• "How the West Grew Rich" by Rosenberg & Birdzell - Review by Gustafsson

    From a425couple@21:1/5 to All on Wed Jun 14 16:06:08 2023
    XPost: soc.history.war.misc, alt.economics

    from https://www.amazon.com/How-West-Grew-Rich-Transformation/product-reviews/0465031099/ref=cm_cr_dp_d_show_all_btm?ie=UTF8&reviewerType=all_reviews

    Fredrik Gustafsson
    4.0 out of 5 stars

    Institutions as the fundamental cause
    Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on March 21, 2006
    Monographs dealing with West's rise from a backward feudal society to
    the most technologically advanced and wealthiest civilization this world
    has ever seen, seem to come a dime a dozen nowadays. Given the large
    amounts of books available on this topic, and the fact that it was
    published twenty years ago, what reasons are there for reading How the
    West Grew Rich? Quite a few I would argue.

    The main question of the book is of course: how, or rather why, did the
    West (as opposed to the South or the East) achieve modern economic
    growth? The authors come to the correct conclusion that standard growth
    models can only provide the proximate causes of growth. Innovation and accumulation of capital, labour and natural resources is growth, it does
    not explain growth.

    So what, according to R&B, are the fundamental causes of growth? The
    answer lies in favourable institutions and freedom from political
    restrictions - more specifically, secure property rights and the freedom
    to engage in any line of business and to acquire and sell goods at an unregulated price. This meant that the process of innovation was
    delegated to private firms and that individuals themselves were forced
    to bear full responsibility for their failures and reap the full
    benefits of their successes.

    Why then did such favourable institutions and political and economic
    freedoms arise in the West? The answer according to R&B is political fragmentation and competition between different territories in Europe. Investments and the merchant class were drawn to areas were property
    rights were respected and where they could carry out their business
    without too much political interference. There was no single empire in
    Europe. The growth of markets - especially that of cities and
    long-distance trade - further spurred this development.

    The arguments in How the West Grew Rich are, which should be apparent by
    now, very similar to those found in The Rise of the Western World by
    North and Thomas, although they focus a lot less on population growth.
    As they should, R&B refer to this book on several occasions. Despite
    this fact, How the West Grew Rich proves to be an interesting read: the familiar arguments are explored further and the book includes several interesting examples of how institutional innovations lowered
    transaction costs and facilitated further development.

    There are a number of objections one could raise against R&B's account
    of the rise of the Western world - their account of the middle ages and alternative explanations behind West's success are far from
    satisfactory, to name a few. There are however a few things speaking in
    favour of this book. First of all, it has a clear message. It does not,
    like some other books on the same topic, name hundreds of different
    reasons for why the West grew rich. Rather, it presents a clear
    hypothesis that is present throughout the book and it also provides very
    clear policy recommendations to current developing countries wanting to
    emulate West's success. Secondly, and perhaps because it has such a
    clear message, it is fun to read!
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    5.0 out of 5 stars How the West Grew Rich
    Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on September 25, 2015
    Verified Purchase
    Excelent analysis of how to create wealth. The book provides a very
    realistic theoretical framework of how wealth can be created in any
    place of the world.
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    komyathy
    4.0 out of 5 stars "adaptation takes place through the formation of
    enterprises that are, at least initially, small," ie.,
    decentralization=growth.
    Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on December 27, 2006
    It is entirely safe to generalize: innovation is more likely to occur in
    a society that is open to the formation of new enterprises than in a
    society that relies on its existing organizations for innovation."
    Feudalism thus had to be eclipsed for serious change to occur since it
    "was a society which dealt with the risks of life by legislating
    rigidity. Economic growth is inherently a byproduct of change, and the political and religious ideology of the Middle Ages guarded against the heresies of change in every way it could," argues the authors herein as
    they set out to explain "how the West generated the organizational and technological skills required to produce and exploit" its wealth. A "decentralization of authority," thus was crucial...and this was greatly spurred by the Protestant Reformation, the long term effect of which, economically, "was the progressive removal of religion from intimate involvement in the sphere of business activity." "In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries , the business sphere was, in a
    word, secularized." "Protestantism sanctioned a high degree of
    individual responsibility for moral conduct and reduced the authority of
    the clergy." Under these circumstances, it would have been too much to
    expect the Catholic clergy to continue to stress doctrines which could
    only turn prosperous parishioners toward Protestantism." The authors
    argue moreover that this "was not wholly a question of the theological
    content of either Catholicism or Protestantism. It was partly a question
    of the competition inherent in the existence of several rival religions,
    which, like the existence of competition inherent in the existence of
    several rival national states, enabled a rising merchant class chafing
    under the restraints of one authority to take refuge with another more congenial" as trade & exchange, both domestic and foreign, became ever
    more prevalent in the prevailing economy of the day. But how did such a merchant class even gain a foothold in the first place since feudalism
    was already petering out during the 15th century, ie., before the
    Protestant Reformation and the later rise of capitalism. As the authors
    remark: "the decline of feudalism is complete a century before the
    beginnings of capitalism."

    "For if one thing is clearer than another, it is that the merchant class
    did not get its economic power from the feudal nobility, or by
    displacing or super-ceding the feudal nobility in agricultural or other economic activities. The merchant class gained economic power by
    expanding the trading activities in which it had always engaged." That's
    the key herein, trade and exchange; or rather, the ability of people to
    be able to engage in such. So the authors argument herein is not that democratization shall necessarily lead to an economic boom, but that the reverse is far more likely; that "economic growth was [and remains, I'd
    add] a force for democratization." Marx was thus, the authors assert,
    wrong yet again: Capitalism wasn't a natural stage progressing out of feudalism, and capitalism doesn't inherently lead to monopolistic centralization of wealth; nor can monopolistic control of the economy
    (under the banner of communism or socialism) drive continued economic
    growth. After all, "one must keep in mind that growth implies change and adaptation, and that much of the adaptation takes place through the
    formation of enterprises that are, at least initially, small." Hence the authors' view that "the strength of the tendency to decentralization in
    Western economies is chronically underestimated."

    You may bemoan the influence of such mega companies as Microsoft, Exxon,
    & Walmart now and worry how much influence they may have in 20 years,
    but such is but a parlor game of sorts. (Look at the once great US
    Steel, or General Motors, or IBM, or any one of a dozen railroad
    companies, and you can see the futility of simple extrapolation.) Such
    high fliers now are not hurting the American economy. Such companies are stimulating it. That's the point, after all, is it not? Not to penalize success, but to focus on "the value of advancing the material welfare of
    human beings as measured by the means available to THE GREAT MAJORITY of individuals to choose and shape the quality of the lives they
    lead"(emphasis added). And as long as the Microsofts and Walmarts of our economy continue to add to the growth of such they shall be secure as
    entities, but there shall come a time when innovations (think Linux,
    Google, Apple multimedia platforms to come, home grocery delivery and
    internet shopping---you name it) will seek to dethrone them. To wit, the authors point out that a "seldom praised function of competition in
    economic growth is that it eliminates obsolete forms of economic
    activity." (Contrast this to "the difficulty experienced by the
    political sphere in getting rid of programs that are obsolete or that
    have simply failed.") Hence "the real point...essential to understanding
    why the benefits of Western growth were so widely diffused is that the
    West's system of economic growth offered its largest financial rewards
    to innovators who improved the life-style not of the wealthy few, but of
    the less-wealthy many. This is a point that bodes ill for 3rd world ever-developing disappointments (ie., Russia, Venezuela, slews of
    countries in Africa/The Middle East) who are hopelessly (or so it seems)
    overly centralized and concerned only with enhancing the riches of the
    elites in such societies. Corrupt self-interested cliques are simply instinctively hostile to bottom-up anything. Regarding most African and
    Middle Eastern states, some would say that the Western economic path
    "involves a diffusion of power and a degree of individualism which is incompatible with many modes of social life" in such parts of the world,
    but the authors herein suggest that such could have been once said about European peoples, too...until power diffused within such societies to an
    extent made possible by trade-generated economic growth. Nothing is
    guaranteed, of course, but as long as power remains centralized in
    backwater states the chance of real sustainable economic growth and
    seriously better lives for the average citizens of such societies will
    remain but a hopeful wish. (Interestingly, many European economies have
    begun to grow rather sluggishly since the European Union has been
    increasingly taking power back from individual states and localities
    with them.) Thanks for reading my words of review of this worthy book.
    Cheers
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