Yes, it's that time of year again ...
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that it recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the government to
access any user's cloud data.
The Online Safety Act became law in 2023 and retained a controversial >encryption-breaking clause, although it could only be invoked where >technically feasible.
The Online Safety Act became law in 2023 and retained a controversial
encryption-breaking clause, although it could only be invoked where
technically feasible.
As the old adage goes, The impossible takes a little longer.
Yes, it's that time of year again ...
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that it recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the government to<snip>
access any user's cloud data.
Such a mechanism would enable the government to independently access and
read encrypted data, both within the UK and potentially for users
worldwide.
The Home Office told The Register: "We do not comment on operational
matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence of
any such notices."
Apple did not immediately reply to our request for input and the UK's
NCSC deferred the matter to the Home Office.
Of course, if you encrypt the data locally before sending to the cloud
there isn't much they can do about it.
On Fri, 07 Feb 2025 18:26:08 +0000, Jethro_uk wrote:
Yes, it's that time of year again ...<snip>
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that it
recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the government to
access any user's cloud data.
Such a mechanism would enable the government to independently access and
read encrypted data, both within the UK and potentially for users
worldwide.
The Home Office told The Register: "We do not comment on operational
matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence of
any such notices."
Apple did not immediately reply to our request for input and the UK's
NCSC deferred the matter to the Home Office.
Of course, if you encrypt the data locally before sending to the cloud
there isn't much they can do about it.
On 09/02/2025 14:08, David wrote:home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
On Fri, 07 Feb 2025 18:26:08 +0000, Jethro_uk wrote:
Yes, it's that time of year again ...
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/
<snip>
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that it
recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the government to
access any user's cloud data.
Such a mechanism would enable the government to independently access
and read encrypted data, both within the UK and potentially for users
worldwide.
The Home Office told The Register: "We do not comment on operational
matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence of
any such notices."
Apple did not immediately reply to our request for input and the UK's
NCSC deferred the matter to the Home Office.
Of course, if you encrypt the data locally before sending to the cloud
there isn't much they can do about it.
Apple could put software on your phone that checks for naughtiness
before you encrypt it.
On Fri, 07 Feb 2025 18:26:08 +0000, Jethro_uk wrote:
Yes, it's that time of year again ...<snip>
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that it
recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the government to
access any user's cloud data.
Such a mechanism would enable the government to independently access and
read encrypted data, both within the UK and potentially for users
worldwide.
The Home Office told The Register: "We do not comment on operational
matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence of
any such notices."
Apple did not immediately reply to our request for input and the UK's
NCSC deferred the matter to the Home Office.
Of course, if you encrypt the data locally before sending to the cloud
there isn't much they can do about it.
On Sun, 09 Feb 2025 16:39:48 +0000, Max Demian wrote:
On 09/02/2025 14:08, David wrote:home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
On Fri, 07 Feb 2025 18:26:08 +0000, Jethro_uk wrote:
Yes, it's that time of year again ...
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/
<snip>
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that it >>>> recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the government to >>>> access any user's cloud data.
Such a mechanism would enable the government to independently access
and read encrypted data, both within the UK and potentially for users
worldwide.
The Home Office told The Register: "We do not comment on operational
matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence of
any such notices."
Apple did not immediately reply to our request for input and the UK's
NCSC deferred the matter to the Home Office.
Of course, if you encrypt the data locally before sending to the cloud
there isn't much they can do about it.
Apple could put software on your phone that checks for naughtiness
before you encrypt it.
You would (obviously) encrypt it off the device and then copy it onto the device to be uploaded. The plaintext should never leave your control.
On 9 Feb 2025 at 17:39:50 GMT, "Jethro_uk" <jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com>
wrote:
On Sun, 09 Feb 2025 16:39:48 +0000, Max Demian wrote:
On 09/02/2025 14:08, David wrote:home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
On Fri, 07 Feb 2025 18:26:08 +0000, Jethro_uk wrote:
Yes, it's that time of year again ...
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/
<snip>
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that
it recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the
government to access any user's cloud data.
Such a mechanism would enable the government to independently access >>>>> and read encrypted data, both within the UK and potentially for
users worldwide.
The Home Office told The Register: "We do not comment on operational >>>>> matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence
of any such notices."
Apple did not immediately reply to our request for input and the
UK's NCSC deferred the matter to the Home Office.
Of course, if you encrypt the data locally before sending to the
cloud there isn't much they can do about it.
Apple could put software on your phone that checks for naughtiness
before you encrypt it.
You would (obviously) encrypt it off the device and then copy it onto
the device to be uploaded. The plaintext should never leave your
control.
Do you think it possible to obtain a computer and operating system that
you fully control? My understanding is that you cannot obtain a computer
that does not require a closed-source 'authorisation' code to enable it
to be 'trusted'.
Roger Hayter <roger@hayter.org> wrote:
On 9 Feb 2025 at 17:39:50 GMT, "Jethro_uk" <jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote: >>
On Sun, 09 Feb 2025 16:39:48 +0000, Max Demian wrote:
On 09/02/2025 14:08, David wrote:home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
On Fri, 07 Feb 2025 18:26:08 +0000, Jethro_uk wrote:
Yes, it's that time of year again ...
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/
<snip>
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that it >>>>>> recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the government to >>>>>> access any user's cloud data.
Such a mechanism would enable the government to independently access >>>>>> and read encrypted data, both within the UK and potentially for users >>>>>> worldwide.
The Home Office told The Register: "We do not comment on operational >>>>>> matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence of >>>>>> any such notices."
Apple did not immediately reply to our request for input and the UK's >>>>>> NCSC deferred the matter to the Home Office.
Of course, if you encrypt the data locally before sending to the cloud >>>>> there isn't much they can do about it.
Apple could put software on your phone that checks for naughtiness
before you encrypt it.
You would (obviously) encrypt it off the device and then copy it onto the >>> device to be uploaded. The plaintext should never leave your control.
Do you think it possible to obtain a computer and operating system that you >> fully control? My understanding is that you cannot obtain a computer that does
not require a closed-source 'authorisation' code to enable it to be 'trusted'.
There are two issues there.
Obtaining a computer and operating system that you fully control is
uncertain for modern computers because of their complexity. Ken Thompson’s Turing Award lecture from 1984 “Reflections on Trusting Trust” is a good starting point. If someone can subvert the tools, you cannot be sure that things produced using those tools are free of trapdoors and trojan horses that give someone else control. That can go all the way down into what is usually considered to be hardware.
As for the computer being ‘trusted’, it depends what you mean by that. I have just got out my copy of “Trusted Computing Platforms” by Siani Pearson
et.al. published in 2003. One of the headings (on page 9) is “Trust: A Complex Notion” and that section explains why you need more than just the word ‘trust’ by itself to get to grips with the issues. The book also goes
into detail about the Trusted Platform Module that is the hardware root of trust and which contains the private part of the endorsement key. As far as
I know, the technology and processes described in the book are what you can find in modern devices even if they have different names.
I remember that there was opposition to the idea of Trusted Platforms in
some parts of the free software community because it could be used to
support digital rights management. The technical issues for DRM are not so different from what is needed for a bank to verify that a customer is using
a genuine version of their online banking app rather than one infected by malware.
On 9 Feb 2025 at 17:39:50 GMT, "Jethro_uk" <jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Sun, 09 Feb 2025 16:39:48 +0000, Max Demian wrote:
On 09/02/2025 14:08, David wrote:home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
On Fri, 07 Feb 2025 18:26:08 +0000, Jethro_uk wrote:
Yes, it's that time of year again ...
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/
<snip>
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that it >>>>> recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the government to >>>>> access any user's cloud data.
Such a mechanism would enable the government to independently access >>>>> and read encrypted data, both within the UK and potentially for users >>>>> worldwide.
The Home Office told The Register: "We do not comment on operational >>>>> matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence of >>>>> any such notices."
Apple did not immediately reply to our request for input and the UK's >>>>> NCSC deferred the matter to the Home Office.
Of course, if you encrypt the data locally before sending to the cloud >>>> there isn't much they can do about it.
Apple could put software on your phone that checks for naughtiness
before you encrypt it.
You would (obviously) encrypt it off the device and then copy it onto the
device to be uploaded. The plaintext should never leave your control.
Do you think it possible to obtain a computer and operating system that you fully control? My understanding is that you cannot obtain a computer that does
not require a closed-source 'authorisation' code to enable it to be 'trusted'.
On 10 Feb 2025 at 01:15:55 GMT, "Owen Rees" <orees@hotmail.com> wrote:
Roger Hayter <roger@hayter.org> wrote:
On 9 Feb 2025 at 17:39:50 GMT, "Jethro_uk" <jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Sun, 09 Feb 2025 16:39:48 +0000, Max Demian wrote:
On 09/02/2025 14:08, David wrote:home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
On Fri, 07 Feb 2025 18:26:08 +0000, Jethro_uk wrote:
Yes, it's that time of year again ...
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/
<snip>
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that it >>>>>>> recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the government to >>>>>>> access any user's cloud data.
Such a mechanism would enable the government to independently access >>>>>>> and read encrypted data, both within the UK and potentially for users >>>>>>> worldwide.
The Home Office told The Register: "We do not comment on operational >>>>>>> matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence of >>>>>>> any such notices."
Apple did not immediately reply to our request for input and the UK's >>>>>>> NCSC deferred the matter to the Home Office.
Of course, if you encrypt the data locally before sending to the cloud >>>>>> there isn't much they can do about it.
Apple could put software on your phone that checks for naughtiness
before you encrypt it.
You would (obviously) encrypt it off the device and then copy it onto the >>>> device to be uploaded. The plaintext should never leave your control.
Do you think it possible to obtain a computer and operating system that you >>> fully control? My understanding is that you cannot obtain a computer that does
not require a closed-source 'authorisation' code to enable it to be 'trusted'.
There are two issues there.
Obtaining a computer and operating system that you fully control is
uncertain for modern computers because of their complexity. Ken Thompson’s >> Turing Award lecture from 1984 “Reflections on Trusting Trust” is a good >> starting point. If someone can subvert the tools, you cannot be sure that
things produced using those tools are free of trapdoors and trojan horses
that give someone else control. That can go all the way down into what is
usually considered to be hardware.
As for the computer being ‘trusted’, it depends what you mean by that. I >> have just got out my copy of “Trusted Computing Platforms” by Siani Pearson
et.al. published in 2003. One of the headings (on page 9) is “Trust: A
Complex Notion” and that section explains why you need more than just the >> word ‘trust’ by itself to get to grips with the issues. The book also goes
into detail about the Trusted Platform Module that is the hardware root of >> trust and which contains the private part of the endorsement key. As far as >> I know, the technology and processes described in the book are what you can >> find in modern devices even if they have different names.
I remember that there was opposition to the idea of Trusted Platforms in
some parts of the free software community because it could be used to
support digital rights management. The technical issues for DRM are not so >> different from what is needed for a bank to verify that a customer is using >> a genuine version of their online banking app rather than one infected by
malware.
But it also means that you have to accept a binary blob from Microsoft even if
you are using an open source OS, and the DRM means that even if you don't want
to display protected media the protectors of that media have an unknown degree
of access to your device.
I can live without playing protected media on at least one computer, but I am not given that option.
On Sun, 09 Feb 2025 16:39:48 +0000, Max Demian wrote:
Apple could put software on your phone that checks for naughtiness
before you encrypt it.
You would (obviously) encrypt it off the device and then copy it onto the device to be uploaded. The plaintext should never leave your control.
Roger Hayter <roger@hayter.org> wrote:
On 10 Feb 2025 at 01:15:55 GMT, "Owen Rees" <orees@hotmail.com> wrote:
Roger Hayter <roger@hayter.org> wrote:
On 9 Feb 2025 at 17:39:50 GMT, "Jethro_uk" <jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Sun, 09 Feb 2025 16:39:48 +0000, Max Demian wrote:Do you think it possible to obtain a computer and operating system that you
On 09/02/2025 14:08, David wrote:home_office_apple_backdoor_order/
On Fri, 07 Feb 2025 18:26:08 +0000, Jethro_uk wrote:
Yes, it's that time of year again ...
https://www.theregister.com/2025/02/07/
<snip>
The UK's Home Office refuses to either confirm or deny reports that it >>>>>>>> recently ordered Apple to create a backdoor allowing the government to >>>>>>>> access any user's cloud data.
Such a mechanism would enable the government to independently access >>>>>>>> and read encrypted data, both within the UK and potentially for users >>>>>>>> worldwide.
The Home Office told The Register: "We do not comment on operational >>>>>>>> matters, including for example confirming or denying the existence of >>>>>>>> any such notices."
Apple did not immediately reply to our request for input and the UK's >>>>>>>> NCSC deferred the matter to the Home Office.
Of course, if you encrypt the data locally before sending to the cloud >>>>>>> there isn't much they can do about it.
Apple could put software on your phone that checks for naughtiness >>>>>> before you encrypt it.
You would (obviously) encrypt it off the device and then copy it onto the >>>>> device to be uploaded. The plaintext should never leave your control. >>>>
fully control? My understanding is that you cannot obtain a computer that does
not require a closed-source 'authorisation' code to enable it to be 'trusted'.
There are two issues there.
Obtaining a computer and operating system that you fully control is
uncertain for modern computers because of their complexity. Ken Thompson’s
Turing Award lecture from 1984 “Reflections on Trusting Trust” is a good
starting point. If someone can subvert the tools, you cannot be sure that >>> things produced using those tools are free of trapdoors and trojan horses >>> that give someone else control. That can go all the way down into what is >>> usually considered to be hardware.
As for the computer being ‘trusted’, it depends what you mean by that. I
have just got out my copy of “Trusted Computing Platforms” by Siani Pearson
et.al. published in 2003. One of the headings (on page 9) is “Trust: A >>> Complex Notion” and that section explains why you need more than just the >>> word ‘trust’ by itself to get to grips with the issues. The book also goes
into detail about the Trusted Platform Module that is the hardware root of >>> trust and which contains the private part of the endorsement key. As far as >>> I know, the technology and processes described in the book are what you can >>> find in modern devices even if they have different names.
I remember that there was opposition to the idea of Trusted Platforms in >>> some parts of the free software community because it could be used to
support digital rights management. The technical issues for DRM are not so >>> different from what is needed for a bank to verify that a customer is using >>> a genuine version of their online banking app rather than one infected by >>> malware.
But it also means that you have to accept a binary blob from Microsoft even if
you are using an open source OS, and the DRM means that even if you don't want
to display protected media the protectors of that media have an unknown degree
of access to your device.
I can live without playing protected media on at least one computer, but I am
not given that option.
Is there a binary blob from Microsoft on my iPad or my iPhone? Is there one on the rather old iMac I have?
Can you be more specific about where the binary blob would be if I had a spare machine on which I could install Linux as the OS. Would it show up
when running Linux as a guest under VirtualBox on the iMac?
It would not surprise me if those promoting the idea of access to everyone’s data are dismissing the people who understand the technology as nerds who do not see the bigger picture.
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