There are roundabout arguments that, for example,
the FINITE ORDINALS, as a set, consequently contain
themselves, as an element. This is a direct
compactness result.
On 02/19/2024 05:01 PM, Mild Shock wrote:
The contradiction is very easy:
Lets say X is the set of all finite ordinals.
- observe that X is an infinite ordinal.
- observe that if Y in X, then Y is a finite ordinal.
- hence if X in X it would be an infinite and finite ordinal at the
same time.
- an X cannot be infinite and finite at the same time.
Q.E.D:
Ross Finlayson schrieb am Dienstag, 20. Februar 2024 um 00:04:06 UTC+1: >>>>>> There are roundabout arguments that, for example, the finite
(Maybe that's just me.)ordinals,
as a set, consequently contain themselves, as an element. This is a >>>>>> direct compactness result.
Imagine if ordinals' proper model was that the successor
was powerset, instead of just any old ordered pair.
So, those together are the "sets that don't contain themselves",
the sets of ordinals.
Quantifying over those, results the "Russell set the ordinal",
it contains itself.
So here Y isn't necessarily a finite ordinal.
Q.E.R.
You only make it worse!
There are roundabout arguments that, for example,
the FINITE ORDINALS, as a set, consequently contain
themselves, as an element. This is a direct
compactness result.
If you want to have ordinals that contain themselves,
you need to mention an encoding. Because per se,
we understand by ordinal an order type.
There ware various encodings for finite ordinals around:
1) von Neuman encoding, based on succ(X) = X u {X} and 0 = {}
2) Zermelo encoding, bsaed on succ(X) = {X} and 0 = {}
3) Your Powerset idea, based on succ(X) = P(X) and 0 = {}
All 3 have the property that:
/* provable */
n in n+1 and n is finite
Proof:
case 1): n+1 = n u {n}, n in n+1 because n in {n}.
further succ(X) sendes an already finite set into a finite set.
case 2): n+1 = {n}, n in n+1 because n in {n}.
further succ(X) sendes an already finite set into a finite set.
case 3): n+1 = P(n), n in n+1 because n in P(n).
further succ(X) sendes an already finite set into a finite set.
Q.E.D.
But none has the property that omega = { n } contains
itself, the proof of contradiction applies irrelevant
of the encoding, it only makes use of the
notion finite and infinite:
/* provable */
~(omega in omega) & (Y in omega => Y finite)
Proof:
(Y in omega => Y finite) follows by the claim that
omega = { n }, i.e. the least set that contains all finite
ordinals in the corresponding encoding. If it would
contain something infinite it would not be the least
set that contains all finite ordinals, would have some
extra in it. Violating the very construction of omega from
the finite ordinals.
Q.E.D.
Ross Finlayson schrieb:
On 02/19/2024 05:01 PM, Mild Shock wrote:
The contradiction is very easy:
Lets say X is the set of all finite ordinals.
- observe that X is an infinite ordinal.
- observe that if Y in X, then Y is a finite ordinal.
- hence if X in X it would be an infinite and finite ordinal at the
same time.
- an X cannot be infinite and finite at the same time.
Q.E.D:
Ross Finlayson schrieb am Dienstag, 20. Februar 2024 um 00:04:06 UTC+1: >>>>>>> There are roundabout arguments that, for example, the finite
(Maybe that's just me.)ordinals,
as a set, consequently contain themselves, as an element. This is a >>>>>>> direct compactness result.
Imagine if ordinals' proper model was that the successor
was powerset, instead of just any old ordered pair.
So, those together are the "sets that don't contain themselves",
the sets of ordinals.
Quantifying over those, results the "Russell set the ordinal",
it contains itself.
So here Y isn't necessarily a finite ordinal.
Q.E.R.
No set can contain itself. The set of all ordinals would be a new ordinaland thus contain itself. Ergo, there cannot be a set of all ordinals.
On 02/20/2024 11:35 AM, markus...@gmail.com wrote:
No set can contain itself.
The set of all ordinals would be a new ordinal,
and thus contain itself.
Ergo, there cannot be a set of all ordinals.
"... in set-theories like ZF
that are ordinary/well-founded,
according to an axiom like Regularity
of restriction of comprehension."
There are others, ..., "Mengenlehre(n)".
In any theory in which ordinals are ordinals,
at least the ordinals have finite.descent,
Ordinals are well.ordered.
Le 20/02/2024 à 23:02, Jim Burns a écrit :
Ordinals are well.ordered.
Only those which can be specified.
In any theory in which ordinals are ordinals,
at least the ordinals have finite.descent,
That proves finite ascend too,
because
otherwise
every ordinal could be ascended
and then
the way upstairs could be gone back downstairs.
Seriously, you don't know what classes are?
The membership relation is the same
for members of classes and for members of sets.
Since members of classes are sets just like
the members of sets are sets, in ZF. And there is
only one membership relation ∈ between sets. The
distinction between classes and sets was described
in the past as:
sets: includes collections of sizes from the numbers to
the transfinite numbers
classes: includes collections that Cantor called
NCONSISTENT MULTIPLICITIES
You had them somewhere in one of your random posts:
Ross Finlayson schrieb:
Of course, the goal is "there are no paradoxes at all",
then what seem "inconsistent multiplicities", just don't relate.
But this below is awful gibberish:
Ross Finlayson schrieb:
If ORD involves class/set distinction,
and a set-theory can also be written as a part-theory,
then what's part/particle distinction/
If set theory's relation is "elt", element-of, "in"
and class theory's relation is "members", "contains", "has",
then, is :
class/set theory
set/part theory?
Here that "numbering" and "counting" are two different things,
one for ordering theory the other for collection,
ordinals and sets, numbering and counting,
what about
set/class distinction and
set/part distinction and
part/class distinction?
See, this is among reasons why
I've been way both ahead of
and on top of this for a long time,
and trying to tell you so all the time.
I told you, ..., I told you.
Mostly is for understanding that
"numbering" and "counting" are
two different things, and they
involve each other in their resources.
Of course, the goal is "there are no paradoxes at all",
then what seem "inconsistent multiplicities", just don't relate.
If ORD involves class/set distinction,
and a set-theory can also be written as a part-theory,
then what's part/particle distinction/
If set theory's relation is "elt", element-of, "in"
and class theory's relation is "members", "contains", "has",
then, is :
class/set theory
set/part theory?
Here that "numbering" and "counting" are two different things,
one for ordering theory the other for collection,
ordinals and sets, numbering and counting,
what about
set/class distinction and
set/part distinction and
part/class distinction?
See, this is among reasons why
I've been way both ahead of
and on top of this for a long time,
and trying to tell you so all the time.
I told you, ..., I told you.
Mostly is for understanding that
"numbering" and "counting" are
two different things, and they
involve each other in their resources.
On 2/21/2024 3:33 AM, WM wrote:
Le 20/02/2024 à 23:02, Jim Burns a écrit :
Ordinals are well.ordered.
Only those which can be specified.
No.
All of them are well.ordered.
Anything else wouldn't be the ordinals.
Anything else would be like declaring
that only specifiableᵂᴹ right.triangles
have three corners.
The ordinals' descents and ascents are not the same.
For each ordinal ψ
if ψ has any infinite descent,
then, because well.order,
an ordinal χ exists first with any infinite descent.
However,
one step down from χ to any ordinal β < χ is to
β with only finite descents,
and finite plus one is finite.
First χ doesn't have any infinite descent.
Contradiction.
ψ doesn't have an infinite descent.
Generalizing over ordinals,
each ordinal ψ has finite.descent.
Le 21/02/2024 à 18:59, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/21/2024 3:33 AM, WM wrote:
Le 20/02/2024 à 23:02, Jim Burns a écrit :
Ordinals are well.ordered.
Only those which can be specified.
No.
All of them are well.ordered.
How do you know?
Anything else wouldn't be the ordinals.
In fact, not these ordinals.
Anything else would be like declaring
that only specifiableᵂᴹ right.triangles
have three corners.
That is too drastic.
Natnumbers keep almost all of their properties.
The ordinals' descents and ascents are not the same.
Every way up can be reversed.
That proves that also the ascents are finite.
For each ordinal ψ
if ψ has any infinite descent,
then, because well.order,
an ordinal χ exists first with any infinite descent.
However,
one step down from χ to any ordinal β < χ is to
β with only finite descents,
and finite plus one is finite.
First χ doesn't have any infinite descent.
Contradiction.
ψ doesn't have an infinite descent.
And one step upwards is finite too.
Finite plus one is finite.a
ψ doesn't have an infinite ascent
(for every visible predecessor).
Generalizing over ordinals,
each ordinal ψ has finite.descent.
Each ordinal has finite ascent.
Actually, for class/set distinction,
I just introduced set/part distinction,
and part/particle distinction,
and set/particle distinction.
set:class::part:particle
set:part::class:particle
This is a usual form that A:B::C:D is
that A relates to B as C relates to D,
"set is to class as part is to particle", and
"set is to part as class is to particle".
Doesn't make any sense at all.
Not a single mention of proper classes here: https://plato.stanford.edu/ENTRIES/mereology/
Ross Finlayson schrieb:
Actually, for class/set distinction,
I just introduced set/part distinction,
and part/particle distinction,
and set/particle distinction.
set:class::part:particle
set:part::class:particle
This is a usual form that A:B::C:D is
that A relates to B as C relates to D,
"set is to class as part is to particle", and
"set is to part as class is to particle".
I guess we have reached your intellectual
boundaries, inherent in your squirell brain
sized, that of a walnut, cerebrum and cerebrellum.
Mild Shock schrieb:
Doesn't make any sense at all.
Not a single mention of proper classes here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/ENTRIES/mereology/
Ross Finlayson schrieb:
Actually, for class/set distinction,
I just introduced set/part distinction,
and part/particle distinction,
and set/particle distinction.
set:class::part:particle
set:part::class:particle
This is a usual form that A:B::C:D is
that A relates to B as C relates to D,
"set is to class as part is to particle", and
"set is to part as class is to particle".
Hm. "squirrel:brain::walnut:cerebrum".
What we can say is the following:
i) Every set is a class
ii) Not every class is a set
So there is a hypernym / hyponym relationship
between the two. Here is are proof of i) and ii):
Proof i): Let s be a set. Then we can form
the class { x | x e s }. So there is an injection
from the sets to the classes.
Proof ii): Let V be the class { x | true },
this is the universal class which is provably
not a set. So there is no surjection from
the sets to the classes.
Hope this helps. Injection is usually taken
as indicative that two sets are in the
less than or equal relation ship, i.e. ⊆.
And lack of surjection indicates that there
is no bijection, i.e. ≠, so we have:
Sets ⊆ Classes and Sets ≠ Classes
Or together:
Sets ⊂ Classes
The difference Class \ Sets, those things
that are classes but not sets, are called
proper classes.
Mild Shock schrieb:
I guess we have reached your intellectual
boundaries, inherent in your squirell brain
sized, that of a walnut, cerebrum and cerebrellum.
Mild Shock schrieb:
Doesn't make any sense at all.
Not a single mention of proper classes here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/ENTRIES/mereology/
Ross Finlayson schrieb:
Actually, for class/set distinction,
I just introduced set/part distinction,
and part/particle distinction,
and set/particle distinction.
set:class::part:particle
set:part::class:particle
This is a usual form that A:B::C:D is
that A relates to B as C relates to D,
"set is to class as part is to particle", and
"set is to part as class is to particle".
I.e., the universe of mathematical objects
"is what it is", it's got numbers in it, and on it,
and counting is an act, two different things.
If you follow this thinking long enough,
you will proof Mückenheims identifiable numbers.
And suddently have finite ascent in mathematics.
LoL
Ross Finlayson schrieb:
I.e., the universe of mathematical objects
"is what it is", it's got numbers in it, and on it,
and counting is an act, two different things.
Ross Finlayson schrieb:
[...]
Seriously, you don't know what classes are?
The membership relation is the same
for members of classes and for members of sets.
Since members of classes are sets just like
the members of sets are sets, in ZF. And there is
only one membership relation ∈ between sets. The
distinction between classes and sets was described
in the past as:
sets: includes collections of sizes from the numbers to
the transfinite numbers
classes: includes collections that Cantor called
NCONSISTENT MULTIPLICITIES
I once had a lecturer in math who would refer to
proper classes as "syntactic sugar",
which I found out today is a _programming_ term.
On 2/22/2024 8:00 AM, WM wrote:
Le 21/02/2024 à 18:59, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/21/2024 3:33 AM, WM wrote:
Le 20/02/2024 à 23:02, Jim Burns a écrit :
Ordinals are well.ordered.
Only those which can be specified.
No.
All of them are well.ordered.
How do you know?
In the same way that I know
that right.triangles have three corners.
On 2/23/2024 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
We know that Peano induction not.ceases in
the Peano (final) ordinals.
Le 22/02/2024 à 17:13, Jim Burns a écrit :
...]
Having three corners is essential for triangles.
Being well-ordered is essential for ordinals.
What I meant is that
we cannot follow the well-order into the dark realm.
In particular Peano ceases.
Having three corners is essential for triangles.
Being well-ordered is essential for ordinals.
What I meant is that
we cannot follow the well-order into the dark realm.
In particular Peano ceases.
Le 27/02/2024 à 20:25, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/23/2024 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
We know that Peano induction not.ceases in
the Peano (final) ordinals.
We know that every visible step is reversible.
On 2/27/2024 3:05 PM, WM wrote:
Le 27/02/2024 à 20:25, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/23/2024 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
We know that Peano induction not.ceases in
the Peano (final) ordinals.
We know that every visible step is reversible.
A one.ended ascent is reversible,
but is not a descent.
Le 27/02/2024 à 23:24, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/27/2024 3:05 PM, WM wrote:
Le 27/02/2024 à 20:25, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/23/2024 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
We know that Peano induction not.ceases in
the Peano (final) ordinals.
We know that every visible step is reversible.
A one.ended ascent is reversible,
but is not a descent.
Every reversion of an ascent is a descent.
On 2/28/2024 4:48 AM, WM wrote:
Le 27/02/2024 à 23:24, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/27/2024 3:05 PM, WM wrote:
Le 27/02/2024 à 20:25, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/23/2024 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
We know that Peano induction not.ceases in
the Peano (final) ordinals.
We know that every visible step is reversible.
A one.ended ascent is reversible,
but is not a descent.
Every reversion of an ascent is a descent.
A one.ended ascent starts and not.stops.
Le 28/02/2024 à 12:52, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/28/2024 4:48 AM, WM wrote:
Le 27/02/2024 à 23:24, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/27/2024 3:05 PM, WM wrote:
Le 27/02/2024 à 20:25, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/23/2024 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
We know that Peano induction not.ceases in
the Peano (final) ordinals.
We know that every visible step is reversible.
A one.ended ascent is reversible,
but is not a descent.
Every reversion of an ascent is a descent.
A one.ended ascent starts and not.stops.
As long as it runs through visible numbers it is finite and reversible.
Regards, WM
On 2/28/24 12:24 PM, WM wrote:
Le 28/02/2024 à 12:52, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/28/2024 4:48 AM, WM wrote:
Le 27/02/2024 à 23:24, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/27/2024 3:05 PM, WM wrote:
Le 27/02/2024 à 20:25, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/23/2024 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
We know that Peano induction not.ceases in
the Peano (final) ordinals.
We know that every visible step is reversible.
A one.ended ascent is reversible,
but is not a descent.
Every reversion of an ascent is a descent.
A one.ended ascent starts and not.stops.
As long as it runs through visible numbers it is finite and reversible.
In other words, your definition of "Visible Numbers" are finite sub-sets
of the actual set of values.
And this is because your logic can only handle finite sets.
Your "Dark" numbers are
There is actually no problem with those numbers,
Le 28/02/2024 à 23:07, Richard Damon a écrit :
On 2/28/24 12:24 PM, WM wrote:
Le 28/02/2024 à 12:52, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/28/2024 4:48 AM, WM wrote:
Le 27/02/2024 à 23:24, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/27/2024 3:05 PM, WM wrote:
Le 27/02/2024 à 20:25, Jim Burns a écrit :
On 2/23/2024 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
We know that Peano induction not.ceases in
the Peano (final) ordinals.
We know that every visible step is reversible.
A one.ended ascent is reversible,
but is not a descent.
Every reversion of an ascent is a descent.
A one.ended ascent starts and not.stops.
As long as it runs through visible numbers it is finite and reversible.
In other words, your definition of "Visible Numbers" are finite
sub-sets of the actual set of values.
Visible narural numbers are FISONs {1, 2, 3, ..., n}.
And this is because your logic can only handle finite sets.
This because there is no infinite natural number.
Your "Dark" numbers are
the only possibility to have completed infinity. Note: "Going on and on"
is not completed infinity but potential infinity.
There is actually no problem with those numbers,
What numbers? Infinite natural numbers?
Regards, WM
On 2/29/24 3:23 AM, WM wrote:
Visible narural numbers are FISONs {1, 2, 3, ..., n}.
And so SUBSETS of the Natural Number
There is actually no problem with those numbers,
What numbers? Infinite natural numbers?
The unbounded set of Natural Numbers that go on and on and on.
Le 29/02/2024 à 13:35, Richard Damon a écrit :
On 2/29/24 3:23 AM, WM wrote:
Visible narural numbers are FISONs {1, 2, 3, ..., n}.
And so SUBSETS of the Natural Number
Of course. What else? Every natural number belongs to the set ℕ.
There is actually no problem with those numbers,
What numbers? Infinite natural numbers?
The unbounded set of Natural Numbers that go on and on and on.
Visible numbers do never complete infinity.
Regards, WM
And evvery natural number is finite and thus namable and thus visible.
It is the SET that "completes infinity", and the set isn't any of the individual number.
Le 01/03/2024 à 04:12, Richard Damon a écrit :
And evvery natural number is finite and thus namable and thus visible.
That concerns potential infinity only.
It is the SET that "completes infinity", and the set isn't any of the
individual number.
The set is nothig but the collection of its elements.
The complete set
requires that no element is missing. That proves, via ∀n ∈ ℕ: 1/n - 1/(n+1) = d_n > 0, the existence of a smallest unit fraction.
Regards, WM
On 3/1/24 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
Le 01/03/2024 à 04:12, Richard Damon a écrit :
And evvery natural number is finite and thus namable and thus visible.
That concerns potential infinity only.
No, it applies to ALL Finite numbers, which of course, being finte,
never actally REACH infinite, so if you want to invent a term for that
as "Potential Infinity", so be it.
It is the SET that "completes infinity", and the set isn't any of the
individual number.
The set is nothig but the collection of its elements.
But it is, it is the COLLECTION of ALL its elements AT ONCE.
Le 01/03/2024 à 15:44, Richard Damon a écrit :
On 3/1/24 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
Le 01/03/2024 à 04:12, Richard Damon a écrit :
And evvery natural number is finite and thus namable and thus visible.
That concerns potential infinity only.
No, it applies to ALL Finite numbers, which of course, being finte,
never actally REACH infinite, so if you want to invent a term for that
as "Potential Infinity", so be it.
But here we assume finished infinity.
It is the SET that "completes infinity", and the set isn't any of
the individual number.
The set is nothig but the collection of its elements.
But it is, it is the COLLECTION of ALL its elements AT ONCE.
There is nothing at once. Numbers are for counting one after the other. Your claim shows that you need matheologial magic. But that's not maths.
Regards, WM
... fourier my ass, what has it to do with ordinals ...
Somehow I am quite new to the ordinal analysis
that Alan Turing started. Nice find Gödel introduces
a nice notion in his incompletness paper,
namely he says a function is primitive recursive,
to degree N, if the primitive recursion schema is
applied N times. So I guess this definition of
factorial would then have degree 3, since 'R' is used 3 times:
/* The R combinator */
natrec(_, 0, X, X) :- !. % attention, not steadfast
natrec(F, N, X, Z) :- M is N-1, natrec(F, M, X, Y), call(F, Y, Z).
plus(X, Y, Z) :- natrec(succ, X, Y, Z).
mult(X, Y, Z) :- natrec(plus(X), Y, 0, Z).
step((X,Y),(Z,T)) :- succ(X,Z), mult(Z,Y,T).
factorial(X,Y) :- natrec(step,X,(0,1),(_,Y)).
Works fine, although eats quite some computing resources,
i.e. 9_303_219 inferences, since it must form
3268800 successors:
?- factorial(10,X).
X = 3628800.
?- time(factorial(10,X)).
% 9,303,219 inferences, 0.578 CPU in 0.617 seconds
(94% CPU, 16092054 Lips)
X = 3628800.
Ross Finlayson schrieb:
... fourier my ass, what has it to do with ordinals ...
? = o
/ | \
* o o
| |
* o
|
*
Or as a set:
? = {{},{{}},{{{}}}}.
Know that one is the secret and source of all the cardinals.
-- Abraham ibn Ezra (1153)
But have mercy to me. So far I thought in ordinal
anlysis of programs, we would simply take the
tree of execution, and this is somehow an ordinal
for a terminating program? But whats the tree
repectively ordinal for for example 3! = 6 ?
Are all finite ordinals the same or not?
For example the ordinals 0, 1, 2, 3, with von
Neumann succeessor are:
0 = {}
1 = {{}}
2 = {{},{{}}}
3 = {{},{{}},{{{},{{}}}}}.
Or as trees, * = empty set, o = non-empty set:
0 = *
1 = o
|
*
2 = o
/ \
* o
|
*
3 = o
/ | \
* o o
| / \
* * o
|
*
But what about this tree, it has also no infinite decend,
but what property is missing to make it an ordinal?
? = o
/ | \
* o o
| |
* o
|
*
Or as a set:
? = {{},{{}},{{{}}}}.
Why is it not an ordinal?
P.S.: I tried to find an answer here, but I guess
I am too lazy to read it. Its starts with the funny
quote and has funny pictures in it:
Trees, ordinals and termination
N Dershowitz · 1993 https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/3-540-56610-4_68.pdf
Mild Shock schrieb:
Somehow I am quite new to the ordinal analysis
that Alan Turing started. Nice find Gödel introduces
a nice notion in his incompletness paper,
namely he says a function is primitive recursive,
to degree N, if the primitive recursion schema is
applied N times. So I guess this definition of
factorial would then have degree 3, since 'R' is used 3 times:
/* The R combinator */
natrec(_, 0, X, X) :- !. % attention, not steadfast
natrec(F, N, X, Z) :- M is N-1, natrec(F, M, X, Y), call(F, Y, Z).
plus(X, Y, Z) :- natrec(succ, X, Y, Z).
mult(X, Y, Z) :- natrec(plus(X), Y, 0, Z).
step((X,Y),(Z,T)) :- succ(X,Z), mult(Z,Y,T).
factorial(X,Y) :- natrec(step,X,(0,1),(_,Y)).
Works fine, although eats quite some computing resources,
i.e. 9_303_219 inferences, since it must form
3268800 successors:
?- factorial(10,X).
X = 3628800.
?- time(factorial(10,X)).
% 9,303,219 inferences, 0.578 CPU in 0.617 seconds
(94% CPU, 16092054 Lips)
X = 3628800.
Ross Finlayson schrieb:
... fourier my ass, what has it to do with ordinals ...
So I remember Jim Burns when he posited a more
general approach, he said transfinite induction
must be satisfied.
Otherwise we can take this Quine atom x = {x}, https://math.stackexchange.com/a/2874533
And by a suitable interpretation of the circular
h-trans definition, a definition that is not well-defined
since it has no unique interpretation,
we might judge this Quine atom an ordinal.
LoL
On 3/1/2024 3:08 PM, Mild Shock wrote:
So I remember Jim Burns when he posited a more
general approach, he said transfinite induction
must be satisfied.
In a phrase I'm a little proud of, I said
transfinite.induction is well.order in drag.
One is a simple re-write of the other.
Otherwise we can take this Quine atom x = {x},
https://math.stackexchange.com/a/2874533
And by a suitable interpretation of the circular
h-trans definition, a definition that is not well-defined
since it has no unique interpretation,
we might judge this Quine atom an ordinal.
LoL
Ah.
But an ordinal is
a _regular_ transitive set of transitive sets.
So, not x = {x}
A regular non.empty set A holds
a disjoint element B.
∃B ∈ A: A∩B = ∅
But, if A is transitive.transitive,
each element is a subset, and
∀B ∈ A: A∩B = B
Transitive.transitive A can only be regular
if one of its elements is 0
∅ ∈ A ∧ ∅ ∈ A′ ties all the ordinals together.
It's a beautiful thing.
Lets work without regularity axiom, and
examine this naive attempt, hereditary =
my ancestors satisfied it as well:
"hereditarily transitive sets"
h-trans(A) :<=> trans(A) & ∀x(x ∈ A => h-trans(A))
Otherwise when regularity is present,
this excludes Quine atom q = {q}. When regularty is
not present, we can prove:
~h-trans(q)
Jim Burns schrieb:
On 3/1/2024 3:08 PM, Mild Shock wrote:
So I remember Jim Burns when he posited a more
general approach, he said transfinite induction
must be satisfied.
In a phrase I'm a little proud of, I said
transfinite.induction is well.order in drag.
One is a simple re-write of the other.
Otherwise we can take this Quine atom x = {x},
https://math.stackexchange.com/a/2874533
And by a suitable interpretation of the circular
h-trans definition, a definition that is not well-defined
since it has no unique interpretation,
we might judge this Quine atom an ordinal.
LoL
Ah.
But an ordinal is
a _regular_ transitive set of transitive sets.
So, not x = {x}
A regular non.empty set A holds
a disjoint element B.
∃B ∈ A: A∩B = ∅
But, if A is transitive.transitive,
each element is a subset, and
∀B ∈ A: A∩B = B
Transitive.transitive A can only be regular
if one of its elements is 0
∅ ∈ A ∧ ∅ ∈ A′ ties all the ordinals together.
It's a beautiful thing.
B by ~B -> ~A) of the set induction axiom:
Corr.: we cannot prove:
~h-trans(q)
See also the remark here by Andrés E. Caicedo:
Note that in the absence of foundation (= regularity),
this is a bit peculiar. For instance, if x={x}, then x
is hereditarily finite, although it does not belong to Vω.) https://math.stackexchange.com/a/2874533
About digging into "transfinite.induction is well.order in drag"
by Jim Burns. You probably mean transfinite.induction
follows from well.order. What about the other direction?
Now my question, is assume we have no foundation,
but epsilon induction, what will happen. epsilon
induction is usually not an axiom. But what
if we stipulate it as an axiom?
Considered as an axiomatic principle, it is
called the axiom schema of set induction.
∀ x . ( ( ∀ ( y ∈ x ) . ψ ( y ) ) → ψ ( x ) ) → ∀ z . ψ ( z ) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epsilon-induction
Mild Shock schrieb:
Lets work without regularity axiom, and
examine this naive attempt, hereditary =
my ancestors satisfied it as well:
"hereditarily transitive sets"
h-trans(A) :<=> trans(A) & ∀x(x ∈ A => h-trans(A))
Otherwise when regularity is present,
this excludes Quine atom q = {q}. When regularty is
not present, we can prove:
~h-trans(q)
Jim Burns schrieb:
On 3/1/2024 3:08 PM, Mild Shock wrote:
So I remember Jim Burns when he posited a more
general approach, he said transfinite induction
must be satisfied.
In a phrase I'm a little proud of, I said
transfinite.induction is well.order in drag.
One is a simple re-write of the other.
Otherwise we can take this Quine atom x = {x},
https://math.stackexchange.com/a/2874533
And by a suitable interpretation of the circular
h-trans definition, a definition that is not well-defined
since it has no unique interpretation,
we might judge this Quine atom an ordinal.
LoL
Ah.
But an ordinal is
a _regular_ transitive set of transitive sets.
So, not x = {x}
A regular non.empty set A holds
a disjoint element B.
∃B ∈ A: A∩B = ∅
But, if A is transitive.transitive,
each element is a subset, and
∀B ∈ A: A∩B = B
Transitive.transitive A can only be regular
if one of its elements is 0
∅ ∈ A ∧ ∅ ∈ A′ ties all the ordinals together.
It's a beautiful thing.
About digging into
"transfinite.induction is well.order in drag"
by Jim Burns. You probably mean
transfinite.induction follows from well.order.
What about the other direction?
Now my question, is assume we have no foundation,
but epsilon induction, what will happen. epsilon
induction is usually not an axiom. But what
if we stipulate it as an axiom?
Considered as an axiomatic principle, it is
called the axiom schema of set induction. ∀x.((∀(y∈x).ψ(y))→ψ(x))→∀z.ψ(z) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epsilon-induction
On 3/1/24 1:29 PM, WM wrote:
Le 01/03/2024 à 15:44, Richard Damon a écrit :
On 3/1/24 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
Le 01/03/2024 à 04:12, Richard Damon a écrit :
And evvery natural number is finite and thus namable and thus visible. >>>>That concerns potential infinity only.
No, it applies to ALL Finite numbers, which of course, being finte,
never actally REACH infinite, so if you want to invent a term for that
as "Potential Infinity", so be it.
But here we assume finished infinity.
If we haven't finished the Infinity, you can't have you NUF(x), since it starts at the infinite end.
IF you can't support "All at Once" then you can't have the Set of
Natural Numbers to talk about, and thus we can't have your NUF.
You also can show that Achilles can't pass the Tortoise, as that
requires adding up the values "all at once" to let him catch up.
Le 01/03/2024 à 20:00, Richard Damon a écrit :
On 3/1/24 1:29 PM, WM wrote:
Le 01/03/2024 à 15:44, Richard Damon a écrit :
On 3/1/24 3:47 AM, WM wrote:
Le 01/03/2024 à 04:12, Richard Damon a écrit :
And evvery natural number is finite and thus namable and thus
visible.
That concerns potential infinity only.
No, it applies to ALL Finite numbers, which of course, being finte,
never actally REACH infinite, so if you want to invent a term for
that as "Potential Infinity", so be it.
But here we assume finished infinity.
If we haven't finished the Infinity, you can't have you NUF(x), since
it starts at the infinite end.
True. NUF requires completed infinity. That is the premise.
IF you can't support "All at Once" then you can't have the Set of
Natural Numbers to talk about, and thus we can't have your NUF.
You also can show that Achilles can't pass the Tortoise, as that
requires adding up the values "all at once" to let him catch up.
Every step in half time is enough.
Regards, WM
On 3/2/24 7:36 AM, WM wrote:
Le 01/03/2024 à 20:00, Richard Damon a écrit :
NUF requires completed infinity. That is the premise.
And thus must use a logic that ALLOWS for a completed infinity.
One at a time only doesn't.
Considered as an axiomatic principle, it is
called the axiom schema of set induction.
∀x.((∀(y∈x).ψ(y))→ψ(x))→∀z.ψ(z)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epsilon-induction
That wiki.page assumes regular sets.
My numb nut rewriting faculty, after spying
/* set induction */
¬ ∀ z ψ ( z ) → ¬ ∀ x ( ( ∀ y ( y ∈ x → ψ ( y ) ) → ψ ( x ) )
|
|
v
/* set induction */
u ≠ ∅ → ∃ x (x ∈ u ∧ x ∩ u ≠ ∅)
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