On Monday, 30 October 2023 at 18:25:11 UTC-4, a425couple wrote:

Andrew Tanner
History enthusias tOct 11

What’s an unpopular opinion about Nazi Germany you hold that others don’t?
That the Prime Minister of the UK in 1938, Neville Chamberlain, was
probably right to sign the Munich Agreement with Germany.

This act, which led directly to the conquest of Czechoslovakia, is
generally derided as an extremely short-sighted act of appeasement. Churchill in particular singled Chamberlain out for scathing criticism
over this decision in his auto-biography.

Nazi Germany was not ready for war, Czechoslovakia had quite a strong position, and it is entirely possible that drawing the line here might
have prevented WWII.

However, this wasn’t nearly so obvious at the time.

Chamberlain was not a military man. He had no experience or expertise on
the subject. When Hitler began making demands of Czechoslovakia and threatening war, Chamberlain consulted with the leadership of Britain’s military arms and their intelligence apparatus.

The advice Chamberlain received was that the UK and France - the two
major powers in Western Europe - were in no way ready to confront
Germany. Should war break out in 1938, Germany would have a decisive advantage.

(As an aside, this advice was classified until the late 1960s. It was, however, known to Churchill.)

We now know that this advice was completely inaccurate but it was, nonetheless, the advice to the Prime Minister of the UK by the experts
of the day. I think that, given what he knew at the time, Chamberlain
made the only choice he could - sacrificing Czechoslovakia for time to continue re-arming.

28.7K views
View 165 upvotes
View 2 shares
1 of 3 answers
54 comments from
Chris Thomas
and more

Profile photo for Chris Thomas
Chris Thomas
· Thu
The problem with that theory is, if you read Shirer, chamberlain didn’t just go along with Munich, hee gave away things that weren’t his. And, even if you think it’s your only way out, you don’t take the god damn document out onto the balcony and proclaim peace in our time.
Chamberlain had no idea what he was doing.

Profile photo for Andrew Tanner
Andrew Tanner
· Fri
Shirer is an excellent source, but he was writing at a time when the
advice received by Chamberlain was still classified.

That is one of the interesting issues with the history of this period.
The earlier scholarship benefits from direct access to eye-witnesses
(and often being written by eye-witnesses, as in the case of Shirer) but later scholarship has access to secrets that were not known at the time.

Profile photo for Chris Thomas
Chris Thomas
· Fri
No, but it has all been released by the time Manchester write the second volume off of his biography of Churchill. It doesn’t matter what advice
he wasn’t given. He didn’t care about any international agreements, he wanted peace no matter who he sacrificed. Even Halifax didn’t agree. Again, you don’t stand on the balcony and proclaim peace in our time if you’re just holding in order to rearm. He did - after repeated condemnation in parliament - finally come to his senses in early ‘39,
and come to a mutual defense agreement with Poland (another country that benefited from his betrayal of Checkoslovakia), but he had alienated the Soviet Union by then enough that they signed a non aggression pact with Hitler.

The attempted resurrection of Chamberlain, suggesting he has a clue of
how to deal with Germany, doesn’t hold water. He thought he was smarter than everyone else, including his own foreign minister.

Profile photo for Andrew Tanner
Andrew Tanner
· Fri
Chamberlain made the decision that his military advisors urged him to
make. They said any other decision would be disastrous.

It was the wrong decision, but I can't see how Chamberlain can be
reasonably expected to have known that.

That's all I'm arguing here.

I won't tell you Chamberlain didn't act like a fool when he waved the
Munich Agreement around like that and proclaimed “peace in our time”. It is a classic example for a reason.

I will disagree with you about rearmament though. It was already well
under way in the UK before Hitler started talking about Czechoslovakia.

In fact, British rearmament began in 1933 - though it was initially
about arming for a war with Japan. Germany became the main cause of
British rearmament by 1936 at the latest.

Profile photo for Chris Thomas
Chris Thomas
· Fri
Chamberlain proactively aided Germany in the dismemberment of
Chekoslovakia; he put up no resistance in any form, otherwise he would
have tried to string the negotiations along more than three days, and
would have tried to limit what the nazis took, which he did neither.
Neither the British nor the French were in measurably better shape nine months later, when they finally took a stand for the far less honorable Poland. By that time, Chamberlain, having faced withering criticism in
the Commons, must have uttered Alec Guinness’ last words in Bridge on
the River Kwai, “What have I done?”

Chamberlain felt that the Rhineland, the Sudatenland, and the rest of Bohemia, were not a British concern.

Profile photo for Andrew Tanner
Andrew Tanner
· Fri
In terms of realpolitik, Chamberlain decided that betraying
Czechoslovakia was better than dying beside them. It was a brutal call,
but that’s how realpolitik works.

I suspect he also held out hope that Hitler really would stop with the Sudetenland, but that’s honestly beside my point.

As for the state of military readiness… I am no expert on that of
France, but Britain’s military readiness in late 1939 was streets ahead
of what it had been in 1938.

If nothing else, the RAF in 1938 had been relying on biplanes that were
too slow to intercept Nazi bombers and had not yet completed the fighter intercept system that it would use to win the Battle of Britain (it was completed in August of 1939).

Profile photo for Martin Walsh
Martin Walsh
· 5h
Perhaps not, but it was a popular move at the time with the British
public. I think folk who had been through the first war less than 20
years earlier were simply relieved there would be no follow-up. Perhaps
they should have taken notice of a cartoon published in 1919, showing
the leaders of the victorious nations leaving the peace conference.
Nearby is a baby with 1940 written on him. Lloyd George is saying “Strange! I seem to hear a baby crying…” Prophetic.

Profile photo for Jan Indrák
Jan Indrák
· Wed
I am from Czech republic (former Czechoslovakia) and I oppose this
opinion. I think he should not sold us to this swastika mofo. But then again, we were young country, founded 1918, and no one really cared
about us. Chamby thought he saved peace for Europe. He was oh so wrong…

Profile photo for Andrew Tanner
Andrew Tanner
· Thu
I can understand why you would feel that way. If it had been my homeland
I would probably take the same position.

Note that I am only defending the move as “right” in terms of brutally practical power politics. I would never try to defend it on ethical grounds.

Interesting, but the issue here is when to extend diplomacy to war.

How well the war would have gone in 1938 we can't know now. Certainly the terrain would have been more favourable for defense but, political will leading real war plans using existing forces would have for a short war either 1938 or 9. Chamberlain's real
failure was that he faced a potential war situation and did not plan. He knew that, when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, the French had no plans. If that weren't warning enough, there was Austria. Even if he believed there would be peace, the failure
to plan at the political level was inexcusable.

A few thoughts on what the delay bought (I'm posting to SMN):

The ME 109 was in service about a year before the Hurricane, fully introduced in early '39. In 1938, the bi-wing Gladiator was not completely introduced, although Hurricanes and Spitfires were arriving in small numbers

Armour, including that for HMS Illustrious got out of Czechoslovakia just in time

Chain Home had about 5 stations in 1938

HMS Warspite was the nearest thing the RN had to a modern capital ship (Ark Royal was nearly ready)

The RN's first reasonably modern destroyers first completed in 1939 (one could argue 1944 the J's lacked dual purpose main armament, or even later)

It would take a lot of research to figure out it the delay was worth it militarily

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On 10/31/23 09:18, Peter Skelton wrote:

On Monday, 30 October 2023 at 18:25:11 UTC-4, a425couple wrote:

Andrew Tanner
History enthusias tOct 11

What’s an unpopular opinion about Nazi Germany you hold that others don’t?
That the Prime Minister of the UK in 1938, Neville Chamberlain, was
probably right to sign the Munich Agreement with Germany.


This act, which led directly to the conquest of Czechoslovakia, is
generally derided as an extremely short-sighted act of appeasement.
Churchill in particular singled Chamberlain out for scathing criticism
over this decision in his auto-biography.

Nazi Germany was not ready for war, Czechoslovakia had quite a strong
position, and it is entirely possible that drawing the line here might
have prevented WWII.

snip

Note that I am only defending the move as “right” in terms of brutally >> practical power politics. I would never try to defend it on ethical grounds.

Interesting, but the issue here is when to extend diplomacy to war.

How well the war would have gone in 1938 we can't know now. Certainly the terrain would have been more favourable for defense but, political will leading real war plans using existing forces would have for a short war either 1938 or 9. Chamberlain's

real failure was that he faced a potential war situation and did not plan. He knew that, when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, the French had no plans. If that weren't warning enough, there was Austria. Even if he believed there would be peace, the
failure to plan at the political level was inexcusable.

A few thoughts on what the delay bought (I'm posting to SMN):

The ME 109 was in service about a year before the Hurricane, fully introduced in early '39. In 1938, the bi-wing Gladiator was not completely introduced, although Hurricanes and Spitfires were arriving in small numbers

Armour, including that for HMS Illustrious got out of Czechoslovakia just in time

Chain Home had about 5 stations in 1938

HMS Warspite was the nearest thing the RN had to a modern capital ship (Ark Royal was nearly ready)

The RN's first reasonably modern destroyers first completed in 1939 (one could argue 1944 the J's lacked dual purpose main armament, or even later)

It would take a lot of research to figure out it the delay was worth it militarily

I pick up a lot of books.
I finish a few.
One that was on a topic I appreciated, and interesting enough was
this little odd one:

The Order of the Day Hardcover – September 25, 2018
by Eric Vuillard (Author), Mark Polizzotti (Translator)
4.3 4.3 out of 5 stars 1,170 ratings
3.9 on Goodreads 9,801 ratings
See all formats and editions https://www.amazon.com/Order-Day-Eric-Vuillard/dp/1590519698

one comment

"March 12, 1938, the annexation of Austria is on the agenda: A grotesque
day intended to make history—the newsreels capture a motorized army on
the move, a terrible, inexorable power. But behind Goebbels’s splendid propaganda, an ersatz Blitzkrieg unfolds, the Panzers breaking down en
masse on the roads into Austria. The true behind-the-scenes account of
the Anschluss—a patchwork of minor flourishes of strength and fine
words, fevered telephone calls, and vulgar threats—all reveal a starkly different picture. It is not strength of character or the determination
of a people that wins the day, but rather a combination of intimidation
and bluff.

With this vivid, compelling history, Éric Vuillard warns against the
peril of willfully blind acquiescence, and offers a reminder that,
ultimately, the worst is not inescapable."

I finished it.
If you lived near me,I'd give it to you.
Not worth buying, but possibly worth reading from a library.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On 31/10/2023 16:18, Peter Skelton wrote:

How well the war would have gone in 1938 we can't know now. Certainly the terrain would have been more favourable for defense but, political will leading real war plans using existing forces would have for a short war either 1938 or 9. Chamberlain's

real failure was that he faced a potential war situation and did not plan. He knew that, when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, the French had no plans. If that weren't warning enough, there was Austria. Even if he believed there would be peace, the
failure to plan at the political level was inexcusable.

A few thoughts on what the delay bought (I'm posting to SMN):

The ME 109 was in service about a year before the Hurricane, fully introduced in early '39. In 1938, the bi-wing Gladiator was not completely introduced, although Hurricanes and Spitfires were arriving in small numbers

Armour, including that for HMS Illustrious got out of Czechoslovakia just in time

Chain Home had about 5 stations in 1938

HMS Warspite was the nearest thing the RN had to a modern capital ship (Ark Royal was nearly ready)

The RN's first reasonably modern destroyers first completed in 1939 (one could argue 1944 the J's lacked dual purpose main armament, or even later)

It would take a lot of research to figure out it the delay was worth it militarily

My opinion was it would have gone badly, the main factor in Britain
surviving in 1940 was the sentry into service in adequate numbers was
the RAF single seat fighters and trained pilots. In 1938 there would
have been a few early Hurricanes and a lot of obsolete fighters such as
the Hawker Demon and Gloster Gladiators, equally important the Empire
Air Training scheme would not have been training the pilots that would
have been needed to replace losses. It was touch and go as it was.

Without radar and ground controllers the RAF would have had no other
option than to fly standing patrols.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)