype of a fallacy...
In other words, you admit that you don't under how the logic you are
trying to talk about works, so you just lie and make up stuff that you
think sounds good.
Try and see if you can understand what Ross wrote.
On 2/9/2025 1:18 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 08/02/2025 16:51, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 02/08/2025 07:32 AM, olcott wrote:
(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of
language with each unique natural language sense meaning
of a word having its own GUID.
Illusion and the tyranny of delusion, ad nauseam.
And I am finishing the job. I may have only one month left.
The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% chance
of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has
about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of life.
Food be your medicine, medicine be your food. Conversely,
good luck with any of that.
Instead of just usual model theory and axiomatics
and "what's true in the logical theory", "what's
not falsified in the scientific theory", you can
have a theory where the quantity is truth, and
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas, then the Liar
"paradox" is only a prototype of a fallacy,
Rather, then there is no such thing as a "fallacy", only
flat positivism and Newspeak. Indeed, Popper already is
yet another bad joke at best, but WTF would you know...
In other words you did not understand what he said thus
replied to his words with nonsense gibberish pure rhetoric
with no actual basis in reasoning.
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
True(L,x) <is> a mathematical mapping from finite string
expressions of language through a truthmaker to finite
strings expressions providing formalized semantic meanings
making the expression true.
The prototype of a fallacy that he referred to is the
recursive structure of pathological self-reference that
never resolves to a truth value.
We live in a yellow submarine, just yellower and yellower.
-Julio
On 2/9/2025 4:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-08 15:32:00 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/8/2025 4:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-07 16:21:01 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/7/2025 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-06 14:46:55 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote:Yes, but you didn't claim that.
On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Within the entire body of analytical truth any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language that has no sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formalized semantic deductive inference steps from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the formalized semantic foundational truths of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system are simply untrue in this system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Isomorphic to provable from axioms). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>If there is a misconception then you have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misconceived something. It is well
known that it is possible to construct a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory where some formulas
are neither provble nor disprovable.
This is well known.
And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
a fact or piece of information that shows that something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists or is true:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof
We require that terms of art are used with their term- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of- art meaning and
The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same
no matter what idiomatic meanings say.
Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment.
The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line: >>>>>>>>>>>>> misconception means ~True.
The title line means that something is misunderstood but >>>>>>>>>>>> that something
is not the meaning of "true".
It is untrue because it is misunderstood.
Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be >>>>>>>>>> untrue.
That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim. >>>>>>>>
The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would >>>>>>>>> be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified >>>>>>>>> as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less >>>>>>>>> than complete.
Math is not intentionally incomplete.
You paraphrased what I said incorrectly.
No, I did not paraphrase anything.
Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0].
That is not a part of the definition but it is a consequence of the >>>>>> definition. Much of the lost capability is about things that are
outside of the scope of mathemiatics and formal theories.
When one thinks of math as only pertaining to numbers then math
is inherently very limited.
That's right. That limited area should be called "number theory",
not "mathematics".
When one applies something like
Montague Grammar to formalize every detail of natural language
semantics then math takes on much more scope.
It is not possible to specify every detail of a natural language.
In order to do so one should know every detail of a natural language.
While one is finding out the language changes so that the already
aquired knowledge is invalid.
When we see this then we see "incompleteness" is a mere artificial
contrivance.
Hallucinations are possible but only proofs count in mathematics.
True(x) always means that a connection to a semantic
truthmaker exists. When math does this differently it is simply
breaking the rules.
Mathematics does not make anything about "True(x)". Some branches care >>>> about semantic connections, some don't. Much of logic is about
comparing
semantic connections to syntactic ones.
There are no semantic connections between uninterpreted strings.All of the rules of correct reasoning (correcting the errors ofMany theories are incomplete,
intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest of >>>>>>>> math.
But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied.
When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X lacks >>>>>>>>> a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue.
An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in
another.
I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full
context.
Then you cannot have all the advantages of formal logic. In
particular,
you need to be able to apply and verify formally invalid inferences. >>>>>
formal logic) are merely semantic connections between finite strings: >>>>
With different interpretations different connections can be found.
When we do not break the evaluation of an expression of language
into its syntax and semantics such that these are evaluated
separately and use something like Montague Semantics to formalize
the semantics as relations between finite strings then
it is clear that any expression of language that lacks a connection
through a truthmaker to the semantics that makes it true simply remains
untrue.
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become
inexpressible.
This does not make any sense to me. It is not that truth remains inexpressible. We simply make the system expressible enough that
all of those truths made true through a truthmaker connection to
their formalized semantic meaning can reach this semantic meaning.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all
arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
LP := ~True(LP) // AKA this sentence is not true
is rejected as a not a truth-bearer.
In the big picture way that truth really works there cannot
possibly be true[0](x) that is not provable[0](x) where x
is made true by finite strings expressing its semantic meanings.
When one finite string expression of language is known to be true
other expressions are know to be semantically entailed.
Only if they are connected with (semantic or other) connections that
are known to preserve truth.
Yes, there must be truth preserving operations.
More inportant is that there are no other operations.
Formal logic fails at this some of the time.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
That is not a failure.
I can never understand how anyone can be so gullible to
believe that anything besides FALSE logically follows
from a contradiction.
To me this seems the same as"dead rats" being stipulated
as a kind of "live chicken" and all the biologists believe
it because they mindlessly accept whatever they were told.
The only thing that is actually semantically entailed by a
contradiction is FALSE. (A & ~A) ⊨ FALSE
Yes. And if false is true then everything is true because in ordinary
logic (A ∨ ~A) is a tautology.
I fail to understand how anyone could be gullible enough into
being conned into believing that anything besides FALSE is
entailed by a contradiction.
Indeed. Everybody should understand that a contradiction entails
FALSE, too.
The received view of POE seems to prove that most people do not
understand this.
We simply leave most of formal logic as it is with some changes:
(1) Non-truth preserving operations are eliminated.
There are none anyway.
(A & ~A) ⊨ FALSE thus POE is incorrect.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if
it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises
to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Yes. That is a feature of any formal logic system when interpreted so
that
logical operations satisfy their defining axioms.
However, that requirement involves semantics so it is not applicable to
a purely formal system.
*We correct the above fundamental mistake*
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if
it takes a form that the conclusion is a necessary
consequence of its premises.
Not possible unless you define "necessafy consequence".
Modal Logic already defines this.
(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of
language with each unique natural language sense meaning
of a word having its own GUID.
One kind of semantics. Different interpretations are still possible.
The subjective leeway of interpretation utterly ceases to exist
when every GUID semantic meaning is exhaustively defined.
All expressions of lanhguage are comprised entirely of GUIDs.
True[math] can only exist apart from Provable[math] within
the narrow minded, idiomatic use of these terms. This is
NOT the way that True[0] and Provable[0] actually work.
If you want that to be true you need to define True[math] differently >>>>>> from the way "truth" is used by mathimaticians.
We could equally define a "dead cat" to be a kind of {cow}.
Math does not get to change the way that truth really works,
when math tries to do this math is incorrect.
Math does not care how truth works outside mathematics. But the truth
about mathematics works the way truth usually does.
Math is not allowed to break these rules without making math incorrect.
It is. You have no authority to prohibit anything.
When math tries to override how truth really works then
math is necessarily incorrect.
My point is much more clear when we see that Tarski attempts
to show that True[0] is undefinable.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Tarski did not attempt to show that True[0] is undefinable. He showed >>>>>> quite successfully that arthmetic truth is undefinable. Whether that >>>>>> proof applies to your True[0] is not yet determined.
Tarski is the foremost author of the whole notion of every
kind of truth. "snow is white" because within the actual state
of affairs the color of snow is perceived by humans to be white.
Many philosophers before and after Tarski have tried to find out what
truth really is and how it works.
And I am finishing the job.
Unlikely. Philosohers' job is never finished.
Within the limited domain of {expressions of language that
are true on the basis of their meaning} I am finishing the job.
I may have only one month left.
The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% chance
of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has
about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of life.
Ars longa, vita brevis.
On 2/9/2025 11:04 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 9:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 1:18 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 08/02/2025 16:51, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 02/08/2025 07:32 AM, olcott wrote:
(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of
language with each unique natural language sense meaning
of a word having its own GUID.
Illusion and the tyranny of delusion, ad nauseam.
And I am finishing the job. I may have only one month left.
The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% chance
of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has
about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of life.
Food be your medicine, medicine be your food. Conversely,
good luck with any of that.
Instead of just usual model theory and axiomatics
and "what's true in the logical theory", "what's
not falsified in the scientific theory", you can
have a theory where the quantity is truth, and
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas, then the Liar
"paradox" is only a prototype of a fallacy,
Rather, then there is no such thing as a "fallacy", only
flat positivism and Newspeak. Indeed, Popper already is
yet another bad joke at best, but WTF would you know...
In other words you did not understand what he said thus
replied to his words with nonsense gibberish pure rhetoric
with no actual basis in reasoning.
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
True(L,x) <is> a mathematical mapping from finite string
expressions of language through a truthmaker to finite
strings expressions providing formalized semantic meanings
making the expression true.
The prototype of a fallacy that he referred to is the
recursive structure of pathological self-reference that
never resolves to a truth value.
And, such a mapping can't exist if the language allows references like:
x is defined to be !True(L, x)
When we frame it the succinct way that Ross framed it
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
Then the above expression is simply rejected as not
a WFF of this Comenius language.
As such a statement can't be mapped to True or False without also
mapping True to False or False to True.
Note, he shows that such a statement CAN be formed in logic system
with certain minimal properties, like being able to express the
Natural Numbers and their properties.
So, I guess you are admitting that to you "logic" can't handle
something like mathematics.
The Comenius language expresses the key essence of the most
important aspect of my idea, rejecting expressions that do
not evaluate to Boolean as ill-formed. It only has TRUE
and ill-formed. My system has TRUE, FALSE and ill-formed.
All undecidable propositions fall into the ill-formed category
and logic is otherwise essentially unchanged.
We live in a yellow submarine, just yellower and yellower.
-Julio
On 2/9/2025 5:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 5:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 11:04 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 9:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 1:18 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 08/02/2025 16:51, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 02/08/2025 07:32 AM, olcott wrote:
(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of
language with each unique natural language sense meaning
of a word having its own GUID.
Illusion and the tyranny of delusion, ad nauseam.
Food be your medicine, medicine be your food. Conversely,And I am finishing the job. I may have only one month left.
The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% chance >>>>>>>> of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has >>>>>>>> about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of life. >>>>>>
good luck with any of that.
Instead of just usual model theory and axiomatics
and "what's true in the logical theory", "what's
not falsified in the scientific theory", you can
have a theory where the quantity is truth, and
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas, then the Liar
"paradox" is only a prototype of a fallacy,
Rather, then there is no such thing as a "fallacy", only
flat positivism and Newspeak. Indeed, Popper already is
yet another bad joke at best, but WTF would you know...
In other words you did not understand what he said thus
replied to his words with nonsense gibberish pure rhetoric
with no actual basis in reasoning.
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
True(L,x) <is> a mathematical mapping from finite string
expressions of language through a truthmaker to finite
strings expressions providing formalized semantic meanings
making the expression true.
The prototype of a fallacy that he referred to is the
recursive structure of pathological self-reference that
never resolves to a truth value.
And, such a mapping can't exist if the language allows references like: >>>>
x is defined to be !True(L, x)
When we frame it the succinct way that Ross framed it
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
And if True(L, x) isn't "well formed" then True fails to meet the
requirements of a predicate,
Not at all. True(L,x) is no longer baffled by semantically
incorrect expressions and rejects them as IFF ill-formed-formula.
On 2/9/2025 4:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-08 15:32:00 +0000, olcott said:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible. >>
This does not make any sense to me. It is not that truth remains inexpressible.
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible. >>
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic >> truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the
complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the
problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become
inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all
arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can
understand.
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the
complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the
problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
On 2/8/2025 9:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas...
We can easily extend the Comenius language to evaluate
FALSE as well as TRUE by allowing True(L, x) to also
evaluate True(L, ~x).
On 2/10/2025 6:41 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 11:03 PM, olcott wrote:When x := ~True(L, x) then the Comenius language parser
On 2/9/2025 6:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 6:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 5:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 5:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 11:04 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 9:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 1:18 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 08/02/2025 16:51, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 02/08/2025 07:32 AM, olcott wrote:
(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of >>>>>>>>>>>> language with each unique natural language sense meaning >>>>>>>>>>>> of a word having its own GUID.
Illusion and the tyranny of delusion, ad nauseam.
And I am finishing the job. I may have only one month left. >>>>>>>>>>>> The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% >>>>>>>>>>>> chance
of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has >>>>>>>>>>>> about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of >>>>>>>>>>>> life.
Food be your medicine, medicine be your food. Conversely, >>>>>>>>>> good luck with any of that.
Instead of just usual model theory and axiomatics
and "what's true in the logical theory", "what's
not falsified in the scientific theory", you can
have a theory where the quantity is truth, and
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas, then the Liar
"paradox" is only a prototype of a fallacy,
Rather, then there is no such thing as a "fallacy", only
flat positivism and Newspeak. Indeed, Popper already is
yet another bad joke at best, but WTF would you know...
In other words you did not understand what he said thus
replied to his words with nonsense gibberish pure rhetoric
with no actual basis in reasoning.
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
True(L,x) <is> a mathematical mapping from finite string
expressions of language through a truthmaker to finite
strings expressions providing formalized semantic meanings
making the expression true.
The prototype of a fallacy that he referred to is the
recursive structure of pathological self-reference that
never resolves to a truth value.
And, such a mapping can't exist if the language allows
references like:
x is defined to be !True(L, x)
When we frame it the succinct way that Ross framed it
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
And if True(L, x) isn't "well formed" then True fails to meet the
requirements of a predicate,
Not at all. True(L,x) is no longer baffled by semantically
incorrect expressions and rejects them as IFF ill-formed-formula.
So, what does True(L, x) say for an x defined as !True(L, x)
All answers are just wrong.
*The simplest way for you to understand this is*
On 2/8/2025 9:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas...
In the Comenius language: x := ~True(L,x)
is rejected as an ill-formed-formula.
Ross really did boil down the essence much more succinctly.
So, what is the answer? What answer does True(L, x) return?
returns: Syntax Error.
We live in a yellow submarine, just yellower and yellower.
The Comenius language that Comenius posits, is also
like Leibniz' universal language, which also he posits,
like Nietzsche's eternal text, which he bemoans its
absence, and like Quine in Word & Object, ignores.
A footnote in Quine refers to Russell's inconstancy,
or mere generously, development, with regards to
"never knowing what he is talking about".
Nietzsche as well had a later greater return
to Platonism, though it was much less promoted
since logical positivists of a particular formal
variety don't care for it.
Then the pre-geometric (technical, mathematical, ideal)
and pre-scientific (technical, scientific, analytical)
have that Derrida for Husserl very much has it so
part of the Lebenswelt, which we inhabit.
(analytical)
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic >>>> truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the
complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the
problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
On 2/10/2025 6:41 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 11:03 PM, olcott wrote:When x := ~True(L, x) then the Comenius language parser
On 2/9/2025 6:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 6:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 5:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 5:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 11:04 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 9:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 1:18 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 08/02/2025 16:51, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 02/08/2025 07:32 AM, olcott wrote:
(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of >>>>>>>>>>>> language with each unique natural language sense meaning >>>>>>>>>>>> of a word having its own GUID.
Illusion and the tyranny of delusion, ad nauseam.
Food be your medicine, medicine be your food. Conversely, >>>>>>>>>> good luck with any of that.And I am finishing the job. I may have only one month left. >>>>>>>>>>>> The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% chance >>>>>>>>>>>> of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has >>>>>>>>>>>> about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of life. >>>>>>>>>>
Instead of just usual model theory and axiomatics
and "what's true in the logical theory", "what's
not falsified in the scientific theory", you can
have a theory where the quantity is truth, and
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas, then the Liar
"paradox" is only a prototype of a fallacy,
Rather, then there is no such thing as a "fallacy", only
flat positivism and Newspeak. Indeed, Popper already is
yet another bad joke at best, but WTF would you know...
In other words you did not understand what he said thus
replied to his words with nonsense gibberish pure rhetoric
with no actual basis in reasoning.
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
True(L,x) <is> a mathematical mapping from finite string
expressions of language through a truthmaker to finite
strings expressions providing formalized semantic meanings
making the expression true.
The prototype of a fallacy that he referred to is the
recursive structure of pathological self-reference that
never resolves to a truth value.
And, such a mapping can't exist if the language allows references like:
x is defined to be !True(L, x)
When we frame it the succinct way that Ross framed it
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
And if True(L, x) isn't "well formed" then True fails to meet the
requirements of a predicate,
Not at all. True(L,x) is no longer baffled by semantically
incorrect expressions and rejects them as IFF ill-formed-formula.
So, what does True(L, x) say for an x defined as !True(L, x)
All answers are just wrong.
*The simplest way for you to understand this is*
On 2/8/2025 9:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas...
In the Comenius language: x := ~True(L,x)
is rejected as an ill-formed-formula.
Ross really did boil down the essence much more succinctly.
So, what is the answer? What answer does True(L, x) return?
returns: Syntax Error.
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become
inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all
arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can
understand.
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the
complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the
problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even >>>> exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the
complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the
problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even >>>> exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
On 2/11/2025 3:42 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 13:21:56 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 6:41 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 11:03 PM, olcott wrote:When x := ~True(L, x) then the Comenius language parser
On 2/9/2025 6:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 6:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 5:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 5:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 11:04 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/9/25 9:31 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/9/2025 1:18 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 08/02/2025 16:51, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 02/08/2025 07:32 AM, olcott wrote:
(2) Semantics is fully integrated into every expression of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> language with each unique natural language sense meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a word having its own GUID.
Illusion and the tyranny of delusion, ad nauseam.
Food be your medicine, medicine be your food. Conversely, >>>>>>>>>>>> good luck with any of that.And I am finishing the job. I may have only one month left. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The cancer treatment that I will have next month has a 5% chance >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of killing me and a 1% chance of ruining my brain. It also has >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about a 70% chance of giving me at least two more years of life. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Instead of just usual model theory and axiomatics
and "what's true in the logical theory", "what's
not falsified in the scientific theory", you can
have a theory where the quantity is truth, and
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas, then the Liar
"paradox" is only a prototype of a fallacy,
Rather, then there is no such thing as a "fallacy", only >>>>>>>>>>>> flat positivism and Newspeak. Indeed, Popper already is >>>>>>>>>>>> yet another bad joke at best, but WTF would you know... >>>>>>>>>>>>
In other words you did not understand what he said thus
replied to his words with nonsense gibberish pure rhetoric >>>>>>>>>>> with no actual basis in reasoning.
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
True(L,x) <is> a mathematical mapping from finite string >>>>>>>>>>> expressions of language through a truthmaker to finite
strings expressions providing formalized semantic meanings >>>>>>>>>>> making the expression true.
The prototype of a fallacy that he referred to is the
recursive structure of pathological self-reference that
never resolves to a truth value.
And, such a mapping can't exist if the language allows references like:
x is defined to be !True(L, x)
When we frame it the succinct way that Ross framed it
there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas
And if True(L, x) isn't "well formed" then True fails to meet the >>>>>>>> requirements of a predicate,
Not at all. True(L,x) is no longer baffled by semantically
incorrect expressions and rejects them as IFF ill-formed-formula. >>>>>>>
So, what does True(L, x) say for an x defined as !True(L, x)
All answers are just wrong.
*The simplest way for you to understand this is*
On 2/8/2025 9:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
then there's a Comenius language of it that only
truisms are well-formed formulas...
In the Comenius language: x := ~True(L,x)
is rejected as an ill-formed-formula.
Ross really did boil down the essence much more succinctly.
So, what is the answer? What answer does True(L, x) return?
returns: Syntax Error.
Which Comenius language parser you tried?
Can you give an example of what that parser does accept?
There is an inheritance hierarchy tree of knowledge https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
containing all of the basic facts. Each node on this tree
has its own unique GUID. These facts are formalized natural
language using something like Montague Grammar. This provides all
of the unique sense meanings of every natural language term.
When a finite string expression of language lacks a connection
though a truthmaker to the semantics meanings that make it
true then it is rejected as untrue.
x := ~True(L, x) is rejected as untrue where L is the
body of human knowledge.
On 02/10/2025 09:32 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 11/02/2025 03:19, Ross Finlayson wrote:
We live in a yellow submarine, just yellower and yellower.
The Comenius language that Comenius posits, is also
like Leibniz' universal language, which also he posits,
Language is a tool in Leibniz, not the primary thing.
<https://seprogrammo.blogspot.com/2024/01/on-logic-of-it.html>
Indeed, all you keep spouting is rather anti-Leibniz.
Not per chance, in this empire of fundamental inversions.
like Nietzsche's eternal text, which he bemoans its
absence, and like Quine in Word & Object, ignores.
A footnote in Quine refers to Russell's inconstancy,
or mere generously, development, with regards to
"never knowing what he is talking about".
Nietzsche as well had a later greater return
to Platonism, though it was much less promoted
since logical positivists of a particular formal
variety don't care for it.
Then the pre-geometric (technical, mathematical, ideal)
and pre-scientific (technical, scientific, analytical)
have that Derrida for Husserl very much has it so
part of the Lebenswelt, which we inhabit.
(analytical)
I once wrote a little word randomizer: given any text in
input, it spit out prose that was more honest than yours.
You mentioned "inversions", it's considered primary,
the inversion, more primary than contradiction.
On 2/11/2025 9:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/11/25 9:07 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become
inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all >>>>>>>> arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can >>>>>>> understand.
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the >>>>>>> complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see
the problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot
even
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system >>>> that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The problem is your logic rejects its own output as semantic nonsense.
Spouting off nonsense without any actual basis in reasoning...
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become
inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all >>>>>>>> arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can >>>>>>> understand.
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the >>>>>>> complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see
the problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot
even
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system >>>> that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
The
result depends on all of the change. But as long as we don't even
know whether that kind of change is possible at all the details are
impossible to determine.
LP := ~True(LP) has never been more than nonsense.
Tarski (although otherwise quite brilliant) had a blind spot.
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness.
WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the >>>>>>> complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the >>>>>>> problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even >>>>>> exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system >>>> that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
The
result depends on all of the change. But as long as we don't even
know whether that kind of change is possible at all the details are
impossible to determine.
LP := ~True(LP) has never been more than nonsense.
Tarski (although otherwise quite brilliant) had a blind spot.
On 2/18/2025 6:25 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/17/25 10:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the >>>>>>>>> complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the >>>>>>>>> problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even >>>>>>>> exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system >>>>>> that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
But your logic needs to reject some of the results of your logic as
semantically incorrect, and thus your logic is itself semantically
incorrect.
There is nothing like that in the following concrete example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect
to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language isWHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter >>>>>>>>> can understand.
sufficiently
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become >>>>>>>>>> inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express >>>>>>>>>> all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach >>>>>>>>> the complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't >>>>>>>>> see the problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed
concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that
cannot even
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete
system
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted.
The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this.
It follows from the traditional meanings of "3", "2", and ">".
Therefore the above statement is meaningless.
The
result depends on all of the change. But as long as we don't even
know whether that kind of change is possible at all the details are
impossible to determine.
LP := ~True(LP) has never been more than nonsense.
More specifically, your nonnsense. The symbol ":=" usually means
definition
but requires that the symbol on the left side (in this case "LP") is not
used on the right side (and also that it is not used in the definition of
any of the symbols on the right side).
Usually languages of formal logic are constructed so that symbol that is
defined with an expression that starts with a negation operator cannot
be used as an argument to a function or a predicate.
Tarski (although otherwise quite brilliant) had a blind spot.
Tarski did not use your nonsense.
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the >>>>>>>>> complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the >>>>>>>>> problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even >>>>>>>> exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system >>>>>> that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted.
The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this.
It follows from the traditional meanings of "3", "2", and ">".
Therefore the above statement is meaningless.
The
result depends on all of the change. But as long as we don't even
know whether that kind of change is possible at all the details are
impossible to determine.
LP := ~True(LP) has never been more than nonsense.
More specifically, your nonnsense. The symbol ":=" usually means definition >> but requires that the symbol on the left side (in this case "LP") is not
used on the right side (and also that it is not used in the definition of
any of the symbols on the right side).
Usually languages of formal logic are constructed so that symbol that is
defined with an expression that starts with a negation operator cannot
be used as an argument to a function or a predicate.
Tarski (although otherwise quite brilliant) had a blind spot.
Tarski did not use your nonsense.
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/18/2025 6:25 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/17/25 10:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>>>>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the >>>>>>>>>>> complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the >>>>>>>>>>> problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts. >>>>>>>>>>
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
But your logic needs to reject some of the results of your logic as
semantically incorrect, and thus your logic is itself semantically
incorrect.
There is nothing like that in the following concrete example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect
to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may misbehave. A memory
leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false
This merely means that the result of unification would be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but is not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
I am not going bother to quote Clocksin and Mellish
proving that you are wrong.
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>>>>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the >>>>>>>>>>> complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the >>>>>>>>>>> problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts. >>>>>>>>>>
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted.
The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this.
It follows from the traditional meanings of "3", "2", and ">".
Therefore the above statement is meaningless.
The
result depends on all of the change. But as long as we don't even
know whether that kind of change is possible at all the details are >>>>>> impossible to determine.
LP := ~True(LP) has never been more than nonsense.
More specifically, your nonnsense. The symbol ":=" usually means definition
but requires that the symbol on the left side (in this case "LP") is not >>>> used on the right side (and also that it is not used in the definition of >>>> any of the symbols on the right side).
Usually languages of formal logic are constructed so that symbol that is >>>> defined with an expression that starts with a negation operator cannot >>>> be used as an argument to a function or a predicate.
Tarski (although otherwise quite brilliant) had a blind spot.
Tarski did not use your nonsense.
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of
the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be
able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through.
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently >>>>>>>>>> restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become inexpressible.WHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter can understand.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach the >>>>>>>>> complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but can't see the >>>>>>>>> problem, as he just doesn't understand the needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that cannot even >>>>>>>> exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete system >>>>>> that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted.
The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this.
It follows from the traditional meanings of "3", "2", and ">".
Therefore the above statement is meaningless.
On 2/21/2025 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/25 6:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/12/2025 4:21 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-11 14:07:11 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/11/2025 3:50 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-10 11:48:16 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/10/2025 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-09 13:10:37 +0000, Richard Damon said:
On 2/9/25 5:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
Of course, completness can be achieved if language isWHich, it seems, are the only type of logic system that Peter >>>>>>>>>>> can understand.
sufficiently
restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths >>>>>>>>>>>> become inexpressible.
It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express >>>>>>>>>>>> all arithmetic
truths that Peano arithmetic can and avoid its incompletness. >>>>>>>>>>>
He can only think in primitive logic systems that can't reach >>>>>>>>>>> the complexity needed for the proofs he talks about, but >>>>>>>>>>> can't see the problem, as he just doesn't understand the >>>>>>>>>>> needed concepts.
That would be OK if he wouldn't try to solve problems that >>>>>>>>>> cannot even
exist in those systems.
There are no problems than cannot be solved in a system
that can also reject semantically incorrect expressions.
The topic of the discussion is completeness. Is there a complete >>>>>>>> system
that can solve all solvable problems?
When the essence of the change is to simply reject expressions
that specify semantic nonsense there is no reduction in the
expressive power of such a system.
The essence of the change is not sufficient to determine that.
In the same way that 3 > 2 is stipulated the essence of the
change is that semantically incorrect expressions are rejected.
Disagreeing with this is the same as disagreeing that 3 > 2.
That 3 > 2 need not be (and therefore usually isn't) stripualted.
The defintion of the set of natural numbers stipulates this.
It follows from the traditional meanings of "3", "2", and ">".
Therefore the above statement is meaningless.
The
result depends on all of the change. But as long as we don't even
know whether that kind of change is possible at all the details are >>>>>> impossible to determine.
LP := ~True(LP) has never been more than nonsense.
More specifically, your nonnsense. The symbol ":=" usually means
definition
but requires that the symbol on the left side (in this case "LP") is
not
used on the right side (and also that it is not used in the
definition of
any of the symbols on the right side).
Usually languages of formal logic are constructed so that symbol
that is
defined with an expression that starts with a negation operator cannot >>>> be used as an argument to a function or a predicate.
Tarski (although otherwise quite brilliant) had a blind spot.
Tarski did not use your nonsense.
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
By showing that given the necessary prerequisites, The equivalent of
the Liar Paradox was a statement that the Truth Predicate had to be
able to handle, which it can't.
It can be easily handled as ~True(LP) & ~True(~LP), Tarski just
didn't think it through. The limitations of logic systems is that
they try to unsuccessfully simply assume that every expression
of language <is> a truth bearer. These systems cannot think outside
of that box.
On 2/22/2025 3:15 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
More specifically, to the idea that the Liar Paradox does not have a
truth value. Do you reject that idea?
This was not what Tarski was saying.
Tarski got totally confused by the fact that:
This sentence is not true: "this sentence is not true"
is true (in his meta-language).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski-truth/#ObjLanMet
The above true sentence is true in the meta-language because
it eliminates the pathological self-reference of the inner
sentence. This PSR makes the inner sentence not a truth-bearer.
Even the current greatest experts in the field of truth bearer
maximalism do not quite fully get this key point. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Max
Part of the issue with them not getting this key point
is that they do not carefully divide empirical truth
from truth on the basis of meaning expressed using language analytical(Olcott) truth.
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said:
There is nothing like that in the following concrete example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect
to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may misbehave. A memory
leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false
This merely means that the result of unification would be that LP conains >>>> itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but is not in the scope >>>> of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
It does in the context where it was presented. More generally,
unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments are not
unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded by their
successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
On 2/22/2025 3:15 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
More specifically, to the idea that the Liar Paradox does not have a
truth value. Do you reject that idea?
This was not what Tarski was saying.
On 2/24/2025 3:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:41:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:15 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
More specifically, to the idea that the Liar Paradox does not have a
truth value. Do you reject that idea?
This was not what Tarski was saying.
Yes, he was. He just assumed that his readers already know that the
Liar Paradox does not have a truth value so he didn't need to be
emphatically explicit about that point.
In other words you never read this: https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said:
There is nothing like that in the following concrete example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect
to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is permitted to fail. >>>>>> If it succeeds the operations using LP may misbehave. A memory
leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false
This merely means that the result of unification would be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but is not in the scope >>>>>> of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
It does in the context where it was presented. More generally,
unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments are not
unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded by their
successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by the Prolog standard.
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish.
an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID.
On 2/25/2025 9:40 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 22:44:03 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 3:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:41:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:15 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
More specifically, to the idea that the Liar Paradox does not have a >>>>>> truth value. Do you reject that idea?
This was not what Tarski was saying.
Yes, he was. He just assumed that his readers already know that the
Liar Paradox does not have a truth value so he didn't need to be
emphatically explicit about that point.
In other words you never read this:
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Did you? Nowhere on those pages he claims that the Liar paradox is true
nor that the Liar paradox is false.
We shall show that the sentence x is actually undecidable and at the
same time true.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
On what page and line did Tarski say anything that could justfy
the claim you made above?
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said:
There is nothing like that in the following concrete example: >>>>>>>>> LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect
to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is permitted to fail. >>>>>>>> If it succeeds the operations using LP may misbehave. A memory >>>>>>>> leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false
This merely means that the result of unification would be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but is not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
It does in the context where it was presented. More generally,
unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments are not
unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded by their
successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by the Prolog standard.
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish.
an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID.
Prolog does not define any semantics other than the execution semantics
of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has any own semantics.
The result of the exectution of an instruction like LP == not(true(LP))
is not fully defined by the standard so we may say that that instruction
is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an expression
in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules and the
evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an infinite loop
then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT.
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said:Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish.
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said:
There is nothing like that in the following concrete example: >>>>>>>>>>> LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect
to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is permitted to fail. >>>>>>>>>> If it succeeds the operations using LP may misbehave. A memory >>>>>>>>>> leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false
This merely means that the result of unification would be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but is not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
It does in the context where it was presented. More generally, >>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments are not
unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded by their
successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by the Prolog standard. >>>>>
an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID.
Prolog does not define any semantics other than the execution semantics >>>> of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has any own semantics. >>>>
The result of the exectution of an instruction like LP == not(true(LP)) >>>> is not fully defined by the standard so we may say that that instruction >>>> is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an expression
in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules and the
evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an infinite loop
then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT.
Which is not done anywhere above.
In other words you can't remember things that I said
a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat everything
every time?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish Quote https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
On 2/25/2025 9:40 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 22:44:03 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 3:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:41:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:15 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
More specifically, to the idea that the Liar Paradox does not have a >>>>>> truth value. Do you reject that idea?
This was not what Tarski was saying.
Yes, he was. He just assumed that his readers already know that the
Liar Paradox does not have a truth value so he didn't need to be
emphatically explicit about that point.
In other words you never read this:
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Did you? Nowhere on those pages he claims that the Liar paradox is true
nor that the Liar paradox is false.
We shall show that the sentence x is actually undecidable and at the
same time true.
On 2/28/2025 3:56 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 14:42:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said:Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish.
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said:
There is nothing like that in the following concrete example: >>>>>>>>>>>>> LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect >>>>>>>>>>>>> to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is permitted to fail. >>>>>>>>>>>> If it succeeds the operations using LP may misbehave. A memory >>>>>>>>>>>> leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false
This merely means that the result of unification would be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but is not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
It does in the context where it was presented. More generally, >>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments are not >>>>>>>>>> unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded by their >>>>>>>>>> successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by the Prolog standard. >>>>>>>
an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID.
Prolog does not define any semantics other than the execution semantics >>>>>> of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has any own semantics. >>>>>>
The result of the exectution of an instruction like LP == not(true(LP)) >>>>>> is not fully defined by the standard so we may say that that instruction >>>>>> is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an expression
in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules and the
evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an infinite loop
then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT.
Which is not done anywhere above.
In other words you can't remember things that I said
a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat everything
every time?
Is this just an instance or your favorite sin? If not, what do you think
I didn't remember?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish Quote
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It just says that your prolog system is defective as it does not reject
your LP = not(true(LP)). The Prolog standard says that this operation may
but need not fail. It also cortectly says that
LP = not(true(LP)), write(LP)
would not work.
There is no "need not fail" Clocksin and Mellish says
impossible to succeed (paraphrase).
More precisely it says that there is a cycle in the
directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the expression.
That you fail to understands that the following means this
is your lack of understanding not my mistake.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of
itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies
“some kind of infinite structure.”
Go back and read the Clocksin and Mellish example and quote on
the same page until you totally understand it. You only need
example the yellow highlighted text.
On 2/28/2025 5:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 20:57:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:40 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 22:44:03 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 3:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:41:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:15 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
More specifically, to the idea that the Liar Paradox does not have a >>>>>>>> truth value. Do you reject that idea?
This was not what Tarski was saying.
Yes, he was. He just assumed that his readers already know that the >>>>>> Liar Paradox does not have a truth value so he didn't need to be
emphatically explicit about that point.
In other words you never read this:
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Did you? Nowhere on those pages he claims that the Liar paradox is true >>>> nor that the Liar paradox is false.
We shall show that the sentence x is actually undecidable and at the
same time true.
At that point Tarski has alredy known that the sentence s can be constructed >> and that it can be represented by an object that the theory can handle.
Later Tarski ideed shows that the sentence x is both undecidable and true. >> But x is not the liar paradox.
If you don't muck up the meanings
of common terms
with idiomatic term-of-the-art meanings then true
and undecidable is the impossibility of true without
a truth-maker.
On 3/1/2025 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 21:58:34 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 3:56 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 14:42:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said:
There is nothing like that in the following concrete example: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may misbehave. A memory >>>>>>>>>>>>>> leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false
This merely means that the result of unification would be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but is not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
It does in the context where it was presented. More generally, >>>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments are not >>>>>>>>>>>> unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded by their >>>>>>>>>>>> successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by the Prolog standard.
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish.
an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID.
Prolog does not define any semantics other than the execution semantics
of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has any own semantics.
The result of the exectution of an instruction like LP == not(true(LP))
is not fully defined by the standard so we may say that that instruction
is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an expression
in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules and the
evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an infinite loop
then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT.
Which is not done anywhere above.
In other words you can't remember things that I said
a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat everything
every time?
Is this just an instance or your favorite sin? If not, what do you think >>>> I didn't remember?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish Quote
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It just says that your prolog system is defective as it does not reject >>>> your LP = not(true(LP)). The Prolog standard says that this operation may >>>> but need not fail. It also cortectly says that
LP = not(true(LP)), write(LP)
would not work.
There is no "need not fail" Clocksin and Mellish says
impossible to succeed (paraphrase).
No, that is not said. In a footnote they say that the behaviour is undefined,
i.e., an implementation may choose what to do. They do say that a typical
implementation does not fail, which implies "need not fail".
More precisely it says that there is a cycle in the
directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the expression.
Assuming that the unification does not fail.
That you fail to understands that the following means this
is your lack of understanding not my mistake.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
It means that the pariticular implementation you used exploited the
"need not fail" permission, producing a cycle in the data structure.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
For this operation there is no "need not fail". The standard specifies that >> the operation must fail.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of
itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies
“some kind of infinite structure.”
Wrong. You above said that the unification LP = not(true(LP)) did not
fail. It may fail on another implementation but that is not required.
Go back and read the Clocksin and Mellish example and quote on
the same page until you totally understand it. You only need
example the yellow highlighted text.
The supreme authority is not Clocksin and Mellish but ISO/IEC 13211.
Clocksin and Mellish concretely show the result of the
infinitely recursive structure of their concrete example.
On 3/1/2025 3:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 23:51:54 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 5:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 20:57:44 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:40 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 22:44:03 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 3:04 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:41:40 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:15 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:19:10 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 2:54 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 03:59:08 +0000, olcott said:
Tarski anchored his whole proof in the Liar Paradox.
More specifically, to the idea that the Liar Paradox does not have a >>>>>>>>>> truth value. Do you reject that idea?
This was not what Tarski was saying.
Yes, he was. He just assumed that his readers already know that the >>>>>>>> Liar Paradox does not have a truth value so he didn't need to be >>>>>>>> emphatically explicit about that point.
In other words you never read this:
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Did you? Nowhere on those pages he claims that the Liar paradox is true >>>>>> nor that the Liar paradox is false.
We shall show that the sentence x is actually undecidable and at the >>>>> same time true.
At that point Tarski has alredy known that the sentence s can be constructed
and that it can be represented by an object that the theory can handle. >>>> Later Tarski ideed shows that the sentence x is both undecidable and true. >>>> But x is not the liar paradox.
If you don't muck up the meanings
That is hard to avoid in contexts where you do.
of common terms
with idiomatic term-of-the-art meanings then true
and undecidable is the impossibility of true without
a truth-maker.
Should this be interpreted according to the term-of-art menings or
common language meanings or some other meanings?
When we use provable(common) that means
{shown to be definitely true by whatever means}
then incompleteness and undecidability cannot exist.
On 3/3/2025 9:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:42:50 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 21:58:34 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 3:56 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 14:42:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said:
There is nothing like that in the following concrete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may misbehave. A >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory
leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false
This merely means that the result of unification would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
It does in the context where it was presented. More >>>>>>>>>>>>>> generally,
unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments are not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded by their >>>>>>>>>>>>>> successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by the Prolog >>>>>>>>>>>> standard.
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish.
an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID.
Prolog does not define any semantics other than the execution >>>>>>>>>> semantics
of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has any own >>>>>>>>>> semantics.
The result of the exectution of an instruction like LP ==
not(true(LP))
is not fully defined by the standard so we may say that that >>>>>>>>>> instruction
is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an expression
in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules and the
evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an infinite loop
then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT.
Which is not done anywhere above.
In other words you can't remember things that I said
a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat everything
every time?
Is this just an instance or your favorite sin? If not, what do you >>>>>> think
I didn't remember?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish Quote
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It just says that your prolog system is defective as it does not
reject
your LP = not(true(LP)). The Prolog standard says that this
operation may
but need not fail. It also cortectly says that
LP = not(true(LP)), write(LP)
would not work.
There is no "need not fail" Clocksin and Mellish says
impossible to succeed (paraphrase).
No, that is not said. In a footnote they say that the behaviour is
undefined,
i.e., an implementation may choose what to do. They do say that a
typical
implementation does not fail, which implies "need not fail".
More precisely it says that there is a cycle in the
directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the expression.
Assuming that the unification does not fail.
That you fail to understands that the following means this
is your lack of understanding not my mistake.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
It means that the pariticular implementation you used exploited the
"need not fail" permission, producing a cycle in the data structure.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
For this operation there is no "need not fail". The standard
specifies that
the operation must fail.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of
itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies >>>>> “some kind of infinite structure.”
Wrong. You above said that the unification LP = not(true(LP)) did not
fail. It may fail on another implementation but that is not required.
Go back and read the Clocksin and Mellish example and quote on
the same page until you totally understand it. You only need
example the yellow highlighted text.
The supreme authority is not Clocksin and Mellish but ISO/IEC 13211.
Clocksin and Mellish concretely show the result of the
infinitely recursive structure of their concrete example.
Irrelevant.
Your above replies prove that you do not understand this
thus cannot correctly say that it is irrelevant.
Prolog determines that all expressions that are
isomorphic to their concrete example are semantically
incorrect because these expressions have an infinitely
recursive structure.
On 3/3/2025 9:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:42:50 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 21:58:34 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 3:56 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 14:42:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said:
There is nothing like that in the following concrete example: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may misbehave. A memory >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false
This merely means that the result of unification would be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but is not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
It does in the context where it was presented. More generally, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments are not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded by their >>>>>>>>>>>>>> successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by the Prolog standard.
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish.
an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID.
Prolog does not define any semantics other than the execution semantics
of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has any own semantics.
The result of the exectution of an instruction like LP == not(true(LP))
is not fully defined by the standard so we may say that that instruction
is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an expression
in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules and the
evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an infinite loop
then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT.
Which is not done anywhere above.
In other words you can't remember things that I said
a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat everything
every time?
Is this just an instance or your favorite sin? If not, what do you think >>>>>> I didn't remember?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish Quote
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It just says that your prolog system is defective as it does not reject >>>>>> your LP = not(true(LP)). The Prolog standard says that this operation may
but need not fail. It also cortectly says that
LP = not(true(LP)), write(LP)
would not work.
There is no "need not fail" Clocksin and Mellish says
impossible to succeed (paraphrase).
No, that is not said. In a footnote they say that the behaviour is undefined,
i.e., an implementation may choose what to do. They do say that a typical >>>> implementation does not fail, which implies "need not fail".
More precisely it says that there is a cycle in the
directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the expression.
Assuming that the unification does not fail.
That you fail to understands that the following means this
is your lack of understanding not my mistake.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
It means that the pariticular implementation you used exploited the
"need not fail" permission, producing a cycle in the data structure.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
For this operation there is no "need not fail". The standard specifies that
the operation must fail.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of
itself” we can know that unification will fail because it specifies >>>>> “some kind of infinite structure.”
Wrong. You above said that the unification LP = not(true(LP)) did not
fail. It may fail on another implementation but that is not required.
Go back and read the Clocksin and Mellish example and quote on
the same page until you totally understand it. You only need
example the yellow highlighted text.
The supreme authority is not Clocksin and Mellish but ISO/IEC 13211.
Clocksin and Mellish concretely show the result of the
infinitely recursive structure of their concrete example.
Irrelevant.
Your above replies prove that you do not understand this
thus cannot correctly say that it is irrelevant.
Prolog determines that all expressions that are
isomorphic to their concrete example are semantically
incorrect because these expressions have an infinitely
recursive structure.
On 3/3/2025 7:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 7:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:42:50 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 21:58:34 +0000, olcott said:Clocksin and Mellish concretely show the result of the
On 2/28/2025 3:56 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 14:42:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is nothing like that in the following concrete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may misbehave. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A memory
leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false
This merely means that the result of unification would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
It does in the context where it was presented. More >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> generally,
unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments are not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded by their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog standard.
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish.
an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID.
Prolog does not define any semantics other than the
execution semantics
of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has any own >>>>>>>>>>>> semantics.
The result of the exectution of an instruction like LP == >>>>>>>>>>>> not(true(LP))
is not fully defined by the standard so we may say that that >>>>>>>>>>>> instruction
is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an expression >>>>>>>>>>> in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules and the >>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an infinite loop >>>>>>>>>>> then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT.
Which is not done anywhere above.
In other words you can't remember things that I said
a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat everything >>>>>>>>> every time?
Is this just an instance or your favorite sin? If not, what do >>>>>>>> you think
I didn't remember?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish Quote
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It just says that your prolog system is defective as it does not >>>>>>>> reject
your LP = not(true(LP)). The Prolog standard says that this
operation may
but need not fail. It also cortectly says that
LP = not(true(LP)), write(LP)
would not work.
There is no "need not fail" Clocksin and Mellish says
impossible to succeed (paraphrase).
No, that is not said. In a footnote they say that the behaviour is >>>>>> undefined,
i.e., an implementation may choose what to do. They do say that a
typical
implementation does not fail, which implies "need not fail".
More precisely it says that there is a cycle in the
directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the expression.
Assuming that the unification does not fail.
That you fail to understands that the following means this
is your lack of understanding not my mistake.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
It means that the pariticular implementation you used exploited the >>>>>> "need not fail" permission, producing a cycle in the data structure. >>>>>>
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
For this operation there is no "need not fail". The standard
specifies that
the operation must fail.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm of >>>>>>> itself” we can know that unification will fail because it
specifies “some kind of infinite structure.”
Wrong. You above said that the unification LP = not(true(LP)) did not >>>>>> fail. It may fail on another implementation but that is not required. >>>>>>
Go back and read the Clocksin and Mellish example and quote on
the same page until you totally understand it. You only need
example the yellow highlighted text.
The supreme authority is not Clocksin and Mellish but ISO/IEC 13211. >>>>>
infinitely recursive structure of their concrete example.
Irrelevant.
Your above replies prove that you do not understand this
thus cannot correctly say that it is irrelevant.
Prolog determines that all expressions that are
isomorphic to their concrete example are semantically
incorrect because these expressions have an infinitely
recursive structure.
In the logic that Prolog supports, which is very limited.
No that is not it. You don't seem to understand
the idea that an infinite loop is an error.
Both the C&M concrete example and the Liar Paradox
are infinite loops.
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 7:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:42:50 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 21:58:34 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 3:56 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 14:42:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is nothing like that in the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is incorrect >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misbehave. A memory
leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false
This merely means that the result of unification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong.
It does in the context where it was presented. More >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> generally,
unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not
unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their
successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog standard.
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish.
an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID.
Prolog does not define any semantics other than the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> execution semantics
of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has any >>>>>>>>>>>>>> own semantics.
The result of the exectution of an instruction like LP == >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not(true(LP))
is not fully defined by the standard so we may say that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that instruction
is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an expression >>>>>>>>>>>>> in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules and the >>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an infinite loop >>>>>>>>>>>>> then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT.
Which is not done anywhere above.
In other words you can't remember things that I said
a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat everything >>>>>>>>>>> every time?
Is this just an instance or your favorite sin? If not, what do >>>>>>>>>> you think
I didn't remember?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish Quote >>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It just says that your prolog system is defective as it does >>>>>>>>>> not reject
your LP = not(true(LP)). The Prolog standard says that this >>>>>>>>>> operation may
but need not fail. It also cortectly says that
LP = not(true(LP)), write(LP)
would not work.
There is no "need not fail" Clocksin and Mellish says
impossible to succeed (paraphrase).
No, that is not said. In a footnote they say that the behaviour >>>>>>>> is undefined,
i.e., an implementation may choose what to do. They do say that >>>>>>>> a typical
implementation does not fail, which implies "need not fail".
More precisely it says that there is a cycle in the
directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the expression.
Assuming that the unification does not fail.
That you fail to understands that the following means this
is your lack of understanding not my mistake.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
It means that the pariticular implementation you used exploited the >>>>>>>> "need not fail" permission, producing a cycle in the data
structure.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
For this operation there is no "need not fail". The standard
specifies that
the operation must fail.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated subterm >>>>>>>>> of itself” we can know that unification will fail because it >>>>>>>>> specifies “some kind of infinite structure.”
Wrong. You above said that the unification LP = not(true(LP))
did not
fail. It may fail on another implementation but that is not
required.
Go back and read the Clocksin and Mellish example and quote on >>>>>>>>> the same page until you totally understand it. You only need >>>>>>>>> example the yellow highlighted text.
The supreme authority is not Clocksin and Mellish but ISO/IEC
13211.
Clocksin and Mellish concretely show the result of the
infinitely recursive structure of their concrete example.
Irrelevant.
Your above replies prove that you do not understand this
thus cannot correctly say that it is irrelevant.
Prolog determines that all expressions that are
isomorphic to their concrete example are semantically
incorrect because these expressions have an infinitely
recursive structure.
In the logic that Prolog supports, which is very limited.
No that is not it. You don't seem to understand
the idea that an infinite loop is an error.
No, an infinite loop is NOT and error for determining truth, it would
be for a proof.
For instance, the fact that G is made true by the infinite loop of
testing with a finite test for EVERY Natural Number,
The infinite loop prevents any testing from being performed
LP := ~True(LP) specifies: ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))))
As Clocksin and Mellish show on their example.
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:47 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 7:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:42:50 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-28 21:58:34 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 3:56 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 14:42:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:Prolog does not define any semantics other than the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> execution semantics
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote:It does in the context where it was presented. More >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> generally,
On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There is nothing like that in the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect
to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misbehave. A memory
leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false
This merely means that the result of unification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but is not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the arguments >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not
unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by their
successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID
Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Prolog standard.
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish.
an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own semantics.
The result of the exectution of an instruction like LP >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == not(true(LP))
is not fully defined by the standard so we may say that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that instruction
is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an expression >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an infinite loop >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT.
Which is not done anywhere above.
In other words you can't remember things that I said >>>>>>>>>>>>> a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat everything >>>>>>>>>>>>> every time?
Is this just an instance or your favorite sin? If not, what >>>>>>>>>>>> do you think
I didn't remember?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish Quote >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It just says that your prolog system is defective as it does >>>>>>>>>>>> not reject
your LP = not(true(LP)). The Prolog standard says that this >>>>>>>>>>>> operation may
but need not fail. It also cortectly says that
LP = not(true(LP)), write(LP)
would not work.
There is no "need not fail" Clocksin and Mellish says
impossible to succeed (paraphrase).
No, that is not said. In a footnote they say that the
behaviour is undefined,
i.e., an implementation may choose what to do. They do say >>>>>>>>>> that a typical
implementation does not fail, which implies "need not fail". >>>>>>>>>>
More precisely it says that there is a cycle in theAssuming that the unification does not fail.
directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the expression. >>>>>>>>>>
That you fail to understands that the following means this >>>>>>>>>>> is your lack of understanding not my mistake.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
It means that the pariticular implementation you used
exploited the
"need not fail" permission, producing a cycle in the data
structure.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
For this operation there is no "need not fail". The standard >>>>>>>>>> specifies that
the operation must fail.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated >>>>>>>>>>> subterm of itself” we can know that unification will fail >>>>>>>>>>> because it specifies “some kind of infinite structure.” >>>>>>>>>>Wrong. You above said that the unification LP = not(true(LP)) >>>>>>>>>> did not
fail. It may fail on another implementation but that is not >>>>>>>>>> required.
Go back and read the Clocksin and Mellish example and quote on >>>>>>>>>>> the same page until you totally understand it. You only need >>>>>>>>>>> example the yellow highlighted text.
The supreme authority is not Clocksin and Mellish but ISO/IEC >>>>>>>>>> 13211.
Clocksin and Mellish concretely show the result of the
infinitely recursive structure of their concrete example.
Irrelevant.
Your above replies prove that you do not understand this
thus cannot correctly say that it is irrelevant.
Prolog determines that all expressions that are
isomorphic to their concrete example are semantically
incorrect because these expressions have an infinitely
recursive structure.
In the logic that Prolog supports, which is very limited.
No that is not it. You don't seem to understand
the idea that an infinite loop is an error.
No, an infinite loop is NOT and error for determining truth, it
would be for a proof.
For instance, the fact that G is made true by the infinite loop of
testing with a finite test for EVERY Natural Number,
The infinite loop prevents any testing from being performed
LP := ~True(LP) specifies:
~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))))
As Clocksin and Mellish show on their example.
Nope. Because the concept of that substitution is just invalid.
Ignoring Closksin and Mellish is a dishonest rebuttal
On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:47 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 7:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:42:50 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:Irrelevant.
On 2025-02-28 21:58:34 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 3:56 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 14:42:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:Which is not done anywhere above.
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:Prolog does not define any semantics other than the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> execution semantics
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Prolog standard.
On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It does in the context where it was presented. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> More generally,
There is nothing like that in the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect
to reject the Liar Paradox.
Above translated to Prolog
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misbehave. A memory
leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false
This merely means that the result of unification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be that LP conains
itself. It could be a selmantically valid result >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but is not in the scope
of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arguments are not
unfiable. But this possibility is already excluded >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by their
successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any own semantics.
The result of the exectution of an instruction like LP >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == not(true(LP))
is not fully defined by the standard so we may say >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that that instruction
is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an expression >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> loop
then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
In other words you can't remember things that I said >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat everything >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every time?
Is this just an instance or your favorite sin? If not, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> what do you think
I didn't remember?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish Quote >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It just says that your prolog system is defective as it >>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not reject
your LP = not(true(LP)). The Prolog standard says that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this operation may
but need not fail. It also cortectly says that
LP = not(true(LP)), write(LP)
would not work.
There is no "need not fail" Clocksin and Mellish says >>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible to succeed (paraphrase).
No, that is not said. In a footnote they say that the
behaviour is undefined,
i.e., an implementation may choose what to do. They do say >>>>>>>>>>>> that a typical
implementation does not fail, which implies "need not fail". >>>>>>>>>>>>
More precisely it says that there is a cycle in theAssuming that the unification does not fail.
directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the expression. >>>>>>>>>>>>
That you fail to understands that the following means this >>>>>>>>>>>>> is your lack of understanding not my mistake.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
It means that the pariticular implementation you used
exploited the
"need not fail" permission, producing a cycle in the data >>>>>>>>>>>> structure.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
For this operation there is no "need not fail". The standard >>>>>>>>>>>> specifies that
the operation must fail.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated >>>>>>>>>>>>> subterm of itself” we can know that unification will fail >>>>>>>>>>>>> because it specifies “some kind of infinite structure.” >>>>>>>>>>>>Wrong. You above said that the unification LP =
not(true(LP)) did not
fail. It may fail on another implementation but that is not >>>>>>>>>>>> required.
Go back and read the Clocksin and Mellish example and quote on >>>>>>>>>>>>> the same page until you totally understand it. You only need >>>>>>>>>>>>> example the yellow highlighted text.
The supreme authority is not Clocksin and Mellish but ISO/ >>>>>>>>>>>> IEC 13211.
Clocksin and Mellish concretely show the result of the
infinitely recursive structure of their concrete example. >>>>>>>>>>
Your above replies prove that you do not understand this
thus cannot correctly say that it is irrelevant.
Prolog determines that all expressions that are
isomorphic to their concrete example are semantically
incorrect because these expressions have an infinitely
recursive structure.
In the logic that Prolog supports, which is very limited.
No that is not it. You don't seem to understand
the idea that an infinite loop is an error.
No, an infinite loop is NOT and error for determining truth, it
would be for a proof.
For instance, the fact that G is made true by the infinite loop of >>>>>> testing with a finite test for EVERY Natural Number,
The infinite loop prevents any testing from being performed
LP := ~True(LP) specifies:
~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))))
As Clocksin and Mellish show on their example.
Nope. Because the concept of that substitution is just invalid.
Ignoring Closksin and Mellish is a dishonest rebuttal
Closksin and Mellish are talking PROLOG, not LOGIC.
They are talking about a specific generic logical an anomaly
that applies to the entire class of decision problems having
pathological self-reference they are using Prolog to make their
explanation concrete.
If you do not understand then that it means this then you
are not paying enough. Because I created Minimal Type Theory
to detect this same generic anomaly as a cycle in the directed
graph of the evaluation sequence of an expression I have a
complete basis for my understanding of the C&M text.
I will post links abut MTT as needed.
On 3/5/2025 5:41 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/5/25 9:25 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:47 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:24 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 7:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 7:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/3/2025 9:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:42:50 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:Irrelevant.
On 2025-02-28 21:58:34 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 3:56 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 14:42:23 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:Which is not done anywhere above.
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote:Prolog does not define any semantics other than the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> execution semantics
On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Prolog standard.
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It does in the context where it was presented. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> More generally,
There is nothing like that in the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect
to reject the Liar Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Above translated to Prolog >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misbehave. A memory
leak is also possible.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false
This merely means that the result of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unification would be that LP conains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> itself. It could be a selmantically valid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> result but is not in the scope >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arguments are not
unfiable. But this possibility is already >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> excluded by their
successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any own semantics.
The result of the exectution of an instruction like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP == not(true(LP))
is not fully defined by the standard so we may say >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that that instruction
is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression
in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the
evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite loop
then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
In other words you can't remember things that I said >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everything
every time?
Is this just an instance or your favorite sin? If not, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what do you think
I didn't remember?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Quote
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It just says that your prolog system is defective as it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not reject
your LP = not(true(LP)). The Prolog standard says that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this operation may
but need not fail. It also cortectly says that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)), write(LP)
would not work.
There is no "need not fail" Clocksin and Mellish says >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible to succeed (paraphrase).
No, that is not said. In a footnote they say that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour is undefined,
i.e., an implementation may choose what to do. They do say >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that a typical
implementation does not fail, which implies "need not fail". >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
More precisely it says that there is a cycle in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the expression. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>Assuming that the unification does not fail.
That you fail to understands that the following means this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is your lack of understanding not my mistake.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
It means that the pariticular implementation you used >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exploited the
"need not fail" permission, producing a cycle in the data >>>>>>>>>>>>>> structure.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
For this operation there is no "need not fail". The >>>>>>>>>>>>>> standard specifies that
the operation must fail.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subterm of itself” we can know that unification will fail >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because it specifies “some kind of infinite structure.” >>>>>>>>>>>>>>Wrong. You above said that the unification LP =
not(true(LP)) did not
fail. It may fail on another implementation but that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not required.
Go back and read the Clocksin and Mellish example and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quote on
the same page until you totally understand it. You only need >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example the yellow highlighted text.
The supreme authority is not Clocksin and Mellish but ISO/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> IEC 13211.
Clocksin and Mellish concretely show the result of the >>>>>>>>>>>>> infinitely recursive structure of their concrete example. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Your above replies prove that you do not understand this >>>>>>>>>>> thus cannot correctly say that it is irrelevant.
Prolog determines that all expressions that are
isomorphic to their concrete example are semantically
incorrect because these expressions have an infinitely
recursive structure.
In the logic that Prolog supports, which is very limited.
No that is not it. You don't seem to understand
the idea that an infinite loop is an error.
No, an infinite loop is NOT and error for determining truth, it >>>>>>>> would be for a proof.
For instance, the fact that G is made true by the infinite loop >>>>>>>> of testing with a finite test for EVERY Natural Number,
The infinite loop prevents any testing from being performed
LP := ~True(LP) specifies:
~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))))
As Clocksin and Mellish show on their example.
Nope. Because the concept of that substitution is just invalid.
Ignoring Closksin and Mellish is a dishonest rebuttal
Closksin and Mellish are talking PROLOG, not LOGIC.
They are talking about a specific generic logical an anomaly
that applies to the entire class of decision problems having
pathological self-reference they are using Prolog to make their
explanation concrete.
Which isn't the class of problems we are talking about.
LP := ~True(LP)
On 3/6/2025 6:36 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/5/25 7:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/5/2025 5:41 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/5/25 9:25 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 10:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 5:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/4/25 9:47 AM, olcott wrote:
On 3/4/2025 6:29 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 10:24 PM, olcott wrote:The infinite loop prevents any testing from being performed
On 3/3/2025 7:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/3/25 7:38 PM, olcott wrote:No that is not it. You don't seem to understand
On 3/3/2025 9:05 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-03-01 19:42:50 +0000, olcott said:
On 3/1/2025 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:Irrelevant.
On 2025-02-28 21:58:34 +0000, olcott said:
On 2/28/2025 3:56 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-26 14:42:23 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/26/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2025-02-25 21:07:31 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/25/2025 9:27 AM, Mikko wrote:Which is not done anywhere above.
On 2025-02-24 21:31:26 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2/24/2025 2:51 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-22 17:24:59 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Prolog does not define any semantics other than >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the execution semantics
On 2/22/2025 3:12 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-21 23:22:23 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Of course it is. Its semantics is well defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by the Prolog standard.
On 2/20/2025 3:01 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-18 13:50:22 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It does in the context where it was presented. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> More generally,
There is nothing like that in the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concrete example:
LP := ~True(LP)
In other words you are saying the Prolog is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect
to reject the Liar Paradox. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Above translated to Prolog >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
?- LP = not(true(LP)). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)).
According to Prolog rules LP = not(true(LP)) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is permitted to fail.
If it succeeds the operations using LP may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misbehave. A memory
leak is also possible. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false
This merely means that the result of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unification would be that LP conains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> itself. It could be a selmantically valid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> result but is not in the scope >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of Prolog language.
It does not mean that. You are wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
unify_with_occurs_check also fails if the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arguments are not
unfiable. But this possibility is already >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> excluded by their
successfull unification.
IT CANNOT POSSIBLY BE SEMANTICALLY VALID >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Go freaking read the Clocksin and Mellish. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an "infinite term" means NOT SEMANTICALLY VALID. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
of a prolog program. Therefore no data structure >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has any own semantics.
The result of the exectution of an instruction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like LP == not(true(LP))
is not fully defined by the standard so we may say >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that that instruction
is semantically invalid.
When we ask for Prolog to determine whether an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression
in Prolog is true according to its facts and rules >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and the
evaluation of the expression gets stuck in an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite loop
then this expression IS SEMANTICALLY INCORRECT. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
In other words you can't remember things that I said >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a few messages ago and I have to endlessly repeat >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everything
every time?
Is this just an instance or your favorite sin? If not, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what do you think
I didn't remember?
page 3 has the liar paradox and the Cloksin & Mellish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Quote
https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
It just says that your prolog system is defective as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it does not reject
your LP = not(true(LP)). The Prolog standard says that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this operation may
but need not fail. It also cortectly says that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LP = not(true(LP)), write(LP)
would not work.
There is no "need not fail" Clocksin and Mellish says >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible to succeed (paraphrase).
No, that is not said. In a footnote they say that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> behaviour is undefined,
i.e., an implementation may choose what to do. They do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say that a typical
implementation does not fail, which implies "need not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fail".
More precisely it says that there is a cycle in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> directed graph of the evaluation sequence of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression.
Assuming that the unification does not fail.
That you fail to understands that the following means this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is your lack of understanding not my mistake. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
It means that the pariticular implementation you used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exploited the
"need not fail" permission, producing a cycle in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> data structure.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
For this operation there is no "need not fail". The >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> standard specifies that
the operation must fail.
Because the Prolog Liar Paradox has an “uninstantiated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subterm of itself” we can know that unification will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fail because it specifies “some kind of infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structure.”
Wrong. You above said that the unification LP = >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not(true(LP)) did not
fail. It may fail on another implementation but that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not required.
Go back and read the Clocksin and Mellish example and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> quote on
the same page until you totally understand it. You only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> need
example the yellow highlighted text.
The supreme authority is not Clocksin and Mellish but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ISO/ IEC 13211.
Clocksin and Mellish concretely show the result of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinitely recursive structure of their concrete example. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Your above replies prove that you do not understand this >>>>>>>>>>>>> thus cannot correctly say that it is irrelevant.
Prolog determines that all expressions that are
isomorphic to their concrete example are semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect because these expressions have an infinitely >>>>>>>>>>>>> recursive structure.
In the logic that Prolog supports, which is very limited. >>>>>>>>>>>
the idea that an infinite loop is an error.
No, an infinite loop is NOT and error for determining truth, >>>>>>>>>> it would be for a proof.
For instance, the fact that G is made true by the infinite >>>>>>>>>> loop of testing with a finite test for EVERY Natural Number, >>>>>>>>>
LP := ~True(LP) specifies:
~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))))
As Clocksin and Mellish show on their example.
Nope. Because the concept of that substitution is just invalid. >>>>>>>>
Ignoring Closksin and Mellish is a dishonest rebuttal
Closksin and Mellish are talking PROLOG, not LOGIC.
They are talking about a specific generic logical an anomaly
that applies to the entire class of decision problems having
pathological self-reference they are using Prolog to make their
explanation concrete.
Which isn't the class of problems we are talking about.
LP := ~True(LP)
Which is the SIMPIFIED form of the expresion.
read what Tarski actually wrote.
The actual "expression" for p was not given, just that it was shown to
have the property that its value was the opposite of True(p).
This is based on the same sort of logic that Godel's G is built on,
that we can express a lot of logic as mathematics.
Of course, when you can't understand that basis, you misunderstand the
simplifications given.
Hew wrote it in a convoluted style where even he
himself could not see the infinite recursion.
The syntax of my Minimal Type Theory exactly maps
to the Prolog equivalent such that Prolog recognizes
and rejects this infinite recursion.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
On 3/7/2025 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/6/25 9:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/6/2025 6:36 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/5/25 7:36 PM, olcott wrote:
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Of course, since you have admitted that your logic system is based on
the FRAUD that you are allowed to change the fundamental meaning of
core terms of the system,
How the Hell does that have anything to do with the above Prolog?
Rambling incoherently DOES NOT COUNT AS REASONING and makes you
look very foolish.
On 3/8/2025 7:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/7/25 9:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/7/2025 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/6/25 9:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/6/2025 6:36 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/5/25 7:36 PM, olcott wrote:
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Of course, since you have admitted that your logic system is based
on the FRAUD that you are allowed to change the fundamental meaning
of core terms of the system,
How the Hell does that have anything to do with the above Prolog?
Rambling incoherently DOES NOT COUNT AS REASONING and makes you
look very foolish.
Because your Prolog has nothing to do with the subject of the thread.
Prolog proves that the Liar Paradox is infinitely recursive.
When it is proven that the Liar Paradox <is> infinitely
recursive then any notion of undecidability based on it is
ill-conceived.
by forming in the language itself a sentence x
such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
On 3/8/2025 7:54 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/7/25 9:36 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/7/2025 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/6/25 9:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 3/6/2025 6:36 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 3/5/25 7:36 PM, olcott wrote:
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Of course, since you have admitted that your logic system is based on
the FRAUD that you are allowed to change the fundamental meaning of
core terms of the system,
How the Hell does that have anything to do with the above Prolog?
Rambling incoherently DOES NOT COUNT AS REASONING and makes you
look very foolish.
Because your Prolog has nothing to do with the subject of the thread.
Prolog proves that the Liar Paradox is infinitely recursive.
When it is proven that the Liar Paradox <is> infinitely
recursive then any notion of undecidability based on it is
ill-conceived.
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